An independent researcher's critique of the NAS Committee on Ballistic Acoustics

                                  W. Anthony Marsh - August 1983 (converted to HTML on June 11, 1998)


 Although this critique is written for other researchers and laypersons, the subject matter deals with the disciplines of acoustics and statistics. Therefore, I have had to compromise by sometimes using scientific wording unfamiliar to the layperson in order to strengthen or clarify a point addressed to the scientific community and yet other times oversimplify, draw analogies, or omit scientific notation. A thorough working knowledge of the basic facts of the assassination of President Kennedy and of the issue of the acoustical analysis done for the House Select Committee on Assassinations(HSCA) is a prerequisite for understanding this critique.


 A police escort motorcycle's radio, which was stuck in the transmit mode while accompanying President Kennedy's motorcade through Dealey Plaza in Dallas, Texas on November 22, 1963, transmitted the sounds of the gunshots which killed JFK and wounded Gov. Connally to the Dallas Police Department where they were recorded on a Dictabelt. One of the shots originated from the grassy knoll. The Report of the National Academy of Sciences which refuted that fact is invalid due to bias, improper applications of method, careless errors, and deliberate misrepresentations of fact.


 Under contract by the HSCA, the firm of Bolt, Beranek, & Newman(BBN) analyzed a tape recording of the JFK motorcade in Dealey Plaza and found 4 possible shots The most controversial was the shot from the grassy knoll, which would imply that a conspiracy was involved. Because BB&N could only state the probability for that shot was 50%, HSCA asked acoustics experts Weiss and Aschkenasy (W&A) to refine the data on that shot in order to reduce the uncertainty either way. W&A stated with a 95% confidence that the impulse on the DPD tape recording was a gunshot fired from the grassy knoll. The HSCA relied quite heavily on that conclusion in issuing its finding of a conspiracy.

 The U.S. Justice Department (DOJ), instead of then investigating the conspiracy, attempted to discredit the HSCA findings. Its first attempt using the FBI bugging experts failed due to the lack of competence in the necessary disciplines. DOJ then had to assign the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) the task of discrediting the HSCA's acoustical findings. To be sure of the outcome, only government connected scientists, most with ties to the intelligence community, were selected and they worked in total secrecy without any challenge from independent researchers. It was hoped that their prestige would end the debate and their mandate was only to discredit the acoustical analysis of the HSCA, not to find the truth. The budget they were given was so limited that they could not do the necessary tests beyond those needed to discredit the HSCA. The DOJ was highly successful. It's been over a year since the issuance of the NAS Report and not one scientist has dared challenge it. It's a national disgrace for a country Which prides itself on freedom of thought that the challenge has to come from an ordinary blue-collar worker, rather than the scientific community.

Areas of criticism

I.     Secrecy
II.   Transcripts
III.  Timing
IV.  Voiceprints
V.   Unanalyzed sounds
VI.  Statistics

 I. Secrecy

     The NAS committee worked in total secrecy without dialogue with critics. I
had written to them on December 1, 1980 suggesting several solutions and points
that had to be addressed. Not only did they ignore them, they didn't even
acknowledge my letter. Phone calls went unanswered. If this treatment was
typical, it  shows a bias that is unmistakable. Many of their glaringly obvious
errors could have been avoided simply by accepting help from outside
     To me, the most shocking aspect of their report is that no one had the
courage to accept responsibility. You'll notice that throughout this paper, I
attribute all the committee's actions to Ramsey. This is not an ad hominem
argument. This is primarily by default as he chaired the committee, but also
because the members who actually did the work would not claim responsibility
for their contributions. To guess from appearances, it would seem that the
entire committee met only a few times, pro forma, and that the bulk of the work
was done independently by one biased, pro-Warren Commission, CIA-contract
consultant with the help of his blindly loyal students. I even doubt that the
indlividual members took the time to read and understand the work. We'll
probably never know due to the extreme secrecy imposed by the NAS. Little more
of substance was accomplished than Luis Alvarez could have done on his own. The
most amazing aspect of this charade is that it is almost unheard of in the
scientific community, except in totalitarian regimes, that one biased
researcher publish his work unattributed under the cover of a
government-supported agency and then refuse to defend it or present any
counter-arguments to its critics. This is not merely scientific arrogance, it
is truth by fiat. I suppose that we should next expect the NAS to declare that
the world is flat.
     Another example of the secrecy is the fact that Ramsey did not release
copies of the evidence along with the report so that someone else could try to
duplicate their results. For instance, one of the major points of the NAS
thesis is that Jesse Curry's message,"Go to the hospital." occurred at least 20
seconds before the shots that were identified by BB&N/WA. They based that on a
tape recording provided by DPD Capt. Bowles. Given the fact that NAS and the
DOJ have kept the tape secret, how do we know that someone didn't splice in 30
seconds of Lawrence Welk music in order to pad it? It certainly doesn't match
the tape that I have and I doubt that it matches the tape that was given to the
HSCA. Withholding of raw data is the first indication that the researcher has
something to hide.

II. Transcripts

     As other researchers have pointed out , there have never been accurate
transcripts prepared of the DPD tapes. Ramsey made no exception to that rule,
relying on DPD Capt. Bowles' latest disinformation. There is a wealth of
information on the tapes themselves if anyone just takes the time to transcribe
all the sounds on the tapes, even the silences. Most inaccuracies on the Bowles
transcripts are simply negligence such as not bothering to mark repeats, or
note the source of a transmission, etc. Sometimes Bowles intentionally rewrote
a transmissions to correct grammar or omit pauses in order to keep his fellow
officers from looking like country bumpkins. Most such editing is
inconsequential to the timing of the tapes. Yet there are some which led Ramsey
to draw false conclusions.
     On channel 2 there are several repeats due to wear of the Audograph record
which added time to the apparent duration during playback. When comparing
timing between the two channels, several seconds must be deducted from ch. 2's
timing (see timing  chart ) to account for those repeats. Between Jesse Curry's,
"Go to the hospital." and 190's, "You want me to still hold this traffic..."
which is crosstalked to ch. 1 and recorded simultaneously, there are 6 repeats,
only 4 of which were deducted by Ramsey. The other two he might have missed,
because the transcripts did not accurately record them. Repeat 2 was of the
dispatcher's message, "Parkland has been notified. 12:32.". Ramsey did not
consider it a repeat, because only one word was repeated, "notified", which
would not be of sufficient duration to be a period of rotation of the record.
Yet, if Bowles had simply noted both times at which the "notified" appeared, he
would have noticed immediately that there were 3.4 seconds between them, which
is the correct time for a repeat. The mechanics of this repeat will be
discussed in a further section.
     Repeat 4 is the most blatant example of error caused by Bowles
transcripts. Ramsey considered it not to be a repeat on the basis that not
enough words were repeated to equal a period of rotation.
He based that conclusion on Bowles transcription of the messages between
Deputy Chief Lumpkin and Chief of Police Curry. In Bowles
version, Lumpkins' question ends with the words, " I have with me?",
then Curry breaks in with, "Just go on to Parkland Hospital with me. Just go on
to Parkland.". Period. Actually, the "with me." was the beginning of a repeat,
which included part of Lumpkin's previous message ending with, "with me?" and
continuing to repeat Curry's, "Just go on to Parkland Hospital." This repeat
was also approximately 3.4 seconds in duration. So that's a total error of 6.8
seconds or so in a very crucial area of timing, which was caused by inaccurate
     However, the most important error to me was that Bowles left out and
Ramsey did not correctly include a message which I feel is the most important
on the tape. In my letter of Dec.l, 1980, I pointed out that there was a
transmission on the ch. 1 tape which proves that it was McLain's cycle with the
open mike. About two minutes after the shots, a fellow officer yells to the
cyclist with the open mike, "Take off, Buddy.", whereupon the cyclist turns on
his siren and speeds off to catch up with the motorcade. I did not expect
Bowles to include that, given the fact that the DPD has been a leader in
anti-conspiracy propaganda and many of its officers have destroyed or
manufactured evidence over the years. Yet, Bowles does include a highly
doubtful identification of the message, " hold everything", which confirms the
NAS thesis of a cross-talk, when that message is not at all clear. In his
report, Ramsey ignored the message completely. A simple examination of the tape
at that point would have shown that the voice was speaking directly into the
open mike, confirmed by the lack of a heterodyne, which results from
interference, and that the siren was on the open mike, confirmed by the
presence of an interference arc. H.B. McLain was the only DPD cyclist named
Buddy in the motorcade.    There was a Buddy Walthers in Dealey Plaza, but he was
on foot directing traffic and stayed in Dealey Plaza. Ramsey made no attempt to
find the officer who yelled to McLain, because then he could have testified
that it was indeed he who yelled to McLain, and then that proof that it was
McLain's open mike might have required the NAS to actually look for the shots
which would then have to be recorded somewhere on the tape. This was
unacceptable for scientists who were impanelled only to discredit the
conspiracy finding. Although there is no direct evidence of who is the
unidentified voice, study of the movements of all the cyclists seen in films
taken after the shots suggest fellow cyclists J.B.Courson, James Bobby Hargis, or
Clyde Haygood as possibilities. I tend to think it was Courson as he passed him
halfway down Elm Street. Haygood and Hargis parked their bikes on Elm St. and
went up the grassy knoll in hot pursuit of the assassin. However, McLain could
have slowed down to offer either one help and was yelled off. I do not have the
resources to investigate this aspect more thoroughly, but the DOJ does and will
not. It is hoped that someone will before more witnesses die. Ramsey's omission
of this vital issue is a clear example of the cover-up of evidence.
     A related problem is the fact that there are so many versions of the tapes
themselves. The Bowles tapes, the Curry tapes, the FBI tapes, the Secret
Service tapes, the Warren Commission tapes, the HSCA tapes, etc. I have tried
to get a copy from BB&N and from Ramsey. They both declined to share it. When I
requested a copy under the Freedom of Information Act from the DOJ, FBI, Secret
Service, and National Science Foundation, they all denied ever having or
hearing of the tape. The HSCA records are locked up in the National Archives,
safe from public access. Therefore, my studies are based on the version I
bought from the Collector's Archives, whch I describe as the Canadian copies. I
have no idea which other version they are identical to. If you wish to
duplicate my research you can get copies from that source.

III. Timing

     Ramsey's major thesis rests on the conclusion that Curry's message, "Go to
the hospital." occurred before the purported shots. On this basis he concluded
that there was no reason to look for shots. It's ironic that the NAS panel was
called  a "Committee on Ballistic Acoustics" when they didn't perform one such
test or deal with the topic. They went to great lengths of propaganda to just
avoid having to do any ballistic acoustics. Even if Curry's message came before
the time that W&A found a shot, and Ramsey thought their and BB&N's methods
flawed, there could still be shots on ch. 1 before Curry's message that went
undetected. After all, if BB&N's method could not find shots, then it might
have missed them. Ramsey did not look, for his mandate was only to destroy, not
     As I pointed out previously, Ramsey failed to deduct time for 2 repeats on
ch. 2, amounting to app. 6.8 seconds. Further he based the timing on tapes
which he and the government have kept secret. My Canadian tapes show marked
differences. The timing between ch. 1 and ch. 2 can be compared by identifying
any messages broadcast simultaneously over both channels. Ramsey spent a great
deal of effort and money trying to do this for uncertain messages, but ignored
an obvious one, Henslee's simultaneous broadcast to all emergency equipment. This
one is unmistakable, well documented in transcripts, and needs no elaborate
tests to confirm. Comparing ch. 1 to ch. 2 based on that message as the
benchmark and making the necessary adjustments for known factors produces the
following results: Henslee's ch. 2 message at 324.5 minus Curry's at 32.7 =
291.8 secs. between messages. Deducting 31.1 secs. for the 8 repeats = 260.7
secs. corrected. Two corrections must be made for ch. 1. First, 6 secs.
representing a break in recording must be deducted from the 432.5 yielding
426.5. Then the time must be corrected by .99 for the difference in recording
speeds (confirmed by a comparison of the frequencies of Henslee's voice during
the simulcast), yielding 422.2. The grassy knoll shot at 143.2 corrected by .99
yields 141.8. Then 422.2-141.8 = 280.4. Then comparing the corrected times,
260.7-280.4 = -19.7. This would tend to confirm that Curry's message came almost
20 seconds after the shots, rather than a minute before as Ramsey has
concluded. These rough calculations were done easily with little expense and no
need to rely on controversial tests. But, can more accuracy be obtained by
using as a common reference point a message earlier than Henslee's simulcast? I
believe that there is compelling evidence as presented by Ramsey to justify the
opinion that the earlier message, "You want me to still hold this traffic..."
transmitted over ch. 2 was retransmitted via cross-talk on ch. 1 at the same
time. Using this message as the common reference point, the comparison produces
the results I have listed in my timing chart.
     In  order to fit both channels in the same chart for easier comparison, I
have omitted some of the calculations used for correcting the times listed as
correct. Arguments for those corrections and calculations used for them are
found here and in other sections of this paper. In the interest of simplicity,
no speed of tape correction was made to ch. 2, but rather to ch. 1. I have
estimated that there is approximately a 1% difference in true speed between the
two channels. That estimate is based on a comparison of the frequencies of
dispatcher Henslee's voice during his simultaneous transmission, "Attention all
emergency equipment...". After deducting 6 seconds for the break in recording
to cassette, ch. 1 times were multiplied by .99. However, the difference in
corrected times for "Attention..." at 426.5 and "You want..." at 318.6 is only
107.9. Ramsey's analysis of "You want..." proves that it is cross-talk, so the
time for ch.2 of 109 secs. should be the same for ch. 1, amounting to a
discrepancy of 1.1 secs. I have arbitrarily decided to add the 1.1 secs. to
ch.1 to correct for that. For one reason, it is possible that the 6 second
break in recording chopped off some of the original tape. Second, the corrected
times fit the times given by BB&N. Third, the corrections to ch. 2 are already
complicated enough. Fourth, deducting more time from ch. 2 would tend to take
the corrected timing out of fit with the dispatchers' time notations more than
adding the 1.1 secs. to ch. 1.
     The major correction to ch. 2 consists of deducting time for repeats,
which have added time to the apparent length. Arguments are presented for each
     Repeat 1 is the same as Ramsey identified. Since it is a double repeat, it
is two times the period of rotation, 3.3 secs., for a total duration of 6.6
secs. My stopwatch timing timed on the word, "secure" agrees with Ramsey's
corrected time.
     Repeat 2 is the one that Ramsey missed entirely, as I pointed out
previously. Now, because the stylus on a Gray Audograph moves from inside
outwards( opposite of the normal phonograph ), the period of rotation increases
with time. Therefore, this repeat measures 3.4 secs, which is confirmed by
noting the difference in time between both "notified"s. An FBI technician
probably lifted the stylus to get past the known repeat.
     Repeat 3 is the same as Ramsey identified. Because some of the message is
unintelligible, it was impossible to tell if it was only one complete repeat or
if someone had manipulated this repeat. The closest approximation by timing
from different words was 3.8 secs. Although this is not a typical period of
rotation, it agrees with Ramsey's uncorrected time.
       Repeat 4 is another that Ramsey misinterpreted, as I pointed out
previously. Starting the stopwatch at the break after "hospital" produces a
time of 3.4 secs., which is a period of rotation.
       Repeat 5 is the same as Ramsey identified. Regardless of the fact that
the words in the repeat are unintelligible, the total duration is 3.4 secs.,
again a period of rotation.
       This brings up an interesting observation. Ramsey clearly labels this
repeat on the strip chart, Figure C-2, but if you look closely, the decibel
level is very low. First, what could account for that, and second, what
implications does that have. It appears to me that the most likely cause is
skating or "soft mistracking", where the stylus rides up one wall of the
groove, but does not break away and jump out of the groove. What are the
implications? Profound! First, such mistracking can occur not only during a
repeat, but also during sections without repeats. Thus, the fact that this is a
mistracking can not,not,also prove that it is also a repeat.
       Second, Ramsey tried to pad the earlier part of ch. 2 with supposed
silences. One of the criteria he used in establishing the existence of the
silences was that the strip charts showed periods where the signal stayed below
his arbitrarily imposed threshold of 10 decibels below peak voltage for more
than 4 seconds. He based that on the word of DPD Capt. Bowles, with no hard
evidence. But even granting the possibility that there were hold relays of
approximately 4 seconds, there is no firm evidence about the threshold at which
they operated or that in fact that they were operating properly on Nov. 22,
1963. Moreover, the fact that repeat 5 has a period of duration less that the
estimated hold duration and the fact that its decibel level was much lower than
the estimated hold thresholdwould suggest that such mistracking could be
mistaken for a silence. Thus it is possible that none of the silences
identified by Ramsey were in fact silences. Further, it seems that the signal
in every supposed  silence remains higher than at repeat 5. Ramsey then goes on
to arbitrarily add 46 seconds to ch. 2 to account for his silences, justified
by the specious argument that perhaps ch. 2 wasn't used much at that time. This
can easily be refuted by pointing to the fact that many officers were trying
and unable to use ch. I and switched to ch. 2 to report that fact, get orders,
or try to find out what was happening. Also, BBN's study showed that ch. 2 was
running "nearly continuously" during that time.
       As pointed out before, ch. 1 and ch. 2 real times must be the same for
"You want..." and "Attention...". As you will remember, I arbitrarily chose to
use 109 secs. for ch. 1. It could be slightly less, but not by much. The
smallest corrected time was 107.9. Ch. 1 was recorded on a Dictabelt running
continuously, in contrast to ch. 2's voice-actuated record. So there is simply
no way that the time for ch. 1 can be reduced further. If anyone wants to
quibble over the 1.1 secs., he can do the calculations the other way. But if
the corrected time for ch. I is 109 secs., what impact does that have on the
corrections for ch. 2? The uncorrected time of 324.5 minus 230.5 yields only 94
secs., not 109. To make matters worse, 7 secs. must be deducted for repeats 7
and 8 yielding only 87 secs. The only way to account for such a large
discrepancy is by the fact that there are 22 secs. of silence somewhere during
that period on ch. 2. This is the reason for the NA instead of a corrected time
and the reason for the 315.4 instead of 293.4. Without access to the strip
charts which Ramsey has declined to release, there is no way to tell exactly
how many, where, of what duration there are silences. If Ramsey had done this
analysis, he'd have found the silences, analyzed their characteristics, and
gone back to his previously suspected silences to do a more careful study. Just
listening to the tape, it seems to me that there are much fewer messages during
this period than the earlier one.
       Repeat 6 is the same as Ramsey identified. The duration, of 3.5 secs.,
the same as Ramsey's, is a period of rotation.
       Repeat 7 was overlooked, because Ramsey was only interested in the
period before "You want . .." . Like repeat 2, only one word was repeated and
the time between each was a period of rotation. In addition, an analysis of the
background frequencies between each word would show a complete match.
       Repeat 8 is a very clear example of a repeated phrase. The period of
rotation is 3.5 secs. It is so obvious that the only explanation for Ramsey's
missing it is the bias he had for padding the earlier part of ch. 2.

  IV. Voiceprints

       Although I have no expertise in this field, several errors appear
obvious even to a layperson. The most controversial finding by Ramsey was his
validation of Barber's subjetive identification of a simultaneous transmission
of the words, "hold everything." I have never been able to hear any distinct
words on ch. I at that time. Perhaps this is another example of the differences
between various versions of the tape.
       The correlation shown in NAS Figure 6 is misleading. Here Ramsey uses a
favorite old trick of changing the scale in order to create what Huff calls a
"gee-whiz" graph. Notice that although the horizontal scale is the same for
both the "You want..." correlation and "hold evcrything", the vertical scale
for "You want..." is about 19mm/.1, whereas the "hold everything" is about
28mm/.1. This exhaggerates the goodness of the correlation and distorts the
spike in order to make it resemble the "You want..." spike. The actual numbers
are more revealing.
      The peak of the spike is about .518, whereas even
background static reached .3, a difference of .218. BB&N's correlation
coefficient = 10¸Ö(12*ÿ14) = .77. Yet Ramsey implies such a figure is
unimpressive. Then how could he accept .518 as significant? If there is a
choice, logic demands that the source with the higher correlation be chosen as
the true source. Incidentally, Ramsey criticized W&A for choosing the
correction factor which gave the best match and went ahead to do the same thing
himself for this correlation. Also, Ramsey criticized W&A for not considering
alternative sources, but it would seem that the screening process and Ramsey's
voiceprints rule out most other sources. Comparing the grassy knoll shot
pattern to other portions of the tape which included static, voice
transmissions, etc., BB&N found that the correlation exceeded .6 only during
the 9 seconds where other shots were identified. Now Ramsey has found a
correlation of only .518, which would not have passed BB&N's screening process.
       One weakness of his study, for which he had the gall to criticize W&A,
was the failure to do a control. Perhaps any voice-transmission could achieve a
correlation of .5, but not even a known simultaneous transmission could achieve
a 1.0 correlation, due to the static or background noise. There are some
examples on the tape where cross-overs from ch. 2 were recorded along with live
sounds on ch. 1 from the open mike. Moreover, Ramsey does not offer any
evidence that the message,"hold everything" is unique and identical to Decker's
known transmission. If the message had been a very common one, like"l0-4." or a
persistent one like"75.Signal 5?", there could be several such occurances and
it would be difficult to prove which was the match. Ramsey failed to look for
other occurances of "hold everything" and do a control correlation for each. If
he had done the same comparison to Curry's "hold everything" message, the
correlation would have been approximately .55.
       The correlation for "You want..." was much better,.766 at the peak of
the spike. Looking at the actual voiceprints , the two channels look very much
alike, unlike the "hold everything"which look nothing alike. On hearing the
two, it seems clear to me that they are the same message, though the ch. 1
cross-talk sounds as if it has more background interference and that the last
few words fade out or get chopped off. Ramsey also suggested the use of Bayes
theorem, but gave no concrete examples, even though he had a perfect
opportunity here. Using Bayesian logic, he should have noted that although the
"You want..." is clearly and audibly a known match, the highest correlation he
could achieve was .766, which represents a probability of 1.0, amounting to a
difference of .234 due to inaccurate methodology, technique, and/or noise.
Therefore, the highest correlation one could hope to achieve might be
approximately .8. Adding this loss factor to BB&N's.77 results in an estimated
.97, which is quite significant.
       Further, there is another simultaneous transmission that should have
been analyzed. At the time of Henslee's simulcast"Attention..." there was very
little noise. Why didn't Ramsey do a control on this message? Because it might
achieve a correlation of only .8 or less, which would show how imprecise and
subjective his correlation method and technique was, casting doubt on the
identification of "hold everything". Second, it would have increased the
probability of the grassy knoll shot.
       In general the whole study was biased and subjective, relying on the
FBI, Bowles, and the one member of the committee whose bias is well documented.
Calling in outside consultants would not necessarily have guaranteed
elimination of bias, but perhaps might have made the study more objective. As
a recent article in "Technology Illustrated" pointed out, there are several
researchers at MIT, Carnie-Mellon University, and IBM doing advanced work on
speech recognition by computers. Although they may have ties to the
intelligence community, it is assumed that they wouldn't tinker with the basic
computer program, so that the computer could do the same study completely
objectively. Ramsey failed to use the best resources available.

V. Unanalyzed sounds

     Another area left uninvestigated was the analyzing of additional sounds on
the tape, not just the ones Ramsey tried to use to prove Barber's thesis. One
such sound is the message which I point out to the NAS. The fact that Ramsey
did no study of the message proves how important it is. A thorough study might
prove that the arcing is a result of McLain turning on his siren. This would
put an unbearable burden on those who argue both that McLain turned on his
siren immediately and that the open mike was stationary at the Dallas Trade
     Also of interest is the nature of static and interference from the Dallas
Electric radios. Could such interference resemble gunshots? Ramsey criticized
W&A for not considering alternative sources, but failed to do any study
himself. Ramsey also criticized W&A for not using the same method as they did
on the grassy knoll shot on the other shots as a control,  but fails to point
out that the HSCA's contract was only for the detailed analysis of the grassy
knoll shot. W&A were not asked to do the same work on the others and were so
hard pressed for time that they could not have physically done it. Since the
HSCA expired, none of their acoustical experts has shown any interest in doing
follow-up work on their own, offer help to other reesearchers, or vigorously
defended their reputations. I have attempted to do so in my limited way. I have
applied the method W&A used for the grassy knoll shot to the other 4 and
offered to share my latest calculations with Ramsey, but received no reply. If
Ramsey thought that the method W&A used was flawed, he should have shown that
by applying it to the other shots.

VI. Statistics

     This is the most crucial and yet perplexing aspect. No scientist involved
in any study to date can state with absolute certainty if there were or weren't
shots recorded on the DPD tape. Everyone talks in terms of probability and
likelihood. This is typical of scientists, but not comforting to the layperson
who wants absolute truth. But most people are perfectly capable of understanding
simple odds and probabilities associated with everyday life such as games or
the weather. If there is a 99% chance of rain, you'd take your umbrella or
postpone the picnic, whereas if there is only a 1% chance of rain, you
wouldn't. That's no guarantee, but at least it's a good guideline on which to
base decisions.
     15 matches between test shot  patterns and DPD impulses had correlations
exceeding 0.6. BB&N noticed that the pattern of matches seemed to fit the path
of the motorcade. Viewing the dots  representing the time from the first match
to the last on one axis and the distance along the microphone layout on the
other as a scattergram, there appears to be a definite non-random sequence.
This chart is based on the raw data, which included obvious false alarms. At
this point, there was no attempt to deduct them. Mikes had been placed about 18
feet apart along the motorcade route as a compromise between the estimated
acceptance windows and the need to cover as much of Dealey Plaza as possible
with the fewest necessary mike locations. The design of the test was adequate,
given the constraints imposed. The pattern of matches can be as important as
the total number. A cluster of several matches from neighboring mikes matching
the same DPD impulse not only tends to confirm the impression that the pattern
of the DPD impulse is a shot, but also gives clues to the real location of the
policeman's mike. If an early DPD impulse pattern matches with mikes 2(5) and
2(6), the true location might be somewhere between them, but if it matches
mikes 2(5) and 2(2), the true location is more likely between them. If a DPD
impulse pattern matches widely separated mikes, say 1(4), 2(10), and 3(12),
that would suggest that 2 or maybe all 3 matches are false alarms.
     To test whether there was any relationship between the time and distance
coordinates, BB&N partitioned the matches into a  2 x 2 contingency table and
used a generalized  c² test with the null hypothesis that matches were
independent so that the distribution in the cells should be random. Using the
data 1,6,8,0 produced a c² = 11.4. For 1 degree of freedom, BB&N stated that
the probability that this large a value could occur at random is less than 1%.
Ramsey failed to criticize 2 important aspects of this calculation. First, the
1% level may be too high, because BB&N did not use a table extensive enough to
give an accurate percentage level for such a large value. The c² value for the
1% level is 6.635. More extensive tables, such as the Biometrika, show the
value for the 0.5% level is 7.879. A Fisher and Yates' table shows the value
for the 0.1% level is 10.827. Thus BB&N's stated significance would seem, to
the casual reader or layperson, to be not as significant as the value really
is. Second, the c² distribution for such a low total (N=15) tends to be skewed.
It might have been better to use an exact test. As Langley points out, the
recommended test for N<50 is Fisher's Test(1934), which makes use of the
hypergeometric formula: (n1!n2!n3!n4!)¸(N!a!b!c!d!), to derive the exact
probability. Although the computations can be more complex, because of the
factorials, the fact that N is moderate and the importance of accuracy
necessitates using Fisher's Test. For the data 1,6,8,0 the exact probability
computed by this test is .0013986.
     Ramsey attempts to criticize BB&N's highly significant result by
arbitrarily and informally deducting 7 matches, saying that some of the alarms
are dependent,because some of the microphone and rifle locations were similar.
Why should independence be a criterion for inclusion when that is what is being
tested? Ramsey cites no standard reference or test that advocates such a
reduction in the individual cells. Even if that were a valid approach, he'd
have to go through the table match by match and justify each deduction. Then we
could challenge or debate each one. Due to the design of the test, we would
expect patterns from neighboring mikes to be similar, but that does not mean
they are dependent on each other. How close or how far away from each other do
the mikes have to be for Ramsey to consider them "independent"? He cites no
estimates for that. Ramsey's criticism that rifle locations were similar seems
to have more validity and should be studied more carefully. BB&N designed the
test so that rifles would fire at different targets, with the muzzle first in
the plane of the window of the TSBD and then pulled back 2 feet inside to see
if there was any significant difference in the patterns, and therefore the
correlations. Perhaps the pattern would be different if the shockwave
trajectory were different. Or perhaps the inside wall and window significantly
reduced the decibel levels of the echoes if the gun were fired from well within
the TSBD. If a DPD impulse matched one set of conditions rather than the other,
that might provide vital clues to the real conditions of the assassination.
     Evidence from other fields contradicts the assumptions that Ramsey used to
calculate the probabilities of the other shots. Even Ramsey himself conceeds
that his calculations may be too conservative, but fails to fully explain what
assumptions he made. He deducted 6 false alarms as BB&N had from the 15 matches
to get the 9 remaining. But one of those matches was incorrectly identified as
a false match. BB&N stated that the one at 140.32 came too close after another
more likely match to have been fired from the same rifle. Although that is a
proper attempt to eliminate a false match based on corroborating evidence, the
logic is flawed and the acceptance of the veracity of that evidence is biased.
Perhaps an automatic weapon was used for those two shots, or one man was firing
two weapons, or one shot came from the TSBD and the other came from the grassy
knoll. The case that I believe most likely is that another man fired the second
shot from a few windows down. There is some evidence and eyewitness testimony
that there was a second man on the same floor of the TSBD and a different
weapon from Oswald's Mamlicher-Carcano. Ramsey's value of 7 is based on the
assumption that only 2 shots were fired in Dealey Plaza, accounting for 9
wounds, 3 points of  damage to the limo, and 4 scars in the street. That's how
he came up with 1-(7¸9)³. If he had stuck to the old Warren Commission 3 shots,
then 1-(6¸9)³ = 0.7037037. The trajectories of the wounds  compared to the timing
suggested by the tape make 4 shots the minimum, even without a miss, so
1-(5¸9)³ = 0.8285323. I have found corroboration in all the other evidence for 5
sbots, which includes BB&N false alarm 140.32, so the equation should be
1-(5¸10)³ = 0.875. Notice that for these calculations, Ramsey doesn't complain that
the mikes were too close as he did for the chi-square. He wants to have it both
ways. If he did, he'd have to deduct 5 of the matches as duplicates, then 5
more false alarms, leaving only 5 matches for 5 possible shots, so the equation
would be 1-(0¸5)¹ = 1.0.
     The critical issue is BB&N's computation of the probability that W&A could
obtain such a good match between the DPD tape pattern and the echo pattern they
calculated for their estimated cycle-shooter locations. BB&N calculated that
the  probablity that such a match could occur at random was about 0.053, giving
them a 95+% confidence that the pattern on the tape was a grassy knoll shot.
Some of Ramsey's criticisms of BB&N's computation are correct and quite
important, but his only purpose seemed to be to increase the p above 0.05, not
to seek the true conditions, nor try for maximum accuracy. As W&A pointed out
quite clearly, there is always a chance that the pattern is not a shot, but a
random pattern due solely to chance.The thing which gives inversely
proportional confidence is the chance that it could occur at random.
     If Ramsey thinks the randomness of the DPD impulse pattern is an important
criterion, then the first thing that should have been done that none of the
scientists did, would have been to test the pattern for randomness. Using W&A's
Table 4, I counted the runs of signals and the runs of non-signals, using 2 ms.
time windows starting at .1 ms. With the values: n1=22, n2=163, N=185, and r=40,
I used Wald and Wolfowitz's formula with  correction as shown on Langley p.326.
The resulting z = -.0200981 doesn't even reach the 10% value of 1.64. Thus this
test does not show that the pattern is not random. I then deducted the 190 ms.
of silence between the two groups of impulses adtsted the randomness with the
values: n1=22, n2=68, N=90, r=40. The resulting z = .6626179 was slightly more
significant, but was still much greater than 10%. Thus even withV the dedction
for the silence duration, non-randomness could not be shown. cause this tet is
a modification designed to make calculations easier , I decided to look for a more
complex formula. In Freund's Modern Elementary Statistics, p. 326  test of runs
is based on the formula   z =
                                             s    .
Calculation with the original values yields z = .2858912. Again deducting the 95
time windows of silence this time yielded z = -3.0090982, which is significant
almost to the .2% level. This shows a definite non-randomness.
     Ramsey tries to criticize the 0.053 figure with a ridiculous analogy to a
bridge hand having 3 Aces. That is like comparing apples and oranges. As
Russell Langley points out in Practical Statistics, pp. 374-375, a person might
throw a handful of coins into the air and notice the pattern they land in. The
probability of their landing in those positions may be a billion to one, but
that doesn't imply that it is due to anything other than chance. The
probability would be significant only if the pattern had been predicted before
the experiment. Then we could say that it's extremely unlikely that the pattern
is due to chance. The specific bridge hand was not predicted before the deal.
W&A did predict an echo pattern that matched with the DPD impulse pattern very
closely, as noted elsewhere.
     Also, why would anyone suspect the dealer of dishonesty? I dealt that hand
a few weeks ago and everyone had to pass. Why not suspect the opponents who
shuffled and cut the cards? If a player were dishonest, he'd want to arrange
the cards for maximum profit with the least suspicion. An excellent card
manipulator can stack the deck or misdeal after the opponents have shuffled and
cut to give himself a 7NT hand. But no one would double that 37 point hand and
everyone would suspect him of card sharking. Most cheating at bridge consists
of secret conventions, hand signals, or other relayingtechniques. Professionals
make use of ceiling peepholes and leg transmitters. Most average players
suspicions are not aroused by a few lucky finesses and psych bids, but are when
the opponents get a 7 NT hand every time. If a card manipulator were really
skillful, he might give himself a 10 card spade suit and two voids, his partner
the 3 missing spades and a void in the fourth suit, plus giving the dealer
those famous 3 aces and his side most of the remaining high cards, thus fooling
him into taking some kind of action over his spade bid, so that when he jumps
to 7 Spades, he makes the dealer guess whether to double or bid 7 NT. Either
way would be diastrous , giving the manipulator maximum profit.
     But Ramsey also makes simple errors in his analogy. He states that p =.044
(actually .043841538), but that is cumulative including getting 4 aces. For only
3 aces the p = .0412004786. He then goes on to compare the 0.053 which he
considers a Poisson probability with 0.044 which should be considered only a
hypergeometric probability. To make a valid comparison, he'd have to take the
hypergeometric,and then calculate the chance of getting only 1 in 180 trials as
BB&N did. The expected number in 180 would be 7.41608615. Using 7, x = 1, the
Poisson Test shows that p = 0.006832038. So if you never get a hand which
contains 3 aces out of 180 deals, you might get some sympathy.
     Ramsey correctly pointed out BB&N errors of logic and simple oversight. As
Ramsey pointed out, BB&N did make a simple oversight in stating that N = 45
windows as used in the hypergeometric calculation. Each of the two groups
containing impulses was 90, for a total duration of 180 ms., thus 90 windows
not 45. However, Ramsey doesn't tell you what the hypergeometric distribution
would then be, given N = 90. In fact, h(9;12,14,90) = 5.13843913 x 10-7 which is much
less than h(9;12,14,45), which is 3.12899277 x 10-4 . Note here that Ramsey
fails to point out that BB&N had already made 2 conservative adjustments to the
data. First, they deducted the 320 ms.(should have been 190 ms.) of silence
between the two groups of impulses. If that duration had been included, then
they would have started with a much smaller value for the hypergeometric.
Second, they deducted 1 match, because any match could be made simply by moving
the time scale of either. Ramsey ignored this adjustment, but I feel that it
must be questioned. Moving either time scale would inrease the sampling space.
But given the fact that N is now so large, the difference may be minor. On the
other hand,Ramsey makes the very important observation that 2 pairs of
impulses, 19+20, 23+24 coincide in the same 2 ms. window and one pair of the
predicted echoes coincide in the same window. That all depends on where you
draw the boundary between time windows. In this case, it is natural to start at
0.0 and make each 2 ms. Thus 312.4 and 313.1 fall in the same window. Further,
#19 and #20 are both 283.7; they obviously fall in the same window no matter
what boundary is set. So Ramsey deducts those coincident impulses to reduce the
data to x=8, n=11, M=12, N=90. That's o.k., but then he goes on to reduce those
by 7 to acunt for the so-called "free" parameters. Later he does note that the
data tend to suggest non-randomness, except for his admittedly conservative
adjustment. However, he states plainly in the text that such an adjustment of
deducting one match for each "free" parameter is a traditional method. To me it
seems outrageous, and nowhere does he cite any reference or test which
advocates that approach. There may be similar methods applied to other tests,
but it is a complete misuse to apply them to the hypergeometric arbitrarily,
with no experimental results or logical proof.
     Yet even given his adjustments, Ramsey fails to perform the same
calculations that BB&N did with that data. Specifically, the hypergeometric
h(1;4,5,83)=.206996006, not .223. Then the next problem arises when trying to
compute the probability of getting such a match only once in the many trials
possible just by moving the cyclist's position. Ramsey should have noticed
W&A's error in estimating the width of the corridor travelled by the cycle.
They derived the 18 feet length correctly by noting that the test pattern from
only mike 3(4) matched, not the one before or after, so the cycle was probably
in the range of mike 3(4). But when estimating the width, they erroneously
concluded that, because the mike was supposed  to be in the middle of the
street with no mike on either side, the cycle could have been anywhere along
the width of the street. In making that estimate, they presupposed certain
real-life conditions. They assumed that the cycle remained in the street,
otherwise the width could have been 100 feet or more. That is not necessarily a
safe assumption, given testimony of witnesses that saw a cyclist try to jump
the curb and drive up the grassy knoll. In this case they should have examined
the evidence more carefully. The estimate of 180 Bernoulli trials is very
important. W&A never actually performed 180 trials, but BB&N estimated that
they could have and used that figure in the binomial calculation. There are
several clues which they overlooked.
     First, the cycle has been identified as McLain's which was on the left
side of the motorcade at the side of the press cars. Also, the previous matches
were with mikes on the left side of the motorcade route. For the cyclist to
have been on the right side of the motorcade at the time of the grassy knoll
shot, he would have had to cross the center lane through the press cars. There
is absolutely no  testimony that McLain did that. Further, there is
photographic evidence that only one cycle, Courson, crossed through the press
cars from the left to the right side of the street. These  films, including
Dorman and Couch, show that McLain stayed on the left. Also, the Altgens 6
photograph, taken at about the same time as Zapruder frame 255, just a few
seconds before the grassy knoll shot shows several cars rounding the corner in
the middle of the street. Calculating a smooth trajectory from his known
positions in these films, the farthest to the right McLain could have been
would be about 5 feet into the middle lane, and that is even doubtful, given
the closeness of the press cars. We must assume that W&A would remember that no
two objects can occupy the same space at the same time. If that space was
occupied by a car, it is unavailable to the cycle as a possible trial. So these
limits produce a corridor of 18 by 18 feet square, equal to 81 trials.
        Ramsey's deduction of 7 parameters must be studied more in depth. For
example, he states that there are 2 parameters associated with the location of
the shooter. If one is for the test shooter and the other for the second
assassin, then a more careful examination of the evidence would allow one to
determine their positions within a very small margin of error. If both are for
just one, representing the x and y axes, then why not a third for the z axis?
Even then, the variation in recoil would leave an uncertainty of about 1 inch.
Would Ramsey still cite that as a "free" parameter when it has an impact of
less than .001% on the calculations? If the 2 parameters are for one shooter,
then maybe there should be 6 total, 3 for each shooter. Or what about the cycle
position? Ramsey seems to imply that the cycle can be anywhere, whereas I have
shown that the travel corridor was actually much narrower. Even such minor
factors as the wind velocity, building shading, bullet airodynamics, etc. could
be considered "free' parameters. The main problem is that Ramsey never cites any
criteria for deciding what a parameter is and how "free" it is, nor any
standard method of accounting for them. Some of the parameters he lists are
dependent or off-setting. Others fall far below the built-in uncertainty. In
addition, there are other factors which Ramsey did not consider. The maps used
were only accurate to ±3 feet, so that's almost a 1% difference for most echoes
right there. Or perhaps one temperature was measured with a dry bulb and the
other with a wet bulb. What difference would that make? Perhaps the shockwave
of one bullet or the explosion of the explosive bullet temporarily rarified the
air through which the sound of the next echo travelled. What difference would
that make? No logic seems clear. Any fool could make up a list of all the
variable conditions that could have existed and then deduct one match for each.
      Perhaps the worst mistake Ramsey makes is found in the next to last
sentence of his criticism of BB&N's computation. I tend to give him the benefit
of doubt and assume it was a simple oversight or writing fatigue. If not, it is
one of the most blatant misrepresentations of fact ever. Ramsey states that the
level of p = 0.223 is not impressive in contrast to the claim of p = 0.053. Again
Ramsey is comparing apples and oranges by contrasting the p of his incorrect
hypergeometric with BB&N's binomial. In his attempt to raise the p level,he
incorrectly plants the impression that the p level of the hypergeometric is
what determines the significance. Here Ramsey went overboard the other way. If
the h(x) is .206996006, then the expected occurances by chance in 180 trials
would be 37.2592811. Contrary to Ramsey's summary of BB&N's analysis, one does
not obtain the binomial probability simply by multiplying the h(x) by the
number of trials. That may be an approximation if the E(x)<x. But by using a
standard binomial test for that data, the actual probability of only one match
is 3.47957775 x 10-17 . Ramsey suggests using the Poisson Test, but that may be
less accurate than a simple binomial test when the p is so large. For the other
calculations where the p is small and n is large, the Poisson may be a good
approximation. It is often used as an approximation, because calculations are
done more easily than by the binomial. As an analogy, suppose you have 180
coins whose bias is known that approximately 37 heads will come up when they
are all tossed. Then suppose that on the next trial only 1 head comes up. Given
the expected value,  l=37, the probability of getting only 1 head is 3.15730616
x l0-15 . As it turns out, calculation is relatively easy using the binomial,
because x=1 in all these cases so that nCr=n. This means that the calculation
of the combinations does not involve any factorials or logs of them. Usually,
the variance should equal the mean to use the Poisson.
      I believe that the actual situation is h(8;11,12,90)= 9.0512911 x 10-7 .
Then the chance of 1 success in 81 trials= 7.3310083 x 10-5 . That value of p
makes me 99.99% confident that the DPD pattern matches the predicted grassy
knoll shot pattern, and given the fact that other shots were identified by the
same method before and after this impulse convinces me that the DPD pattern is
a shot from the grassy knoll.
      As Ramsey pointed out, there are some places in BB&N's report where the
wording is misleading. He missed some however and should have been more
specific. For example, on p. 75, the following corrections should have been
made: in the first paragraph, the first sentence should read, " 12 of the 22
predicted echoes would be..."; in the next sentence, "...that were judged loud
enough..."; in the last paragraph, starting at the second sentence, "We
observed that they obtained 10 matches, within ±1ms., out of 12 predicted
 echoes, with 14 DPD tape impulses in a 370 ms. time span. We note, however,
that the 12 predicted echoes were contained in two time intervals of
approximately 90 ms. each, for a total duration of 180 ms. These two time
intervals were separated by a span of about 190 ms. in which no echoes louder
than background noise appeared. Because an echo was counted if it occurred
within a 2 ms. time window, there were 90 possible windows in which echoes
might have occurred, ignoring the 95 windows between the two time intervals.";
and on p. 76 BB&N should not say 9, or more out of 12. Instead of pointing out
this error, Ramsey copied it. The calculation of the hypergeometric is a simple
one, not cumulative. Only 10 matches were made, not 11 or 12. And the number of
trials should be 81 as I pointed out previously.
     Even though W&A's match between a DPD impulse pattern and their predicted
grassy knoll shot was significant, Ramsey still criticized the conclusion that
there was evidence that it was actually a shot. He claims that W&A and BB&N
failed to consider alternative sources, but gave no examples. I have always
thought that one of the basic tenets of science is that one cannot attempt to
disprove a contention without offering an alternative explanation. That would
be like saying that you think Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity is wrong,
because other things could account for the observed phenomena which it
accurately predicted, but offer no alternative theory or examples. That's not a
scientific argument; it is demagoguery. In the case of possible shots on ch. 1,
there are several obvious alternative sources. Ramsey dare not specify or
consider them, because all of them can be easily disproven. I offer some now
merely as strawmen to show why Ramsey couldn't risk specifying. If static was
the source, matches should be found at other portions of the tape, yet none
were found elsewhere and 15 were found within a 9 sec. portion of the tape. No
attempt was made by Ramsey to show that any portion of the tape contained
static that was not random and then no explanation for the non-randomness, such
as sunspots, RF interference from the Dallas Electric radios, natural
electrical discharge like lightning or static electricity, periodic discharge
such as the motorcycle's ignition, or nearby cars without suppression spark
plug wires, is offered, because there is no evidence that such sources occurred
and were recorded on the tape, especially during the critical 9 secs. However,
there are examples of mechanical sources, such as the fact that the mike had
stuck open before the well-known 5 min. portion and occassionally after, but
never has Ramsey tried to prove that the action of turning on or off the
switch, or even the headlight or turn signal or emgency lights, or the siren
could mimic a gun shot pattern. The mike turning on or off while other radios
were trying to use the same channel should display a heterodyne( interference
tone ) of a specific pitch and the actual noise of the switch keying in takes
less than .1 sec., whereas the detected shots had no heterodyne, were recorded
while the mike was continuously open, and lasted for almost a half second. Nor
did Ramsey attempt to compare the decibel levels of the keying in to the shots.
Another mechanical event which Ramsey overlooked was the jarring of the mike,
which should not be considered unusual given the fact that the mike was on a
moving motorcycle, a fact that can be confirmed by the presence of exhaus noise
and squealling tires while rounding corners. These may be what Bowles calls the
"bonk-bonk" sounds heard near the time of the shots. For years I had thought
these might be the shots, but at the closest time to the BB&N detected shots,
there are only two of these bonks, spaced about a second apart, so that if
these were typical shot sounds, and may be loud enough, there would only be 2
shots to the assassination, separated by about 1 second. This definitely does
not fit the known ballistics, medical, photographic, or earwitness testimony.
JFK is clearly wounded by Zapruder frame 225 and struck in the head at frame
313, a difference of about 4.8 secs. Any detected shots must  have at least
that separation. Some examples of jarring which Ramsey should have tested are:
hitting the mike, running the bike over a bump, into a curb, etc., and kicking
the side while shifting gears or putting up the kick stand. These are
mechanical sources that also should be detected as impulsive sources, but could
they mimic a shot? And how likely would it be that 5 such events occurred only
within the 9sec.section and nowhere else.
     Ramsey dare not even consider alternative acoustical sources, lest he fall
into the same trap that the FBI did. Once you start with the premise that the
sounds are impulsive, it doesn't matter what you chose as the initiator, the
matching test will still identify the location of the source and the open mike.
Then you can just argue what type of source could have made such a loud sound
with echoes coming in after .5 sec. at 100 decibels. The FBI tried to suggest a
stick hitting concrete, but when have you ever heard a stick hitting concrete
inside a building as loud as 130 decibels? And if you try to use that
alternative source for all 5 shots, you are left with the improbable conclusion
that professional assassins tried to kill the President of the United States by
slapping sticks against concrete walls. The only sources capable of producing
the high volume levels are explosive, so it really doesn't matter what you call
the source, but that it's very loud and it's location is identifiable. It could
be any type of firearm, even firing blanks, or even a loud firecracker. But
again, the BB&N method would work and you'd identify the source as a loud
explosive impulse. In the case of the TSBD, there is no physical evidence of
anything other than a gun, and loads of physical and eyewitness evidence of the
gun. On the grassy knoll, there is no evidence of anything other than a gun,
and some circumstantial evidence that if there was a loud explosive sound from
there, that it was due to a gun. There is no photographic evidence of any other
source such as a firecracker or car exhaust backfire, but there is photographic
evidence of a gun at that location. There is also the speculative
identification of a shockwave which would have to preceed the blast of a loud
explosive sound. As far as I know, there are no supersonic blanks, and there is
no evidence that a high explosive like TNT or RDX was set off above the fence.
Other loud impulses such as jet plane sonic booms or thunderclap are absurd
explanations. These few examples show why Ramsey dare not offer alternative
     Ramsey's improper methods not only impede a proper investigation of the
assassination, but they also pose a danger to traditional science. Take, for
example, his assertion that just because BB&N were able to reject the null
hypothesis, that doesn't mean that their alternative hypothesis was correct.
Ramsey introduces unnamed alternatives as equally likely causes. By that same
reasoning, all statistical tests and analyses of experiments are invalid,
because the results may be due to some "magical" alternative sources. Thus no
medical firm or researcher could claim success with a new drug or treatment
simply because the null hypothesis was rejected at a highly significant level.
The basic defiition of success of an experiment would be invalid. Progress
would come to a complete standstill. I can understand why experts on statistics
and acoustics are not interested in the assassination of a political figure,
but they should rise up in anger when their science is degraded by misuse.

     Corrections to "Rebuttal to Ramsey"

     Page 8: All calculations of the Runs Test were incorrect. In each case,
the value for r was keyed into the calculator instead of the value for N. I
have since expanded my computer's statistics program to include the Runs Test.
Using the same data and tests, the results calculated by the computer are as
follows: For n1= 22, n2= 163, N =185, r = 40, z = .25964663 using Langley's version of the
Wald-Wolfowitz Test with Yates correction, whereas z = .0823970838 using the
simpler version found in Freund.

For n1= 22, n2= 68, N = 90, r = 40, z = 1.8024943 using Langley's version of the Wald-Wolfowitz
Test with Yates correction, whereas z = 1.65842282 using the simpler version
found in Freund.

     In order to reect the null hypothesis, that the pattern is random, at the
5% level, the z score must be ³ 1.96. In none of these calculations did the z
ever exceed 1.96, therefore there is no statistical evidence that the DPD
impulse pattern is anything but random.
     Although this result is merely peripheral to the issue of the match
between the W&A predicted pattern and the DPD pattern, it does confirm my
suspicion that prediction is much more important than randomness.

        Addendum, Sept.1983: The national security establishment
 should also be alarmed that the work of this country's top acoustical
 experts was dismissed so cavalierly. In addition to having analyzed
 the Watergate tapes and proven who fired which shots in the Kent
 State assacre, Bolt,Beranek and Newman is an important defense
 contractor, especially to the Navy. If their basic understanding of
 science is as flawed as Ramsey suggests the implications are
 frightening. In that case, they couldn't tell a Russian sub from a
 whale by sonar. No intercepted code could be decrypted, because the
 noise reducing or filtering algorithms would be suspect. As for the
 validity of Ramsey's work, it would be a travesty if someone were
 convicted on the basis of the same type of voiceprint analysis he
 did. If that work is accepted as a precedent for the growing field of
 speech recognitionthere will be a lot of dangerous and costly
 misidentifications leading to cold leads and needless brinksmanship.
         Addendum, Dec.1983: Another piece of unanalyzed evidence which
 I have recently come across is the live broadcast by KBOX at the
 Dallas Trade art. As reporter Ron Jenkins breaks in, he states quite
 clearly that he had just heard the broadcast about Industrial
 Boulevard over the radio. Then the motorcade goes past; then he and
 the DPD motorcycles stationed at the Trade Mart join the race to
 Parkland Hospital. It is obvious from listening to the KBOX tape that
 none of the DPD cyclists at the Trade Mart had turned on their sirens
 until several seconds after the motorcade passed them. Thus it is
 impossible that the open microphone was at the Trade Mart, as
 suggested by some critics of the HSCA acoustical studies. Sirens are
 clearly heard on Ch.1 at 12:32:56 ( 262.6 seconds after the mike
 stuck open ) and on on Ch.2 at 12:32:37.3 (132.7 seconds after
 Curry's "triple underpass" message). But the first mention of
 Industrial Boulevard on Ch.2 was almost two minutes later, from
 Unit#15-car 2, Capt. J.N. (Red) Souter's order to the dispatcher to
 have Unit#283 cut the traffic at Hines and Industrial followed
 immediately by the dispatcher's order to 283 to cut traffic, Hines
 and Industrial. Furthermore, the patterns, types, and sheer numbers
 of sirens you can hear at the Trade Mart joining the motorcade sound
 much different from the patterns, types, and much fewer numbers on
 Ch.l. This is proof that the sirens heard on Ch.1 were not at the
Trade Mart. Therefore, they were part of the motorcade.

I have since learned that one of the lead cyclists named E. D. Brewer was
known by the nickname Buddy. So it may well have been McLain yelling
over the open microphone to his buddy to take off.


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Ramsey, Prof. Norman et al., Report of the Committee on Ballistic Acoustics,
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Statistics, 5th edition, W.H. Freeman and Company, San Francisco, 1972

Freund, John E., Modern EIementary Statistics, 3rd edition, Prentice-Hall,
Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1971

Hodges, J.L., Jr., and Lehman, E.L., Basic Concepts of Probability and
Statistics, 2nd edition, Holden-Day, Inc., San Francisco, 1970

Hoel, Paul G., Introduction to Mathematical Statistics, 4th edition, John Wiley
& Sons, New York, 1971

Koosis,Donald J., Statistics, A Self-Teaching Guide, 2nd edition, John Wiley
& Sons, New York, 1977

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