Soc.History.War.Vietnam Newsgroup
Archive Log #96-048



This is the soc.history.war.vietnam archived log sh96-048, containing
articles 4800 to 4899, dated 02/14 to 02/17/96.  All articles to
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___________________________Log Begins_________________________________

Index:  4800      Reference:  4540, 4781
From: rickncma@aol.com (RickNCMA)
Subject: Re: REQ: vietnam war country lyrics
Date: 14 Feb 1996 08:25:01 -0500
Organization: America Online, Inc.
Keywords: Cultural representations, music

just remembered another one--"My Uncle," by the Flying Burrito
Brothers, on their first album, "The Gilded Palace of Sin"; the
Burritos were perhaps the first country-rock band, and "My Uncle" was
an uptempo shitkicker against the draft.

Rick McGahey

"Being in politics is like being a football coach.  You have to be smart
enough to understand the game, and dumb enough to think it's
important."--Gene McCarthy

----------------------

Index:  4801      Reference:  4645, 4656
From: baguio@ix.netcom.com (Spectre Gunner)
Subject: Re: USAF Gunships
Date: 14 Feb 1996 08:26:16 -0500
Organization: Baguio Technology Group
Keywords: AC-130E, Spectre Gunships (USAF); SA-7 SAM (PAVN)

In article <602084656@panix3.panix.com>, Brian Ross posted:
BR> In article <602074645@panix3.panix.com>, Spectre Gunner wrote:
BR>SG> Armor
BR>SG>      The AC-130E could take a tremendous pounding.  I'll show you a
BR>SG> pix of one that took a direct hit from a SA-7 and made it home.
BR> 
BR>      A "direct hit" or a near miss?  As I've always understood it,
BR> SAM's use proximity fuses, so even a near miss would result in a lot
BR> of damage but not necessarily the downing of the target.  While I
BR> don't doubt your aircraft pictured suffered a hit, the severity would
BR> perhaps suggest that it wasn't a "direct hit" (particularly
BR> considering the SA-7 regularly downed B52's).

The aircraft in question was hit in the tail section of the aircraft.
The missile penetrated the skin at a point about a foot above the join
where the side of the ramp and door meet the fuselage.  The impact
point was fairly close to the point where the ramp and the door meet.
( Hope that is clear, wish I could draw you a picture )
(Question to moderator:  may I post the picture?)

The missile was actually inside of the aircraft when it blew, it took
out all of the hydraulics, broke several ribs, blew a zillion holes in
the skin and raised havoc with the gunners and the illuminator
operator.  It was the first CONFIRMED hit by an SA-7.  There was one
aircraft lost about a week earlier and it was a SUSPECTED hit byan
SA-7, however there were no survivors and no radio messages.

I'm not sure that the SA-7 had the "legs" to get to a B52's altitude.
The SA-7 is the shoulder-fired copy of the US AIM-9 heat-seeking
missile and I thought it took an "adult" SAM to reach the 50,000+ foot
altitudes where the BUFFs flew.

-snip-
BR>SG> As to the 105MM, whenit fired, it was not as bad as one would imagine.
BR>SG> It had a good recoil system, and actually seemed to fire in slow
BR>SG> motion.  We had a huge steel cage mounted to the back to keep us from
BR>SG> getting hit when it fired, but we used to have one gunner on each
BR>SG> side, and when it fire and the breech came back, we waited until it
BR>SG> just started forward, opened the breech block and pulled out the
BR>SG> brass.  The other gunner slammed in a new (crimped) round, and by the
BR>SG> time the gun went back into battery position, we had the breech block
BR>SG> all closed.  That is what let us keep up a strong rate of fire for a
BR>SG> reasonably long period of time.
BR> 
BR> An interesting point which I hadn't considered before.  he normal
BR> 105mm howitzer used seperate loading ammunition.  Obviously the USAF
BR> modified the ones mounted in the AC130 to use fixed case ammunition. 
BR> One wonders if there were any other significant differences.  Was the
BR> mounting slaved to the fire control system (ie it compensated for the
BR> aircraft's movement and the difference in the trajectories for the
BR> various weapons at a given range) or simply fixed in azimuth and
BR> elevation?

During the mission the weapon was set in a fixed position and the fire
control system made the aiming adjustments.  We did have to crank the
gun up and down for takeoff and landing as the muzzle-blast deflector
was so long that it would scrape the runway if we didn't move the gun.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Vietnam Veteran
AC-130E Spectre Gunships
16th Special Operations Squadron (USAF)
"We were winning when I left."

----------------------

Index:  4802      Reference:  4533, 4543
From: baguio@ix.netcom.com (Spectre Gunner)
Subject: Re: REQ: Vietnam War History Video Series?
Date: 14 Feb 1996 08:27:28 -0500
Organization: Baguio Technology Group

On 2 Feb 1996 09:44:58 -0500, "John R. Tegtmeier" 
posted:
JT> On 2 Feb 1996 <602024533@panix3.panix.com>, John A. Landry wrote:
JT>JL> I'm trying to find out the name, producer, and source of a Vietnam War
JT>JL> video history series I saw on PBS in the mid '80's.  It was maybe 6 to
JT>JL> 8 segments of 1 hour each.  I remember it used to be on once or twice
JT>JL> a year, but now I never see it anymore.
JT>JL> 
JT>JL> A co-worker thinks the name of the series is "The 10,000 day War" but
JT>JL> a call to the PBS Video Store doesn't pull that title up.  I received
JT>JL> an e-mail message from the Program Director at a local Seattle PBS
JT>JL> station, and he thinks the series was called "Vietnam: A Television
JT>JL> History", but that doesn't sound right to me.  My wife thinks the
JT>JL> later was a more recent production.
JT>JL> 
JT>JL> Anyway, I'd love to buy a set of the whole series if I could only
JT>JL> figure out the correct name and a source.
JT> 
JT> John,
JT> 
JT> The series was called "Vietnam: A Television History", and it had 13
JT> one hour segments.  It was produced  by WGBH (Boston's PBS station),
JT> Central Independent Television/UK and Antenne 2 (France). The series
JT> is/was available on cassettes from Sony.  Copyright dates range from
JT> 1985 to 1987.  Stanley Karnow's book "Vietnam: A History" was
JT> developed as a companion to the series.

John:

You never cease to amaze me!  My hat is off to you!

Frank

----------------------

Index:  4803      Reference:  
From: "George Moore" 
Subject: Indochina Trip Report (fwd)
Date: 14 Feb 1996 08:29:06 -0500
Organization: x
Keywords: Economic growth, Viet Nam; Doi Moi; Khmer Rougr; Travel, SRV
     War Crimes Museum, SRV; Travel, Cambodia; Traavel, Laos;

     This report may have already been posted to
soc.history.war.vietnam, but if not, readers may enjoy an impression
of today's Indochina written by another member of the post-war
generation.

George Moore
gmoore3501@msn.com

----------
From:     claudia@netcom.com
Sent:     Thursday, February 08, 1996 8:38 PM
To:  George Moore
Subject:  Trip Report (fwd)

Indochina Trip Report
Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam
1994-1995

Barry M. Crawford
Klongtoey, Bangkok
10110  Thailand

Dr. Dennis Doolin
Asian Studies
University of Maryland

January 1996
 
I.  Introduction
     Laos -  Land of a "Million Elephants".  Vietnam -  The War. 
Cambodia -  The Killing Fields.  These three countries had little
meaning to the average young American of my age.  For my generation,
the Vietnam War was not talked about nor studied in school in the same
manner as the Revolutionary war, World Wars I and II, and even the
Korean Conflict.  It was not until the late 1980's that the academic
community began to open my eyes to the happenings in Southeast Asia
during the 1960's.  This report is the culmination of my desire to see
for myself what really happened and why.  I became interested in 
Southeast Asia when I took a class on the Vietnam War at The Ohio
State University in 1986.  The text that we used then is still the
best history of Vietnam (in English) available today, Stanley Karow's
"Vietnam. A History."
     My intent for this report is not to retype a bunch of history
from a book, but to share my observations on the present and future
direction of these countries.  You are in a unique position as the
audience for this paper - you have extensive first hand experience
with all three of these fascinating countries during the times of
their turmoil.  Plus, you have a knowledgeable feel of my background
with Southeast Asia.  By combining these two aspects, I hope to
provide an enlightening "solid trip report" worthy of consideration.
     As background, the trips to Vietnam were in July and October of
1994, Laos and Cambodia in December of 1995.  Also important, however,
has been the time in Bangkok this year.  Bangkok is very much the
regional center it claims to be, and the Bangkok Post's Inside
Indochina section each week provides a more detailed analysis of
events in the region than anywhere else.
     As in any personal travel journey, I have based my observations
on what I know, what I saw and how I have interpreted these events. 
These observations are therefore clouded by my own cultural
experiences.  I realized how this can severely skewer judgments when I
had two people react passionately to my social trip report that I sent
out last month.  (I sent you a copy - hope you received it.)  The
nature of the Worldwide Web being as it is, my report was circulated
to many other people who don't know me.  Two responses from people 
who were interested in Cambodia severely questioned my judgment that
"Cambodia is going to Hell again, this time at their own hands." 
These people did not understand my reasoning because they didn't have
any background into Asian culture, religion, business, corruption,
Royalty, treatment of women, etc.  Unfortunately, these things are
still a way of life here.
     Hopefully, my observations for Vietnam are correct and for
Cambodia incorrect.  I realize that my background on Laos is still too
limited to really form a good opinion on its immediate future.  This
year I have to make a decision regarding whether or not to visit
Burma.  "Visit Mynamar '96" is being heavily promoted by the SLORC but
just as heavily condemned by many NGO's and Human Rights groups.  I'll
keep you informed but I think that my next trip will be back to
Cambodia and up to Angkor Wat.

II.  Thanh Pho Ho Chi Minh (Socialist Republic of Vietnam)
     The Vietnamese Communist Party is still very ideologically
aligned to the Asian communist doctrine, as modified heavily
throughout the years, but are also very pragmatic in relation to
economic matters.  The bottom line - when the former Soviet Union and
its satellite Eastern European countries were no longer able to
subsidize Vietnam's budget, something had to give.  A sudden 
opening (compared to the long years of revolution) to Western, but
more specifically Asian money has caused a remarkable recovery of the
Vietnamese economy.  Obviously, meaningful statistics are unavailable
to enable direct comparison, but the 1989 opening of Vietnam to
outside investors ('Doi Moi') has created a thriving marketforce
economy, although primarily in the urban centers for the present time.
     The growth potential in Vietnam is phenomenal.  Even Microsoft
Windows comes in a Vietnamese language edition.  It may only be a
stereotype, but the Chinese mentality of the Vietnamese is evident
throughout the city.  Of all three countries, the people in Vietnam
are by far the most resourceful and  hardworking people in the area. 
The Vietnamese race is mainly of Chinese descent and their culture,
religion, and social structure all resemble Chinese traditions.  These
traits propel them above the other two countries in regards to
economic transition from communist central planning to a free market 
economy.  Shops, businesses, hotels, buildings, and most importantly 
infrastructure projects are being built at an alarming pace.  The
tourist and businessmen who first visited Vietnam in 1989 would not
recognize Ho Chi Minh City today.  The growth, as in most present day
cities, tends to be upwards.  The 11 floors at the old Continental
Hotel, where war correspondents would sip drinks and watch the city,
will soon be dwarfed by new Omni's and Marriot hotels.  The skyline of
Ho Chi Minh City is the best indication of the economic prosperity of
the country.
     Tourism plays a leading role in the spread of economic vitality
to other sectors of the economy.  While not a major savior of any
economy that isn't already improving, tourism fuels the infrastructure
boom which can in turn fuel tourism.  Vietnam is the first of the
three countries to increase its main international airport from more
than 2 gates (1 arrival / 1 departure).  Even the duty free shop at
Tan Son Nhut Airport is of world class caliber, albeit small.  Vietnam
is in the best position in the region with regards to attracting
tourism.  A long and interesting cultural history, recent
revolutionary conflicts with both France and America, and an abundance
of natural tourist attractions made Vietnam more attractive than Laos
or Cambodia.
     Foreign influences, specifically investors, are emerging as the
new power brokers in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City.  The earliest to
arrive in numbers were the Singaporeans, followed by the Taiwanese and
then the Japanese.  And while relations with China are not as chilled
as they became in the late 1970's, the Chinese influence isn't
perceived to be as politically charged as it is economically directed. 
American influence is a long way from again gaining a spotlight in
South East Asia, but the prospect of large American multi-national
companies are clearly on the immediate horizon.  For now, the greatest
Western influence comes from Australia and France, followed by 
Germany.
     Vietnamese foreign policy has recently attracted much attention
to the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN).  Vietnam
became the seventh member of this organization in 1995, opening the
door for a full 10 member ASEAN in the not so distant future. 
Mynamar, Cambodia and Laos are the three remaining countries who have
only observer status at present.  The lifting of the American-led
embargo preceded the opening of an embassy in Hanoi and a future
consulate in Ho Chi Minh City.  The United States is no longer leading
the prohibition of the World Bank and other United Nations money
institutions from lending large sums of investment and infrastructure
money.  Inflation is becoming a larger worry to financial advisors,
although the decision to shift all domestic transaction to the
Vietnamese currency, Dong, has help stabilize prices in the country.
     The Mekong River Delta plays a central role in the agriculture
sector of Vietnam.  The fertile region located south of Ho Chi Minh
City provides the food and livelihood to a large proportion of the
southern population.  The Red River Delta in the north provides a
similar role for the northern population.  Ho Chi Minh City, situated
on the Saigon River,  is the commerce and transportation hub of the
region.  In its suburbs to the east are the offshore oil terminals
where Vietnam's main export product is found.  Presently there 
is no indigenous oil refinery in the country, so crude oil is exported
mainly to Singapore for refining.

Sites with present day historical/political/cultural value:

     Places of worship.   Ho Chi Minh is filled with Catholic
Cathedrals, Hindu Temples, Chinese Pagodas, and Muslim Mosques.  The
communist doctrine in force in Vietnam condemned the use of religion
as a social or educational vehicle.  However, they were never able to
eradicate the Vietnamese desire for religion.  Throughout the
communist years, religion seemed to be tolerated as long as it was
confined to the home.  At the present time, Buddhist monks who seek to
criticize the government are still confined as political prisoners.
The most famous places of worship are the Emperor of Jade Pagoda
(Phuoc Hai Tu), Notre Dame Catholic Cathedral, and the Xa Loi Pagoda. 
This pagoda was famous in the early 1960's when a few monks committed
self-immolation to protest President Diem's oppression of the Buddhist
religion.  President Diem was a Catholic, which provided him a special
relationship with President Kennedy, at least in the beginning of
Kennedy's term.   Vietnamese Buddhism is very different from Thai and
Cambodian Buddhism and it shows in their pagodas (wats in Thailand and
Cambodia).
     Museums.  The War Crimes Exhibition is the most popular tourist
site in Ho Chi Minh City for both Western and Asian tourists.  It
portrays a very chilling account of American, French and even
Vietnamese atrocities committed during the wars.  Most of the photos
were taken by American news cameramen, from newspapers around the
world.  Vintage American war materiel, all of it still painted army
green with the original serial markings, is scattered around the
complex.
     The Revolutionary Museum.  Housed near the old presidential
palace, this museum preserves the history of the Vietnamese struggle
without the graphic nature of the War Crimes Exhibition.  In this
building the South Vietnamese civilian leadership ran the war from the
basement bunkers.
     Reunification Hall.  This was the old presidential palace.  Still
kept almost as it was left in 1975.  The place is still beautifully
maintained, including the holes where the South Vietnamese pilot
bombed it in April, 1975.  One of the best sites in the city, it is
now host to many international conventions and trade shows, including
the first American-Vietnamese trade show held in late 1994.
     Chu Chi Tunnels - these famous Vietcong War tunnels on the
Northern edge of Ho Chi Minh City - are approximately 30 kilometers
from downtown.  An interesting site, the tunnels have been enlarged
for Western tourists.
     The charm of old Saigon lies in the central business district
along the river and in Chinatown.  These areas are the focus of
today's renovation and revitalization projects.  Ho Chi Minh City will
again be the bustling capital of southern Vietnam, a major economic
force in the coming years.

III. Vientiane (Lao People's Democratic Republic)
     Laos.  Of all three countries, this one is the most difficult to
explain.  The country is the most isolated of the three countries in
the region, mainly due to their own policies.  There is no real desire
to see an influx of Western money into the investment market, mainly
due to the bad aspects that it would bring along.  Asian money seems
to be more welcome, with mainly Thai businessmen being the dominant
force.
     Laos has not developed a tourism industry.   Again, it seems that
there is no desire to allow foreigners into the country.  It lacks an
abundance of natural tourist resources and no real tourist attractions
like beaches or great cultural sites.  The main sites are in the
capital city, Vientiane, the old royal capital of Luang Phabang and
the "Plain of Jars" region. 
     Laos is still the "most communist" of all three countries
(obviously Cambodia is no longer communist) but the people were not as
oppressed as Americans expect all communists to be.  The country is
still rigidly controlled, especially the press.
     The biggest difference about Laos is the small number of people. 
The entire country contains maybe 4 million people, spread all
throughout the countryside.  The capital, Vientiane, is really a small
village by Asian standards.  Most of the interesting sites are within
a small radius of the capital, almost entirely within walking
distance.

Sites with present day historical/political/cultural value:

     The most famous tourist site is the Pha That Luang (Great Sacred
Stupa) which is also the symbol of Lao sovereignty.  This large
religious monument is said to date from the 13th century but it was
totally restored in the early part of this century by the French.
     Wat Si Saket - A Thai name, this is the oldest temple in the
country.  It was not destroyed by the invading Siamese because
(according to  legend) it was built in the Thai style.  It contains
thousands of old Buddha images.
     Haw Pha Kaew  - the old royal temple, directly across the street
from the Wat.  Rebuilt very recently (1942), somewhat disappointing.
     Wat Si Muang - houses the city pillars and legend holds that a
young virgin sacrificed herself during the building of the temple to
protect the residents of the city.
     That Dam - The Black Stupa - very near to the US Embassy, a large
black Stupa (a stupa is hard to explain to Americans - it looks like
an elongated upside down spinning top - sort of) that is in the middle
of a road roundabout.
     Patuxai - their Independence monument built with concrete donated
from the US military, which was suppose to have been used to build a
new runway in 1969.  The Lao government thought that they needed a
Vertical Runway instead (this is the name the foreigners call it) and
made an Arc de Triomphe look-a-like in Laos.  Impressive view of the
city from the top.
     Unknown Soldiers Memorial -  A white stupa to commemorate the
Pathet Lao who died.
     Lao Revolutionary Museum -  contains a collection of photos and
artifacts about the Pathet Lao's struggle for power.
     Unfortunately, that is about it for important sites in Laos.  The
problem really is in the presentation.  There is no attempt to make
any of these sites into anything more than just a site.  No history,
no guides, nothing in English (or Thai or any other language).  I
guess the feeling is that if they build these up as tourist
attractions, then tourists will want to come.
     The prospects for Laos are limited.  They do not have a large
population base to attract the high paying factory jobs that require
cheap labor, i.e. computer parts assembly.  They also do not have a
navigable river channel to the sea, the Mekong being un-navigable at
the Cambodian border due to waterfalls in the region.  Laos, in my
humble opinion, is an anomaly in this day and age.  It served its
purpose for the French, Thais and Chinese when it was a buffer zone
between the Vietnamese, French and British.  But now it almost seems
that Laos is land waiting to be overtaken.  The people are ethnically
mixed, but a majority belong to the Thai race and would easily
assimilate into the Kingdom of Thailand.  It will be interesting to
see how Laos develops, but as in Vientiane, nothing will happen very
quickly.

IV.  Phnom Penh (Royal Government of Cambodia)
     I hope that this is not what hell will be like, but I think
Cambodia is trying to go in that direction.  Cambodian history can and
has filled a large number of recent books, of which I have read 6 this
year.  But I was still not prepared for the reception that I found
here.  It is reasonably safe to visit Cambodia and even to make the
trip to Siem Reap to see Angkor Wat.
     The economic potential of Cambodia is too risky to seriously
consider investments for most overseas companies.  The only ones who
are making investments are heavily involved in the drug and money
laundering aspects of the economy.  Vietnamese, Malaysian and Thai
businessmen are the most heavily represented foreigners in Phnom Penh. 
The most striking observation about the city was the lack of
Westerners - tourist, business, or residents.  The Western embassy and
NGO personnel were conspicuous in their absence, totally unlike
Thailand or Vietnam.
     Tourism, with the exception of Angkor Wat, is almost
non-existent.  A Cambodian-American friend of mine who owns a
restaurant that caters to foreigners is planning on shutting down soon
due to the lack of customers.  The twice daily flights to/from Bangkok
are full, however, and many tourists head straight up to Siem Reap to
see Angkok Wat. 
     The stability of the government is very difficult to gauge. 
Second Prime Minister Hun Sen has recently consolidated his power over
the First Prime Minister and is effectively ruling the country.  The
King, while still personally respected, has lost most of his influence
in governmental affairs.  His recent decision to elevate the Queen was
quickly rebuffed by the government.
     Cambodia's relations with its neighbors are officially cordial
but stiff in reality.   Hun  Sen's relationship to the old
Vietnamese-installed government and his Khmer Rouge background makes
him suspect to many Khmers.  The Khmer Rouge's recent attacks on the
Thai-Cambodian border town of Poipet highlight the difficulties that
still exist in wiping out their strongholds.
     The future for Cambodia unfortunately is not bright.  They will
be left behind Vietnam in the race for regional prosperity.  As this
happens, Vietnam can and will again try to force their 'elder brother'
relationship onto the Cambodians.  Potential border disputes are being
kept in check by Hun Sen, but if there is a change in the coalition
government then these disputes may again lead to bigger problems.
     The Mekong River flows north/south through Cambodia, meeting in
Phnom Penh with the Tonle Sap River before splitting again and heading
into Vietnam.  Water is a big part of Cambodian religion and manifests
itself most prominently in the annual "reversal of the river"
festival.  The King again has presided over this annual event in late
November, when the Tonle Sap changes direction due to the receding
flood waters of the Mekong River.  Whereas Vietnam has the Mekong
River Delta as its ricebowl, Cambodia has the freshwater "Great Lake",
the Tonle Sap, as its main source of food.

Sites with present day historical/political/cultural value:

The two biggest attractions are the Tuol Sleng Museum which housed the
notorious S-21 prison.  The place is a shocking reminder of what
people can do to their own race.  The pictures of the victims (before
execution) are the most horrible.  All of their fear shows so clearly
in their eyes.  A must visit.  The other must visit is the Killing
Fields of Choeung Ek, where up to 17,000 of the prisoners of S-21 were
beaten to death and pushed into mass graves.  So far the government
and private organizations have uncovered about 8,000 remains and have
housed them in a glass tower.  Most of us remember the pictures of the
skulls lying on the ground but they have now been moved into this
tower.  Still, a chilling scene that shouldn't be missed.
     Wats - Cambodia has a number of old wats that are being rebuilt. 
One that is really old is the city namesake, Wat Phnom situated at the
highest point of the city.  Legend has it that a young widow named
Penh found Buddha statues in the river that floated down from Laos on
this spot.  So the city became Phnom Penh (it was originally called
"Four Rivers" in English).
     Wat Ounalom, Wat Lang Ka, and Wat Koh are all famous old wats
that are being rebuilt by the present government.  All were open to
visitors and are undergoing renovations.
     Victory Monument - in the center of the old city by the junction
of the Mekong and Tonle Sap Rivers.   It used to be the Independence
Monument to commemorate Cambodian Independence from France, now it has
been officially changed to commemorate the war dead of the present
government.
     National Museum - a very sad scene since most of Cambodian
heritage has been destroyed. The few remaining articles were stolen
after the KR were driven away and what is left would not fill up a
one-room schoolhouse.  Very sad, especially since the Khmer race was
an ancient and powerful race during the time of our Western Middle
Ages.
     The Royal Palace and the Silver Pagoda.  The two things that the
KR didn't destroy.  The Palace was the prison for the King - (who was
the Prince at the time) and his most favorite consort (Queen Monique)
during the 4 years of KR rule.  The Silver Pagoda is housed in the
outer courtyard grounds of the Palace and is indeed spectacular.

Bibliography

Karnow, Stanley.  Vietnam. A History, London: Penguin, 1984.
Chanda, Nayan.  Brother Enemy.  The War After the War.  A History of
     Indochina since the Fall of Saigon, Bangkok: Asia Books, 1986.
Chandler, David.  A History of Cambodia, 2nd Edition, Chiang Mai,
     Thailand: Silkworm Books, 1993.
Chandler, David.  Brother Number One.  A Political Biography of Pol
     Pot,  Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books, 1992.
Osborne, Milton.  Sihanouk, Prince of Light.  Prince of Darkness, 
     Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1994.
Laos. Lonely Planet Travel Survival Kit.  Joe Cummings, Lonely Planet
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Neher, Clark D.  Southeast Asia in the New International Era. 2nd
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Southeast Asian Affairs 1995, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
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Sihanouk Reminisces, Norodom Sihanouk with Bernard Krisher, D.K.
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South-East Asia on a Shoestring.  Lonely Planet Publications: February
     1992
Focus on Southeast Asia.  Edited by Peter Church, Asean Focus Group. 
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Far Eastern Economic Review - All-Asia Travel Guide.  Southeast Asia
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Watching Cambodia.  Serge Thion.  White Lotus: Bangkok.  1993.
The Tragedy of Cambodian History.  Politics, War, and Revolution since
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Vietnamese Business Handbook - The Birth of Opportunity. 
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Cambodia/Laos.  Nelles Guides English Edition. 1994.
Cambodia & Angkor.  The Great Little Guide.  Great Little Guide Co.:
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Vietnam, Laos & Cambodia.  Lonely Planet Travel Survival Kit.  Lonely
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Vietnam.  Lonely Planet Travel Survival Kit.  Lonely Planet
     Publications,  September 1993.
Vietnam Export-Import Directory of Ho Chi Minh City (1994-1995). 
     Foreign Trade & Investment Development Center of HCMC.  1994.

----------------------

Index:  4804      Reference:  
From: "George Moore" 
Subject: Cambodia Reading List
Date: 14 Feb 1996 09:52:15 -0500
Organization: x
Keywords: Recommended reading list; Chandler, David; Osborne, Milton
     Cambodia; Kiernan, Ben

Recommended additions to the FAQ reading list of
soc.history.war.vietnam

Cambodia

Kiernan, Ben. How Pol Pot Came to Power: A History of Communism in
     Kampuchea. London: Verso Press, 1985.
          If there is an indispensable book for background on
     political events in Cambodia in the post 2nd World War period,
     this is it. The concentration of the book is on the various
     Cambodian communist party movements, but the indelible conclusion
     readers will come to is that these parties did not pose a serious
     threat to Prince Sihanouk and his Royal Government until the very
     late 1960s. This was late in the game where the Vietnamese civil
     war is concerned. Of particular interest is the contrast in what
     the US government was saying about Prince Sihanouk compared to
     what the Cambodian communists were saying about him. Their views
     were diametrically opposed. 
          The Verso Press edition of this book may now be out of
     print, but I believe it can still be found in many public
     libraries in the States. The author of the book is well known in
     Cambodian historical circles and is presently working on some
     sort of project for the US government. His appointment created a
     stir because he apparently supported the Khmer rouge earlier in
     his career. He reads the Khmer language and has translated
     numerous documents found in the Tuol Sleng "War Crimes" Museum in
     Phnom Penh.
 
Osborne, Milton.  Sihanouk: Prince of Light, Prince of Darkness. 
     Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994.
          This author has written what will probably remain the
     definitive biography on Cambodia's Prince and now once again King
     Sihanouk. Sihanouk banned the book from circulation in Cambodia
     just about immediately after it's release in 1994, which is a
     good indication to readers in the west that it cuts a bit to
     closely to the bone. The author's fascination with Sihanouk and
     events in Cambodia began during his tour as an Australian Foreign
     Service officer based in Phnom Penh in 1959.

Chandler, David P.  Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol
     Pot.  Boulder: Westview Press, 1992.
          This definitive biography of Pol Pot recently released by a
     long time follower of Cambodian events may be difficult to read
     without having first read the author's earlier work, listed
     below.

Chandler, David P.  The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War
     and Revolution since 1945.  New Haven and London: Yale University
     Press, 1991.
          No other scholar has written a book as comprehensive as the
     above where recent Cambodian history is concerned. This book will
     be the starting point for every study of events in Cambodia.

Finally, for those readers who need a dose of reality from time to
time, the following book was written by a French woman who was married
to a Khmer rouge cadre. She lived with him in Phnom Penh during the
1975-1979 period, and walked out of Cambodia in 1979 to escape from
the PAVN. The conclusions you reach after reading her book are
entirely yours.

Picq, Laurence. Au dela du ciel.  Paris, 1984

Best regards,

George Moore
gmoore3501@msn.com

----------------------

Index:  4805      Reference:  4384, 4389
From: "John R. Tegtmeier" 
Subject: Buddhist Uprising of 1966
Date: 14 Feb 1996 09:53:30 -0500
Organization: PANIX Public Access Internet and Unix, NYC
Keywords: Buddhists, protests of 1966; Hue; Danang; Herring, George
     Thich Tri Quang; Nguyen Chanh Thi; Fowler, Michael R.

On 22 Jan 1996 in article <601224389@panix3.panix.com>, Craig Thompson
wrote:
CET> I read awhile back about the Danang riots.  What year was that?

The revolt occurred in the first half of 1966, and began in Hue. 
Herring links the revolt to the Honolulu Summit between Ky and Johnson
in February (see George Herring "America's Longest War: The United
States and Vietnam 1950-1975" 2nd edition.  New York: Knopf,1986 p156-
57) and was trigger by Ky's removal of a potential political rival,
Maj Gen Nguyen Chanh Thi, as commander of I Corps.  Thi was a popular
Buddhist, a friend of Thich Tri Quang, and generally popular in the
area.  The revolt included a considerable number of the military in
the region, with major incidents in Hue and Danang.  There were
apparently also some mixed signals from the US (what less is new),
with the Saigon command giving the go ahead and Lt. Gen. Walt (US
commander of I Corps) supporting Thi.  If I get a chance, I'll try to
post a chronology of this crisis.  For a decent short article, see:

Fowler, Michael R.  "War Within a War: I Corps 1966".  Vietnam,
     February 1994, 38-44.

Regards,
John

----------------------

Index:  4806      Reference:  4490, 4511
From: ralphh@ic.gov (Ralph H)
Subject: Re: Igloo White
Date: 14 Feb 1996 10:02:45 -0500
Organization: Express Access Online Communications, Greenbelt, MD USA
Keywords: Operation Igloo White; AC-119K gunships (USAF)

Spectre Gunner (baguio@ix.netcom.com) wrote:
SG> Well, the score of 50 out of 800 is about right for a Stinger/Shadow. 
SG> If you wanted the job done right, you called for a Spectre .
SG> 
SG> Seriously, let's do some math.  
SG> On a typical mission, an AC-130 would nail about a
SG> dozen trucks. About 3% of the time they would get more than 20, often
SG> as many as 25 or 26.  So let's say  18 X 15 for 270 or so trucks each
SG> night from AC-130s. 

This is "friendly fire":  you sure you're not doing, as Shakespeare
said in Henry V, "remembering with advantage" the doughty deeds you 
accomplished?  Our nightly intel briefing usually recapped the previous
night's tally for both gunship squadrons plus the B-57s & the Pave
Nail/fighter teams, & my (admittedly shaky) recollection is that the grand
total was usually well down in the two figures.  Of course those numbers
passed from intel guys to intel guys, & everyone knows that their opinion of
us aircrew guys was pretty low.  They probably knocked off 50% of our claims
as soon as we sauntered in the door.....
  
SG> By 1972, it is estimated that interdiction efforts destroyed 75
SG> percent of the truck traffic moving down the trail.  Unfortunately,
SG> the volume was high enough that the other side only needed 15 percent
SG> to get through.

I don't recall hearing, from anyone, at the time or later, a figure
that high.  More like 10-20 percent.  Lemme do an Ed Moise & query for
sources....

SG> Amateurs talk tactics. 
SG> Warriers talk logistics.

Here we're definitely on the same wavelength.

Ralph Hitchens
AC-119K "Stinger" pilot
1971-72

----------------------

Index:  4807      Reference:  4748, 4785
From: Edwin E. Moise 
Subject: Re: KMT In Laos
Date: 14 Feb 1996 10:15:51 -0500
Organization: Clemson University
Keywords: KMT; Laos; Thailand

In article <602144785@panix3.panix.com>, Phan@tigger.Stcloud.msus.edu
(Dien Phan) wrote:
-snip-
DP>                                        My question is if KMT troops
DP> only need to go back to Taiwan, why chose Ban Houi Sai in Laos? Why
DP> not Thailand which is next to Burma and an ally of Taiwan and US?
DP> Thailand had many larger air bases and would be a much better
DP> place to pickup troops if airlift is the main purpose. So the
DP> presence of KMT troops in Laos may not be just for departure.
DP> May be they were there for many years.

Dien -

*You* are the one who first brought up page 193 of Dommen as a source
relevant to the question of KMT troops in Laos.  Please look at it
again.  It specifically and clearly describes Ban Houei Sai as a place
through which KMT troops passed when on their way to Thailand.
                                ---- -- ----- --- -- --------

"Lucien Coudoux, a journalist, saw approximately 1,200 of these
irregulars at Ban Houei Sai, on the Laos side of the Mekong,
crossing the river into Thailand"

Edwin Moise
eemoise@clemson.edu

----------------------

Index:  4808      Reference:  
From: vietnam-request@panix.com (Moderator)
Subject: Announcing New Co-Moderator
Date: 14 Feb 1996 10:36:29 -0500
Organization: PANIX Public Access Internet and Unix, NYC

In accordance with the Section 4 of Charter of soc.history.war.vietnam
as reproduced below, the current moderators of the newsgroup are
hereby announcing the appointment of a new co-moderator and are
submitting his name to the newsgroup for a five day discussion period.

The new co-moderator nominee is:

Edwin E. Moise      Historical/FAQ Advisor


The following is from the Charter:

4.  Appointment of New Moderators

        New co-moderators will be appointed as necessary through the
nomination of an individual by the other moderators. The appointment
will require a unanimous vote of the current moderators to pass. The
new co-moderator's name will then be submitted to the newsgroup for a
five day discussion period.  During these five days, any of the
current moderators may change their vote in response to this
discussion.  At the end of the five days, if all the moderators are
still in agreement, the nominee becomes a co-moderator.

----------------------

Index:  4809      Reference:  4530, 4645
From: ralphh@ic.gov (Ralph H)
Subject: Re: USAF Gunships
Date: 14 Feb 1996 10:54:39 -0500
Organization: Express Access Online Communications, Greenbelt, MD USA
Keywords: Ho Chi Minh Trail; Easter Offensive; An Loc; Bien Hoa; Danang
     AC-119K gunships (USAF); AC-119G gunships (USAF)

To supplement my learned gunship colleague.....

Spectre Gunner (baguio@ix.netcom.com) wrote:

SG> All of the AC-130 gunships were based in Thailand, except for a very
SG> short timeframe when the prototypes were being tested.

The AC-119G started out & stayed in SVN, & were turned over to the
VNAF around 71, I think.  The AC-119K squadron was based in Thailand,
but had detachments of up to 5 a/c at DaNang & Bien Hoa in SVN.  At
the latter place we mostly did Cambodia, which was quite a different
environment from the Trail proper, & also some An Loc support during
the Easter Offensive. 

SG> Fire control
SG>      We used a modern fire control system adapted from the A7 Corsair.
SG> I'm not sure what the AC-119's used, 

The AC-119K used a somewhat less sophisticated but generally effective
fire control system; the FLIR (infrared system) was identical to that
on the AC-130, but we had only a hand-operated "starlight scope"
instead of the low light level TV on the Spectre.

SG>      The AC-130E could take a tremendous pounding.  I'll show you a
SG> pix of one that took a direct hit from a SA-7 and made it home.

The 119 was much less resilient, but several took & survived hits up
to 37mm.  What my colleague didn't mention is that, in spite of the
above reference, there was an SA-7 kill of an AC-130 up in I Corps
during the early part of the Easter Offensive (I think).  Got nailed
while flying at 9500 AGL, two survivors. 

SG> Time-over-Target
SG>      The AC-130E's average mission duration was 7.1 hours!!!!  

The AC-119K could fly for about 3 & 1/2 hours, giving a TOT on the
Trail of roughly two hours or so.

SG> Operating altitudes
SG>      Face it, after a certain altitude, 7.62mm and 20MM will tumble.
SG> 40MM and 105MM don't tumble.  Needless to say, we gunners used a lot
SG> of yellow walkaround oxygen bottles.

The operating altitudes were letter-coded, alpha thru ?, referring to 
AGL:  alpha was 2500, bravo 3500, etc.  AC-119K's usually operated at 
delta or echo over the trail, & the AC-130s (as I recall) at echo or
one notch higher.  The 7.62 were ineffective above 3500 AGL, so we
never used them along the Trail; the 20mm were good to about 5500 AGL,
as I recall.

SG> Plus, the AC-130's attracted smarter, better looking gunners!

Hey -- seven hours in the back of a C-130 & anyone might start looking
good!!

Ralph Hitchens
AC-119K Stinger Pilot
1971-72

----------------------

Index:  4810      Reference:  4789
From: Edwin E. Moise 
Subject: Re: Tonkin Gulf incident
Date: 14 Feb 1996 10:55:20 -0500
Organization: Clemson University
Keywords: Tonkin Gulf incident

In article <602144789@panix3.panix.com>, "George Moore"
 wrote:
GM>      Just to keep things straight, if you have not been following
GM> recent posts to soc.history.war.vietnam, I am the guy who suggests
GM> that it is a waste of time to concentrate on what did or did not
GM> happen in the Tonkin Gulf in August of 1964.
GM>
GM>      Who cares?

George -

Either the guys in Hanoi were so willing to get into a bigger war with
the United States that they sent a bunch of torpedo boats more than
fifty miles out from their coast, to attack two U.S. Navy destroyers
there, or they were not.  I think anyone who thinks that Hanoi's
policies and Hanoi's actions were important aspects of the Vietnam War
would care about the difference.

Ed Moise
eemoise@clemson.edu

----------------------

Index:  4811      Reference:  4729, 4763
From: Craig Thompson 
Subject: Re: "So-called" anti-war movement
Date: 14 Feb 1996 18:37:04 -0500
Organization: Lost Planet Airmen
Keywords: Anti-war movement, US; Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW)
     Draft, US

In article <602124763@panix3.panix.com>, clements@u.washington.edu 
(S. Clements) writes:
SC> In article <602114729@panix3.panix.com>,
SC> Craig Thompson  wrote:
SC>CET> One of the things that has always irked me about the so-called
SC>CET> anti-war movement .... 
SC>
SC> Craig:
--snip--
SC> But I do have a question regarding "so-called":
SC> If it wasn't an "anti-war movement", what was it?

I remember it as being a "Get America Out of Vietnam and To Hell with
the South Vietnamese" movement.  It is a quirk of mine but I sometimes
associate the term "anti-war" with pacifism and though some members of
the (insert whatever adjectives you wish) movement were pacifists it
wasn't really a pacifist movement was it?

I know I am not always consistent with my usage of the term "anti-war"
but that's probably a reflection of my mixed feelings on that damn war
even after almost three decades of thinking about it almost daily.

Actually I have found this newsgroup (and AWV to a lesser extent) to
be beneficial in sorting out things that have troubled me for years. 
Its given me a chance to write about the friends I had while in the
service, a chance to remember fallen comrades, and a chance to record
things about my war that my kids and grandkids-to-be can read after
I'm gone.

This is an unique opportunity we have here folks:  vet, protestor,
whatever -- post your stories, copy your kids, and tell them where the
archives are.

And its given me an opportunity to learn.  The most recent example has
been the thread on the VVAW (and your post was excellent).  My view of
the VVAW is different now than it was before the thread started.

SC> May I make a guess that you regarded it as a "keeping my own sorry
SC> ass out of the war" movement?  

Bad guess.  I wish you had offered to bet me large sums of money on
this (still not too late :->)  If we were talking about people
protesting the draft your guess might have been closer to the mark. 
Incidentally (though I was burnt pretty badly on this topic last year)
I don't believe we should ever have an involuntary draft.

Back to the motivations of the (insert adjectives of your choice)
movement.  I would imagine that there were a considerable number of
different reasons driving the various participants.  I know that when
I was an anti-war puke in 1966-67 (true there wasn't much of a
movement in Northern Idaho at the time but what little there was I was
a part of) I thought that the war in Vietnam was just a civil war and
the Viet Cong were the equivalent of our own American revolutionaries. 
I've told the story before so I won't go into detail now but in April
of 1967, I enlisted for Airborne primarily (a bit more complex than
this actually) so I could speak out against the war as a veteran of
it.  Yep, the sound judgement of 19 year-olds.

Well, I was anti-American involvement when I got in country but as my
tour progressed I came to realize that the VC weren't analogs to our
own Minutemen, that Ho might not have been Adolf Hitler but he wasn't
Washington either (nor was Thieu Lincoln), and that the people of 
Vietnam needed us.

Probably would be foolish to generalize about the motivations of such
a diverse group as the (you know the routine by now :->) movement but
I will say that they either were selfish (caring only about ending
American involvement) or naive (thinking that the commies weren't 
such bad guys) or both.

I wish to hell that they had been right; that when Saigon fell, the
commies would have let bygones be bygones, that the Vietnamese could
have granted amnesty to one another and gone on to build a prosperous
and happy nation.  And I wish that we could have seen that happen and
would have helped them like we did with the Marshall plan after WW2. 
But there was no amnesty, there was no forgiveness, there was no
compassion, was there?

--snip--
SC> and wrong, also, in that you may underestimate the effectiveness of
SC> the movement in ending the war

Not at all.  They were very effective.  But what was the cost?  Sort
of rough on the South Vietnamese don't you think?  I doubt that more
than a handful of those in the AWM wanted things to turn out the way
they did.  I don't question their sincerity, but it is quite possible
to be both sincere and wrong.

Craig
Anti-war puke 1965-68
Boonie-Rat 1968-69
If I thought I was wrong I'd change my mind.

----------------------

Index:  4812      Reference:  4808
From: frankv@prognet.com (Frank Vaughan)
Subject: Re: Announcing New Co-Moderator
Date: 14 Feb 1996 18:40:35 -0500
Organization: InternetMCI

vietnam-request@panix.com (Moderator) wrote:
MOD> In accordance with the Section 4 of Charter of soc.history.war.vietnam
MOD> as reproduced below, the current moderators of the newsgroup are
MOD> hereby announcing the appointment of a new co-moderator and are
MOD> submitting his name to the newsgroup for a five day discussion period.
MOD> 
MOD> The new co-moderator nominee is:
MOD> 
MOD> Edwin E. Moise      Historical/FAQ Advisor

I recommend the acceptance of Ed by the other moderators.  I have seen
Ed's postings, and have shared threads with him.  He has always been a
gentleman, even in disagreement.  I believe that he has demonstrated,
in this newsgroups as well as in others, the kind of personality that
adds value to moderated newsgroups.

This opinion is my own, and is totally unsolicited.

Frank Vaughan

----------------------

Index:  4813      Reference:  4771
From: starmadnes@aol.com (StarMadnes)
Subject: Re: On This Date - Feb. 13
Date: 14 Feb 1996 18:41:20 -0500
Organization: America Online, Inc.
Keywords: Medal of Honor recipient

In article <602134771@panix3.panix.com>, vietnam-request@panix.com
(Moderator) writes:
MOD> n safety as he fearlessly dashed across the fire-swept terrain and
MOD> was seriously wounded by enemy fire.  At the same time, a grenade was
MOD> thrown into the gully where he had fallen, landing between him and
MOD> several companions.  Fully realizing the inevitable results of his
MOD> action, L/Cpl. Creek rolled on the grenade and absorbed the full force
MOD> of the explosion with his body, thereby saving the lives of 5 of his
MOD> fellow marines.  As a result of his heroic action, his men were

Is this "On This Date" posted daily?  Never noticed it before if so. 
I can't even describe how things like this make me feel when I read
them!  Thanks for posting it.

----------------------

Index:  4814      Reference:  4734, 4757
From: Paul Durham 
Subject: Re: Hmong Origins
Date: 14 Feb 1996 18:42:05 -0500
Organization: MPR Teltech Ltd.
Keywords: Meo; Hmomg

In article <602124757@panix3.panix.com>, RustyLang wrote:
RL> In article <602114734@panix3.panix.com>, gmoore3501@msn.com (George
Moore)
RL> writes:
RL>GM>   My understanding is that "Miao", usually written in the United
RL>GM> States as "Meo", is the polite term for these tribes in the local
RL>GM> languages and that "Hmong" is a pejorative Thai language term which
RL>GM> means something like "barbarian hill tribesman".
RL> 
RL> Hi George,
RL> 
RL> You have it backward.  "Meo" is the perjorative which means something
RL> like "barbarian".  However, "Hmong" is what they call themselves in
RL> their own language, meaning something like "free people".

Actually "Meo" is Vietnamese for "cat". Likewise "Miao" is Chinese for
"cat". I don't know how the association got made, but I don't think
the Viets and Chinese are all that negative about cats (compared to
some other animals) so I suppose the term is not as pejoriative as it
might be.

I know there _is_ a Vietnamese word meaning "barbarian" which is
commonly applied to the Montagnards (not just Hmong), can't remember
it at the moment.

Perhaps someone out there knows the Thai/Lao name(s).

Paul

----------------------

Index:  4815      Reference:  4789
From: STourison@aol.com (Sedgwick Tourison)
Subject: RE: Tonkin Gulf Incident
Date: 14 Feb 1996 18:43:06 -0500
Organization: America Online, Inc.
Keywords: Tonkin Gulf incident; Oplan 34A; Operation DeSoto; USS Maddox
     Marolda, Edward; MACSOG; NSC

A few thoughts to mull around about the Gulf of Tonkin incident.

In 1986 the U.S. Navy's Naval Historical Center published a history of
the U.S. Navy's operations in Viet Nam during the period 1959-1965. 
One of the co-authors, Ed Marolda, a frequent spokesperson at the
Center about the Gulf incident, authored these words:

   "...American leaders did not seek to provide a North Vietnamese
reaction in order to secure a casus belli, as often has been alleged. 
Naval officers, especially, were confident that the Communists were
unable, unwilling, and unlikely to challenge the U.S. Navy at sea. 
Acquiescence to American power rather than military opposition, was
espected.  When it became evident, through intelligence sources, that
the enemy did intend to attack, halting the Desoto Patrol was vetoed
because fleet commanders then felt it imperative to stand up to the
military threat and reassert the traditional American support for
freedom of the sea....the North Vietnamese could not confuse the
Desoto Patrol with 34A operations.  Maddox was clearly distinguishable
from the South Vietnamese fast craft on 2 August......the validity of
the 4 August attack also was established, thus convincing American
leaders that a strong reaction was warranted." (p. 435/436).

Ed Marolda authored these words while in possession of the MACSOG
Documentation Study.  The study, more than anything McNamara writes
today, refutes the U.S. Navy's position in 1986 and has, for
posterity, told us what the thinkers were thinking about in 1963-1964,
a document the author's of the Navy's history wish did not exist.  But
it does and it contains what was deliberately withheld from the
Pentagon Papers.

The MACSOG, a detailed review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, an 18 inch
thick study of MACSOG's covert operations during 1964-1969, contains
major excerpts from the National Security Council directive of March
1964 and the step by step authorization for McNamara's Plan 34A from
the date the president approved its take over by the Defense
Department through each covert team mission in 1964.  The NSC
authorization, and I have copies of the document at Appendix 2,
describes the original operations order issued on 15 December 1963
which forwarded the concept of covert operations and its objective, to
use these attacks in consort with other initiates to persuade Ha Noi
to rethink its infiltration of South Viet Nam.  Within Plan 34A there
was a provision for air strikes.  The air strikes were one of the
higher levels of pressure to be exerted if previous covert raids did
not elicit the type of response that Washington hoped for.  It was at
the level of air strikes that Washington had a great concern that
China might well enter the war, to include the presence of Chinese
ground forces inside North Viet Nam.


As we now know, the agent teams transmitting from inside North Vietnam
had all been captured some years earlier and the deputy chief of the
South Vietnamese Army's counterpart to MACSOG, the unit actually
launching the teams and intimately familiar with our capabilities and
limitations through the use of the covert forces, was an in-place
agent, Captain Do Van Tien. Viet Nam surfaced him about 2 weeks after
my book was released.  

And so, to understand why the Gulf of Tonkin incident took place and
who provoked who, it is important to establish what Ha Noi knew about
our plans and intentions.  Marolda may voice the opinion of a naval
scholar writing at the direction of the U.S. Navy but he has all too
conveniently ignored both the JCS documents and what we learned in
1966 from the POWs captured in the Gulf.  

What Ha Noi knew in 1964 was that it appeared the covert operations
were winding down, the CIA having sent 40 percent of the force into
the North in 1963 and lost them all, McNamara is calling for a U.S.
withdrawal, and Ha Noi is increasing its infiltration.  Thus, by
attacking the Maddox, Ha Noi was assured that we would strike the
North and thus do more than its own propaganda to persuade its
citizenry that the U.S. military wanted war in Viet Nam.  Viet Nam got
behind China, refusing to negotiate on the infiltration issue and
mocking the Soviets for having backed down to Kennedy in 1962 over the
Bay of Pigs.  This, Viet and China argued, demonstrated why the world
liberation movements should listen to and adopt the Chinese model,
not that of Moscow.

Once having brought U.S. air strikes into the North, Ha Noi was able
to mobilize its own rather ambivalent population who did not believe
everything they were told and the widened war was on.

And so, the Gulf of Tonkin incident is an historically imporant
juncture, but not because of anything terribly interesting in the
naval action itself. Rather, the Gulf of Tonkin incident was our
Achilles heel, and Ha Noi played its cards well, knowing we were
leaning forward so far in the trenches in an election year that an
attack would take place, even if we didn't want one.

Hope you enjoy the book.  You will find why the MACSOG Study was never
to have seen the light of day in the lives of those of us who served
there.

Wick Tourison

Office of the U.S. Army Attache, Saigon (1961-1963); Combined Military
Interrogation Center, J-2 (1965-1967); Detachment K, 500th MI Group (TDY to
Thailand/Laos, summer 1970); Senior Interrogation Officer, Laos Exploitation
Team, ARMA/DAO Vientiane, Laos (1971-1974).

----------------------

Index:  4816      Reference:  4533, 4543
From: abqkelly@ix.netcom.com (John Kelly)
Subject: Re: REQ: Vietnam War History Video Series?
Date: 14 Feb 1996 18:44:28 -0500
Organization: Netcom
Keywords: OSS; CIA; British; Japanese occupation, Vietnam

In article <602024543@panix3.panix.com>, John Tegtmeier wrote:
JT>JL> Anyway, I'd love to buy a set of the whole series if I could only
JT>JL> figure out the correct name and a source.
JT> 
JT> John,
JT> 
JT> The series was called "Vietnam: A Television History", and it had 13 
JT> one hour segments.  It was produced  by WGBH (Boston's PBS station),
JT> Central Independent Television/UK and Antenne 2 (France). The series
JT> is/was available on cassettes from Sony.  Copyright dates range from
JT> 1985 to 1987.  Stanley Karnow's book "Vietnam: A History" was
JT> developed as a companion to the series.

FYI, for what it's worth, etc.

This series is available in the four largish video rental stores that
I've been in, over the past several years. Hastings and Blockbuster
are two national chain stores that stock it locally. Renting at less
than a buck a night might dissuade you from buying. Myself, I taped it
off the air. 

I was particularly interested in the in-depth coverage of the events
surrounding the British surruptitious gift of Vietnam to Axis powers,
in the form of Vichy French and released/re-armed Japanese occupation
troops. In the first tape, there is an interview with the British
commander that personally did this, a man who was thereby VERY close
to the smoking gun that signaled the start of the war. The villany of
his masters in London and Washington was a slap in the face to the
Vietnamese who had supported us AGAINST the Axis, ie. Certainly, there
is no question that Churchill was comfortable with this sort of thing,
but Roosevelt was very opposed. He was in conflict with his own State
Department, however, and probably was unaware of what was happening in
this instance. Certainly our OSS, in country at the time, was
distressed! They were replaced, of course, with a more compliant and
less idealistic CIA.

----------------------

Index:  4817      Reference:  4752, 4772
From: pgrunts@aol.com (Pgrunts)
Subject: Re: Letters from a young marine grunt written in Vietnam
Date: 14 Feb 1996 18:45:12 -0500
Organization: America Online, Inc.
Keywords: Operation Idaho Canyon; Operation Virginia Ridge; An Hoa

In article <602134772@panix3.panix.com>, hollis6475@aol.com
(HOLLIS6475) writes:
H> Paul I was on Idaho Canyon and Virginia Ridge...
H> 
H> You must have been done South...

Hollis,

Operation Virginia Ridge...30 Apr-16 Jul 69...Marine losses 106 KIA,
475 WIA. Enemy losses 558 KIA, 9 prisoners.

Operation Idaho Canyon...16 Jul-25 Sep 69...Marine losses 78 KIA, 366
WIA. Enemy losses 565 KIA, 5 prisoners

(Above information taken from The Marines In Vietnam; 1954-1973)

Yes, I was down south with M-3-5. All sorts of rice paddies,
treelines, booby-traps, farmers?/VC?, children?/VC? Not many free fire
zones. We did a lot of moving Vietnamese people around supposedly for
their own good. Actually, I think part of our mission in the An Hoa
basin was to deny the VC and NVA access to the population which = food
and personnel. It takes a lot of muscle to replace trucks and other
vehicles the NVA / VC did without. 

Paul

Paul E. O'Connell

----------------------

Index:  4818      Reference:  4782
From: pgrunts@aol.com (Pgrunts)
Subject: PER NAR: The Worst Meal
Date: 14 Feb 1996 18:45:54 -0500
Organization: America Online, Inc.
Keywords: Operation Taylor Common; Personal narrative, US veteran
     Food, C-rations US

The worst meal I ever had in Vietnam was a tube of toothpaste.
Operation Taylor Common... We were up in the mountains, socked in. No
supplies. C-Rats were all gone including the datenut bread and
fruitcakes. So, I ate the toothpaste. Actually I had to share it with
others in the fire team. (Actually, I had no tooth brush to go along
with the toothpaste, except for the one I used to clean my '16', so, I
might as well have eaten the toothpaste.)

What about a cup of Java... Instant coffee and instant cocoa mixed
together along with  sugar and powdered cream. I still like cocoa and
coffee together. I drink it it memory of those who died in Vietnam.
"Take this all of you and drink it.."

Paul E. O'Connell
M3/5  VN 68-69

Paul E. O'Connell

----------------------

Index:  4819      Reference:  4781, 4800
From: pgrunts@aol.com (Pgrunts)
Subject: Re: REQ: vietnam war country lyrics
Date: 14 Feb 1996 18:47:06 -0500
Organization: America Online, Inc.
Keywords: Cultural representations, music

Another one..."Sky Pilot," by the Animals, along with their other hit,
"We Gotta To Get Out Of This Place."

Paul E. O'Connell

----------------------

Index:  4820      Reference:  
From: tegtmeie@panix.com (John Tegtmeier)
Subject: Anti-war and Nuclear Threat
Date: 14 Feb 1996 18:48:02 -0500
Organization: PANIX Public Access Internet and Unix, NYC
Keywords: Russell, Bertrand; Anti-war movement, US; Nuclear Disarmament

Seems we have discussed a bit about the anti-war movement is the US
but rather ignored one of its major antecedents - the nuclear
disarmament movement of physicist Bertrand Russell, et al.  (Quick
aside for those who don't know - the peace symbol was derived from the
semaphore signal for n and d - nuclear disarmament).

Certainly the nd movement started well before the major US involvement
in Vietnam, and there was some overlap of membership between the two
movements.

So, a couple of questions:

1.  How credible was the risk of the use of nuclear weapons, tactical
or strategic, by any of the powers directly or indirectly involved in
Vietnam?

2.  To what extent was the anti-war movement, especially in the early
formative days, influenced and shaped by the nuclear disarmament
movement or its leadership?

Any takers...

Regards,
John Tegtmeier
Co B, 3/21, 196th LIB and Aeroscout Company, 123rd Aviation Battalion
Americal - 1967/1968

**********************************************************************
"No 'healing', no apologies, no memorials, nothing can possibly
compensate for the damage done and the pain inflicted....The only
thing we can possibly do, twenty years too late, is to try and tell
the truth."  - Eric Bergerud.
**********************************************************************

----------------------

Index:  4821      Reference:
From: vietnam-request@panix.com (John Tegtmeier, Moderator)
Subject: soc.history.war.vietnam FAQ: Admin Info and Posting Guidelines
Date: 15 Feb 1996 15:02:53 -0500
Organization: PANIX Public Access Internet and Unix, NYC
Summary: This FAQ contains administrative information on    
     soc.history.war.vietnam, the location of the archives, the moderators
     names and address, and the posting guidelines as well as the appeal
     process for the newsgroup.  It also contains a brief listing of other
     shwv FAQs.

Archive-Name: vietnam/info-and-guidelines
Last-modified: 1996/02/15
Posting-Frequency: monthly

This announcement supersedes any previous ones.

Contents of this FAQ

1. SHWV FAQs.
2. Administrative Information
3. Posting Guidelines
4. Archives


Part 1. SHWV FAQs 

     Currently, there are five FAQ messages: this one; a recommended
reading list; and a 3 part FAQ on the Australian involvement in the
Vietnam War.

     Others on people, places and events of the various Indochina Wars
are being worked on, and will be posted as available.

     The moderators of the newsgroup, in accordance with the Charter,
have the sole responsibility for the development and content of any
newsgroup FAQs. Any person who believes that they have specialized in-
depth knowledge of a topic that wishes to submit a FAQ for review is
encouraged to do so by sending it to vietnam-request@panix.com.

     FAQs will be posted for comment on the newsgroup for a period of
at least one month.  More time maybe allocated at the discretion of
the moderators.  During this period, the designation [RFD] will
precede the subject in the header.  FAQs will be submitted to
news.answers and soc.answers upon completion of this process.

All FAQs will be archived at the following ftp sites:
1. rtfm.mit.edu in pub/usenet/soc.history.war.vietnam
2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu in the directory 
     pub/history/military/vietnam/soc.history.war.vietnam.  
3. mccaskill.ssn.flinders.edu.au in pub/history/Vietnam-war 

Part 2. Administrative Information:

     The moderated newsgroup soc.history.war.vietnam is dedicated to
the discussion of the Vietnam / Indochina wars, their antecedents and
their aftermath.  All points of view and disciplines are welcome.  It
is our hope to create a "flame-free" environment in which discourse is
possible, and perhaps even some healing and understanding.

     Articles may be submitted in two ways. You can use normal
newsreaders to post to the list.  These will then forward your article
to the submission address for approval.  Or you may send e-mail
directly to the submission address: vietnam@panix.com. The second way
should be faster.

     For your information, the Charter of the newsgroup is reposted on
shwv each month on the first.

The current moderator and co-moderators for soc.history.war.vietnam
are:

     John Tegtmeier      tegtmeie@panix.com
                         Current Moderator
     Co-moderators:
     Edwin E. Moise      EEMOISE@CLEMSON.EDU
                         History/Faq Advisor*
     Richard Rohde       rohde@uhunix.uhcc.hawaii.edu
                         Anthropology/FAQ Advisor
     Brian Ross          brian@coombs.anu.edu.au
                         Archivist and Backup Moderator
     Craig E. Thompson   CTHO461@ecy.wa.gov
                         Veterans Contact and Backup Moderator
     * pending 

     Requests for information should be addressed at to the contact
address:  vietnam-request@panix.com

     Please feel free to contact us with any question or suggestion. 
We hope that you all will enjoy and profit from the newsgroup.


Part 3. Posting Guidelines:

     The criteria for postings is contained in the Charter.  To assist
those who wish to post articles to the newsgroup, the posting
guidelines below were developed. 

     The submission of an article to this newsgroup implicitly gives
permission for that article to be archived for distribution, and for
quotation of that article within this newsgroup for the purpose of
discussion.  All other rights are assumed to remain with the
contributor.

     Please remember that this is a moderated newsgroup.  We are not
on-line all day long (this is all volunteer work) so there may be some
delay from the time you post to the time your article appears on the
newsgroup.  We will try to get articles up as soon as is possible,
normally within a 24 hour time frame.

     1. Topics.

          The charter requires that postings deal with the Indochina
     Wars, their antecedents and their aftermath.  This is to include
     political philosophy and social factors.  This also means the
     mind set of all the participants at the time, and in the present
     to the extent that this reflects on the aftermath of the wars.It
     was made clear from the outset that this was a multi-discipline
     newsgroup, not just history.  It is set up as such in the
     charter. 
          Posters should restrict their comments to the above.  Posts
     containing ANY material not included within the scope of the
     newsgroup, or legitimate rebuttal to material already posted,
     will be returned.  The decision as to an article being admissible
     resides with the moderators, who were named as part of  the
     voting process for the newsgroup, and their successors, as
     provided in the charter.  Further comments on the propriety of
     material shall be deemed as flames, and rejected.

     2.  Personal Comments.

          Articles must be free of personal attacks on individuals or
     groups of individuals in the readership on the newsgroup.  The
     public acts of public figures are, of course, open to critique. 
     The same is true of organizations which similiarly are also open
     to a higher level of critique. Posters will restrict their 
     comments to the material and the discourse surrounding the
     material.  ANY COMMENTS OF A PERSONAL NATURE REGARDING ANOTHER
     POSTERS INTENTIONS, MOTIVES, BELIEFS, ETC. SHALL BE DEEMED A
     PERSONAL ATTACK, AND REJECTED.
          Characterizations of another individual's beliefs or views
     as "ridiculous", "stupid", "lies" or any similar label shall be
     deemed not as a critique of the material, but a personal attack,
     and therefore rejected. Posters will restrict themselves to a
     rebuttal of the material in an article without including
     derogatory or condescending insults.

     3.  The Goal of the Newsgroup

          The goal of this newsgroup, as outlined at the time of the
     voting for its creation, was to promote a flame-free environment
     for discourse and to provide a forum in which various sides of
     the debate, coming from differing backgrounds, could exchange
     ideas.  Posters are asked to bear this in mind.  Posts seeking to
     restrict this open availability to all sides of the debate shall
     be considered flames, and will be rejected.

     4. Commercial 

          No articles of a commercial nature will be posted, with the
     exception of informational sources of not-for-profit groups
     which, at the discretion of the moderators, offer important
     benefits.  Announcements of forthcoming or recent publications in
     the field will also be allowed on a informational basis.  Any
     articles containing advertising of any services for fee must
     conform to the above to be elegible for posting.

     5. Copyright

          Please be aware of the copyright laws as they pertain to
     your submissions. They are a lot stricter than you may think. 
     Under the Berne convention, just about everything is presumed to
     be protected, even if not expressly stated.  The rule of thumb is
     simply that unless the person has expressly put the material in
     the public domain, it should be treated as protected. As stated
     above, articles posted to soc.history.war.vietnam may be quoted
     for the purpose of discussion on this newsgroup. If you need more
     complete information, please look at the copyright myth FAQ on
     the news.answers newsgroup.
          Quotations from published sources for the purposes of
     discussion or illumination are acceptable, as long as those
     quotations fall within the fair use provisions of the copyright
     laws. 

     6.  Net etiquette

          I would as posters to voluntarily adhere to common practice
     in regard to net etiquette and the posting of articles.  Quotes
     from prior posts should not be more than 50% of a posting, and
     those sections quoted should have a direct bearing on the
     commentary in the new article.  Signature files should be
     restricted to 4 lines.  The expansion of the number of Usenet
     newsgroups, as well as the number of sites getting news feeds,
     have increased dramatically, taxing the net's ability to carry
     the load.  Quoting a forty line article to say "I agree" is
     selfish.  Please use the editing features of your newsreaders and
     stick to the essentials.

     7. Cross-posting Articles.

          Request to cross-post articles will be honored with the
     following exceptions:

          A. Other Moderated Newsgroups. You should submit those
          individually to each moderator.

          B. alt.war.vietnam.  The moderator will not honor requests
          to cross-post to alt.war.vietnam except for general
          information postings.  The reasons behind this lie in the
          confusion some readers are having concrning which newsgroup
          they are posting to, and consequently, the allowable
          language in those articles.  This has resulted in an
          excessive number of rejected articles, and delays in posting
          for those only wishing to post to awv.  Contributors to shwv
          who wish to cross-post their articles to awv should do so by
          using the facilites of their newsreaders after the srticle
          appears on shwv.

          Posters who ar replying to aticles posted on other
     newsgroups must cross-post the original article to
     soc.history.war.vietnam, and post their replies to all original
     newsgroups named in the article to which they are responding. 
     This is to insure that articles are not taken out of context, and
     that the author of the original article has an opportunity to
     repond.

     8. Personal Narratives

          It has been our policy for quite some time to treat personal
     narratives - articles marked [PER NAR] in the subject header - as
     oral history.

          Respondents may ask appropriate questions, but the content
     of the articles is considered privileged, and may not be
     attacked.  This holds true not only for vets, but for those who
     were active in the anti-war movement.

          The rationale behind this is simple - it is more beneficial
     to the newsgroup to have oral history posted than it is for
     potential posters to refrain for fear of confrontation and
     critique of their actions 20+ years ago.  

     9.  Appeal Process

          There is an appeal process if you believe that your article
     was unfairly rejection.  Please refer to the Charter for full
     information. Essentially, all that is required to appeal is to
     send an e-mail reply of the rejection notice to all moderators
     (all active moderators will be in the rejected message's header)
     requesting an appeal review of the article.


Part 4. Archives:

     Soc.history.war.vietnam is archived.  Thanks to Larry Jewell and
the folks at Byrd, and Brian Ross, one of our co-moderator in
Ausraliat, these archives are available via FTP.  

The newsgroup logs, along with bibliographies, and the most recent
copies of all FAQS are available at the following sites:
1. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu in the directory 
     pub/history/military/vietnam/soc.history.war.vietnam.  
2. mccaskill.ssn.flinders.edu.au in pub/history/Vietnam-war 

     The archives at McCaskill are in Z compressed form. This site
also holds Tom Holloway's American casualty database.

John Tegtmeier, moderator - shwv

----------------------

Index:  4822      Reference:  
From: vietnam-request@panix.com (John Tegtmeier, Moderator)
Subject: soc.history.war.vietnam FAQ: Recommended Reading List
Date: 15 Feb 1996 15:06:00 -0500
Organization: PANIX Public Access Internet and Unix, NYC
Summary: This FAQ contains a recommended reading list developed
     to cover many aspects of the Indochina (Viet Nam) wars.

Archive-Name: vietnam/reading-list
Last-modified: 1996/02/15
Posting-Frequency: monthly (15th)

Frequently Asked Questions: soc.history.war.vietnam

Copyright 1996 by John R. Tegtmeier.  Permission to use this
     document is expressly given for use in Usenet newsgroup
     discussions and any other educational purpose, as long as
     the source is clearly identified and there is no fee.  All
     other rights are reserved.

Recommended Reading List on the Viet Nam War.

Below is the recommended reading list on the Indochina wars
developed by the moderators of soc.history.war.vietnam primarily
on the basis of an extensive survey of noted academics/authors in
the field, veterans and members of the era's anti-war movement. 
In addition, there are ongoing inquiries regarding new works.  An
attempt has been made to make this list as diversified as
possible, both in the range of topics and the viewpoints
represented.

The reading list has been divided into three major section for
ease on use.  The first is a "core list", a small group of works
which cover most of central themes of the Indochina Wars. In
short, it provides a basic overview.  Works for this list were
chosen on the basis of both superior quality and the coverage
requirements of the list itself.  In addition, books in print
were given preference over equivalent works that are currently
out of print.

The second section of the reading list is an extensive selection
of historical and social science analysis and non-fiction
narratives, divided into topics.  The purpose of this section is
to provide the reader with more depth in areas that may be of
interest.  All these works are recommended, and present important
insights into various topics concerning the Indochina wars. They
are listed in the following topical categories:
     A. General Works
     B. World War II to the Geneva Accords.
     C. Geneva to the American Combat Involvement in Vietnam
          (1954 - 1965)
     D. Period of US Ground Combat (1965 - 1972)
     E. From the American Withdrawal to the Fall of the South
          (1972 - 1975).
     F. Covert Operations and Intelligence.
     G. Laos and Cambodia.
     H. Military Personal Narratives and Oral Histories.
     I. The Press.
     J. Issues of Inequality and the Draft.
     K. North Vietnam, the PAVN and the NLF.
     L. Vietnamese Culture and Politics. 
     M. Ethic Minorities in Indochina
     N. War Crime Allegations.
     O. The Anti-War Movement in the US.
     P. POW/MIA Issues.
     Q. Refugee Issues.
     R. Aftermath and Remembrance - Veterans Issues.
     S. Document Collections and Reference Works.

The final section deals with cultural representations of the wars
and their aftermath, including analysis and criticism, fiction,
poetry, film and folklore. These works are listed in the
following topical categories:
     A. Analysis and Criticism: Cultural Representations of the   
          Vietnam War.
     CB. Novels: Representations of the Vietnam War.
     C. Poetry
     D. Folklore.
          a. Written
          b. Recorded

Other selected specialized bibliographies, by topic, will be
posted from time to time on the newsgroup. Along with Professor
Moise's extensive bibliography, as well as the logs of the
newsgroup and the most recent copies of all FAQS, all specialized
bibliographies are available at the following sites:
1. rtfm.mit.edu in pub/usenet/soc.history.war.vietnam
2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu in the directory 
     pub/history/military/vietnam/soc.history.war.vietnam.  
3. mccaskill.ssn.flinders.edu.au in pub/history/Vietnam-war 


Please send any comments, suggestions or corrections to the
newsgroup request address, vietnam-request@panix.com.

Enjoy.

John Tegtmeier, moderator - soc.history.war.vietnam


Section I.  Core List.

Adams, Sam.  War of Numbers: An Intelligence Memoir. Introduction
     by Col. David Hackworth. South Royalton, VT: Steerforth
     Press, 1994.
Anderegg, Michael A., ed.  Inventing Vietnam: The War in Film and
     Television.  Culture and the Moving Image.  Philadelphia:
     Temple University Press, 1991. 
Baskir, Lawrence M. and William A. Strauss.  Chance and
     Circumstance: The Draft, the War, and the Vietnam
     Generation. New York: Vintage, 1978.
Caputo, Philip.  A Rumor of War.  New York: Holt, Rinehart, &
     Winston, 1977; Ballantine, 1978.  
Fall, Bernard.  Street Without Joy. With an Introduction by
     George C. Herring.  Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 1961;
     reprint, Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1994.
Gioglio, Gerald R. Days of Decision: an Oral History of
     Conscientious Objectors in the Military during the Vietnam
     War. Trenton, NJ: Broken Rifle Press, 1989.
Hallin, Daniel C.  The "Uncensored War": The Media and Vietnam.
     New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.  
Hickey, Gerald C.  Shattered World: Adaptation and Survival among
     Vietnam's Highland Peoples During the Vietnam War.
     Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993.       
Huynh Kim Khanh.  Vietnamese Communism: 1925-1945.  Ithaca:
     Cornell University Press, 1982.
Jamieson, Neil L.  Understanding Vietnam. Berkeley: University of
     California Press, 1993.
Karnow, Stanley.  Vietnam: A History. New York: Viking, 1983.    
Patti, Archimedes.  Why Vietnam: Prelude to America's Albatross.
     Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980
Puller, Lewis B. Jr.  Fortunate Son: The Autobiography of Lewis
     B. Puller, Jr.  New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991; Bantam,
     1993.
Race, Jeffrey.  War Comes to Long An.  Berkeley: University of
     California Press, 1972.
Shafer, D. Michael, ed.  The Legacy: The Vietnam War in the
     American Imagination. Boston: Beacon Press, 1990.
Shawcross, William.  Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon, and the
     Destruction of Cambodia.  New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979.
Shay, Jonathan. Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the
     Undoing of Character. New York: Atheneum 1994.
Sheehan, Neil.  A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America
     in Vietnam.  New York: Randon House, 1988.  
Snepp, Frank.  Decent Interval.  New York: Random House, 1977.
Thayer, Carlyle A.  War by Other Means: National Liberation and
     Revolution in Viet-Nam, 1954-60.  Cambridge, MA: Unwin
     Hyman, 1989. 
Valentine, Douglas. The Phoenix Program. New York: William Morrow
     and Company, 1990; Avon Books, 1992.


Section IA.  Core List - Documentments.

The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United
     States Decisionmaking on Vietnam.  Boston: Beacon Press,
     1971, 1972. 5 vols.
          There are three versions of the Pentagon Papers, the
     others being: 1. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed
     Services.  United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967: A
     Study Prepared by The Department of Defense.  Washington,
     DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971. 12 volumes. and 
     2. The Pentagon Papers.  New York: Bantam Books, 1971. All
     are recommended. The Bantam version primarily contains
     summaries of the documents by the staff of the New York
     Times rather than the documents themselves.  For a more
     detailed explanation of the differences, see Professor
     Moise's bibliography in the newsgroup archives.


Section II.  Historical and Social Science Analysis and
     Narrative.

A. General Works

Baritz, Loren. Backfire: A History of How American Culture Led Us 
     into Vietnam and Made Us Fight the Way We Did. New York:
     Morrow, 1985.
Gelb, Leslie H. with Richard K. Betts.  The Irony of Vietnam: The
     System Worked.  Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1979.
Gibson, James.  The Perfect War: Technowar in Vietnam.  Boston:
     Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986.
Kahin, George M.  Intervention: How America became Involved in
     Vietnam. New York: Knopf, 1986.
Karnow, Stanley.  Vietnam: A History. New York: Viking, 1983.    
Kolko, Gabriel .  Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States,
     and the Modern Historical Experience. New York: Pantheon,
     1985.
Pratt, John Clark, comp.   Vietnam Voices: Perspectives on the
     War Years, 1941-1982. New York: Penquin, 1984.
Sansom, Robert L.  The Economics of Insurgency in the Mekong
     Delta.  MIT Press, 1970.
Sheehan, Neil.  A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America
     in Vietnam.  New York: Randon House, 1988.  
Turley, William S.  The Second Indochina War: A Short Political
     and Military History,1954-1975. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986
Westmoreland, General William.  A Soldier Reports.  New York:
     Doubleday, 1976.
Young, Marilyn B.  The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990. New York: Harper
     Collins, 1991.


B. World War II to the Geneva Accords.

Fall, Bernard.  Hell in a Very Small Place: The Seige of Dien
     Bien Phu.  Philadelphia: J.J. Lippincott Company, 1967.
Fall, Bernard.  Street Without Joy. With an Introduction by
     George C. Herring.  Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 1961;
     reprint, Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1994.
Patti, Archimedes.  Why Vietnam: Prelude to America's Albatross. 
     Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980
Spector, Ronald.  Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941-1960.
     The United States Army in Vietnam. Washington: Center of
     Military History, 1983.


C. Geneva to the American Combat Involvement in Vietnam (1954 -
     1965)

Browne, Malcolm.  The New Face of War.  Indianapolis:
     Bobbs-Merrill, 1965.
Chomsky, Noam.  Rethinking Camelot: JFK, the Vietnam War, and
     U.S. Political Culture. Boston: South End Press, 1993.
Race, Jeffrey.  War Comes to Long An.  Berkeley: University of
     California Press, 1972.
Spector, Ronald.  Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941-1960.
     The United States Army in Vietnam. Washington: Center of
     Military History, 1983.
Thayer, Carlyle A.  War by Other Means: National Liberation and
     Revolution in Viet-Nam, 1954-60.  Cambridge, MA: Unwin
     Hyman, 1989. 


D. Period of US Ground Combat (1965 - 1972)

Air War - Vietnam.  Introduction by Drew Middleton.  New York:
     Arno Press, 1978.
Berger, Carl, ed.  The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia,
     1961-1973.  Rev ed.  Orignally published 1973. Washington:
     Office of Air Force History and U.S. Government Printing 
     Office, 1984.
Buckingham, William A. Jr.  Operation Ranch Hand: The Air Force
     and Herbicides in Southeast Asia, 1961-1971.  Washington:
     Office of Air Force History, 1982. 
Clarke, Jeffrey J.  Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965-
     1973.  The United States Army in Vietnam.  Washington:
     Center of Military History, 1988.
Hammel, Eric.  Fire in the Streets: The Battle for Hue, Tet 1968.
     Chicago: Contemporary Books, 1991.
Herrington, Stuart.  Silence was a Weapon: The Vietnam War in the
     Villages.  Novato, CA: Presidio, 1982.
Krepinevich, Andrew F., Jr.  The Army in Vietnam. Baltimore:
     Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.
Mangold, Tom and John Penycate.  The Tunnels of Cu Chi: The
     Untold Story of Vietnam.  New York: Random House, 1985.
Moore, Lt. Gen. Harold G. and Joseph L. Galloway.  We Were
     Soldiers Once . . . and Young.  New York: Random House,
     1992.  
Oberdorfer, Don.  Tet! reprint. New York: Da Capo Press, 1984.
     Originally published: Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1971. 
Prados, John and Ray W. Stubbe.  Valley of Decision: The Siege of
     Khe Sanh.  New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1991; New York: Dell,
     1993. 
Spector, Ronald.  After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam.  New
     York: The Free Press, 1993.
Stanton, Shelby L.  The Rise and Fall of an American Army: U.S.
     Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965-1973.  Novato, CA: Presidio,
     1985.
Turley, Col. Gerald H.  The Easter Offensive.  Novato, CA:
     Presidio, 1985.


E. From the American Withdrawal to the Fall of the South (1972 -
     1975).

Burchett, Wilfred.  Grasshoppers and Elephants. New York: Urizen
     Books, 1977.
Cao Van Vien, Gen. The Final Collapse.  Indochina Monographs.
     Washington: Government Printing Office, 1983.
Isaacs, Arnold.  Without Honor: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia. 
     Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983.
Snepp, Frank.  Decent Interval.  New York: Random House, 1977.


F. Covert Operations and Intelligence.

Adams, Sam.  War of Numbers: An Intelligence Memoir. Introduction
     by Col. David Hackworth. South Royalton, VT: Steerforth
     Press, 1994.
Andrade, Dale.  Ashes to Ashes: The Phoenix Program and the
     Vietnam War. Issues in Low-Intensity Conflict.  Lexington
     MA: D.C. Heath and Company, Lexington Books, 1990.
DeForest, Orrin and David Chanoff.  Slow Burn: The Rise and
     Bitter Fall of American Intelligence in Vietnam.  New York:
     Simon & Schuster, 1990.
McGehee, Ralph.  Deadly Deceits: My 25 Years in the CIA.  New
     York: Sheridan Square Publications, 1983.
Tourison, Sedgwick D.  Secret Army, Secret War: Washington's
     Tragic Spy Operation in North Vietnam.  Naval Institute
     Special Warfare Series.  Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
     Press, 1995.
Tourison, Sedgwick D.  Talking with Victor Charlie: An
     Interrogator's Story.  New York: Ivy Books (Ballantine),
     1991.
Valentine, Douglas. The Phoenix Program. New York: William Morrow
     and Company, 1990; Avon Books, 1992.


G. Laos and Cambodia.

Conboy, Kenneth with James Morrison.  Shadow War: The CIA's
     Secret War in Laos.  Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1995.
Nolan, Keith W.  Into Laos: The Story of Dewey Canyon II/Lam Son
     719; Laos 1971.  Novato, CA: Presidio, 1986.
Parker, James E., Jr.  Codename Mule, Fighting the Secret War in
     Laos for the CIA.  Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995.
Shawcross, William.  Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon, and the
     Destruction of Cambodia.  New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979.
Warner, Roger. Back Fire: The CIA's Secret War in Laos and Its
     Link to the War in Vietnam. New York: Simon & Schuster,
     1995.


H. Military Personal Narratives and Oral Histories.

Brennan, Matthew.  Brennan's War: Vietnam 1965-1969.  Novato, CA:
     Presidio, 1985.
Broughton, Col. Jack.  Thud Ridge.  Philadelphia: Lippincott,
     1969; New York: Bantam, 1985.
Caputo, Philip.  A Rumor of War.  New York: Holt, Rinehart, &
     Winston, 1977; Ballantine, 1978.  
Downs, Frederick Jr.  The Killing Zone.  New York: Norton, 1978.
Edelman, Bernard, ed. for the New York Vietnam Veterans Memorial
     Commission.  Dear America: Letters Home from Vietnam.  New
     York: Norton, 1985; Pocket Books, 1986.
Goff, Stanley and Robert Sanders, with Clark Smith.  Brothers:
     Black Soldiers in the Nam.  Novato, CA: Presidio Press,
     1982.
Hackworth, Col. David H. and Julie Sherman.  About Face: The
     Odyssey of an American Warrior.  New York: Simon & Schuster,
     1989.
Mason, Robert.  Chickenhawk.  New York: Viking, 1983.
Maurer, Harry.  Strange Ground: Americans in Vietnam, 1945-1975:
     An Oral History. New York: Henry Holt, 1989.
Santoli, Al.  Everything We Had: An Oral History of the Vietnam
     War by Thirty-three American Soldiers Who Fought It.  hb New
     York: Random House, 1981; Ballantine, 1982.
Sheppard, Don.  Riverine: A Brown-Water Sailor in the Delta,
     1967.  Novato, CA: Presidio, 1992.
Walker, Keith.  A Piece of My Heart: The Stories of Twenty Six
     American Women who Served in Vietnam.  Novato, CA: Presidio
     Press, 1985; New York: Ballantine, 1987.


I. The Press.

Arnett, Peter.  Live from the Battlefield: From Vietnam to
     Baghdad, 35 Years in the World's War Zones.  New York: Simon
     & Schuster, 1994.
Braestrup, Peter.  Big Story: How the American Press and
     Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968
     in Vietnam and Washington. Abridged edition. New Haven: Yale
     University Press, 1983.
Hallin, Daniel C.  The "Uncensored War": The Media and Vietnam. 
     New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.  
Herr, Michael.  Dispatches.  New York: Knopf, 1977; Vintage 
     International, 1991. 


J. Issues of Inequality and the Draft.

Appy, Christian G.  Working Class War: American Combat Soldiers
     and Vietnam.  Chapel Hill: University North Carolina Press,
     1993.
Baskir, Lawrence M. and William A. Strauss.  Chance and
     Circumstance: The Draft, the War, and the Vietnam
     Generation. New York: Vintage, 1978.


K. North Vietnam, the PAVN and the NLF.

Bui Tin.  Following Ho Chi Minh: The Memoirs of a North
     Vietnamese Colonel. Translated and adapted by Judy Stowe and
     Do Van; introduction by Carlyle Thayer. Honolulu: University
     of Hawaii Press, 1995.  
Burchett, Wilfred.  Vietnam: Inside Story of the Guerrilla War.
     New York: International Publishers, 1965.
Fall, Bernard, ed.  Ho Chi Minh on Revolution: Selected Writings,
     1920-66.  New York: Praeger, 1967.
Moise, Edwin E.  Land Reform in China and North Vietnam:
     Consolidating the Revolution at the Village Level.  Chapel
     Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1983.
Nguyen Khac Vien.  The Long Resistance (1858-1975).  Hanoi:
     Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1975.  Various editions.
Truong Chinh.  Primer for Revolt.  New York: Praeger, 1963.
     Contains two shorter works - "The August Revolution" (1946)
     and "The Resistance Will Win" (1947).
Vo Nguyen Giap.  People's War, People's Army.  Forward by Roger
     Hilsman.  New York: Praeger, 1962.


L. Vietnamese Culture and Politics. 

Hess, Martha. Then the Americans Came: Voices from Vietnam.  New
     York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 1993.
Huynh Kim Khanh.  Vietnamese Communism: 1925-1945.  Ithaca:
     Cornell University Press, 1982.
Jamieson, Neil L.  Understanding Vietnam. Berkeley: University of
     California Press, 1993.
Marr, David G.  Vietnamese Tradition on Trial.  Berkeley:
     University of California Press, 1981.


M. Ethic Minorities in Indochina

Hickey, Gerald C.  Free in the Forest: Ethnohistory of the
     Vietnamese Central Highlands, 1954-1976.  New Haven: Yale
     University Press, 1982.
Hickey, Gerald C.  Shattered World: Adaptation and Survival among
     Vietnam's Highland Peoples During the Vietnam War.
     Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993.       
Hickey, Gerald C.  Village in Vietnam.  New Haven: Yale
     University Press, 1964.


N. War Crime Allegations.

Bilton, Michael and Kevin Sim.  Four Hours in My Lai.  New York:
     Viking, 1992.  
Browning, Frank and Dorothy Forman, eds., preface by Gunnary
     Myrdal, introduction by Richard Falk,.  The Wasted Nations:
     Report of the International Commission of Enquiry into
     United States Crimes in Indochina, June 20-25, 1971. New
     York: Harper & Row, 1972.
Duffett, John, ed.  Against the Crime of Silence: Proceedings of
     the Russell International War Crimes Tribunal: Stockholm,
     Copenhagen.  With an Introduction by Bertrand Russell and a
     Forword by Ralph Schoenman.  New York: O'Hare Books and
     Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, 1968.  
Vietnam Veterans against the War.  The Winter Soldier
     Investigation: An Inquiry into American War Crimes.  Boston:
     Beacon Press, 1972.


O. The Anti-War Movement in the US.

Ehrhart, W.D. Passing Time: Memoir of a Vietnam Veteran Against
     the War. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1989.
Gioglio, Gerald R. Days of Decision: an Oral History of
     Conscientious Objectors in the Military during the Vietnam
     War. Trenton, NJ: Broken Rifle Press, 1989.
Hall, Mitchell K.  Because of their Faith: CALCAV and Religious
     Opposition to the Vietnam War.  New York: Columbia
     University Press, 1990.
Heineman, Kenneth.  Campus Wars: The Peace Movement at American
     State Universities in the Vietnam Era.  New York: New York
     University Press, 1993.
Small, Melvin and William D. Hoover, eds.  Give Peace a Chance:
     Exploring the Vietnam Antiwar Movement.  Syracuse: Syracuse
     University Press, 1992.
Tollefson, James W.  The Strength Not to Fight: An Oral History
     of Conscientious Objectors of the Vietnam War.  Boston:
     Little, Brown, 1993.
Wells, Tom.  The War Within: America's Battle over Vietnam.  With
     a Foreword by Todd Gitlin.  Berkeley: University of
     California Press, 1994.
Zaroulis, Nancy and Gerald Sullivan.  Who Spoke Up?  American
     Protest against the War in Vietnam, 1963-1975.  New York:
     Doubleday, 1984.


P. POW/MIA Issues.

Smith, Chief Warrant Officer Garry L.  The Search For MIAs. 
     Columbia, SC: Honoribus Press, 1992.
Stern, Lewis M.  Imprisoned or Missing in Vietnam: Policies of
     the Vietnamese Government Toward Captured and Detained
     United States Soldiers 1969-1994.  Jefferson, NC: McFarland,
     1995.


Q. Refugee Issues.

Weiser, Louis A.  Victims and Survivors: Displaced Persons and
     Other Victims in Viet-Nam, 1954 - 1975.  New York: Greenwood
     Press, 1988.


R. Aftermath and Remembrance - Veterans Issues.

Greene, Bob. Homecoming: When the Soldiers Returned from Vietnam.
     New York: Putnam, 1989.
MacPherson, Myra.  Long Time Passing: Vietnam and the Haunted
     Generation. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1984.
Mason, Robert.  Chickenhawk Back in the World: Life After
     Vietnam.  New York: Viking, 1993.
Puller, Lewis B. Jr.  Fortunate Son: The Autobiography of Lewis
     B. Puller, Jr.  New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991; Bantam,
     1993.
Scott, Wilbur J.  The Politics of Readjustment: Vietnam Veterans
     Since the War.  New York: Aldine deGruyter, 1993.
Shay, Jonathan. Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the
     Undoing of Character. New York: Atheneum 1994.
Wilcox, Fred A.  Waiting for an Army to Die: The Tragedy of Agent
     Orange. New York: Vintage, 1983.


S. Document Collections and Reference Works.

Gettleman, Marvin E., Jane Franklin, Marilyn Young, and H. Bruce
     Franklin, ed. 1985. Vietnam and America: a documentary
     history. New York: Grove Press. 
Gibbons, William C.  The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War:
     Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships.  Part I,
     1954-1960.  Part II, 1961-1964.  Part III, January-July
     1965.  Part IV, July 1965-January 1968. Washington:
     Government Printing Office, 1984-1994; reprint, Princeton
     NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986-1995.
The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United
     States Decisionmaking on Vietnam.  Boston: Beacon Press,
     1971, 1972. 5 vols.
Stanton, Shelby L.  Vietnam Order of Battle. Foreword by Gen.
     William C. Westmoreland.  New York: Exeter Books (and
     perhaps also Galahad Books, and/or Atlantic Monthly Press?),
     1986.



Section III. Cultural Representations of the War: Critical
     Analysis, Fiction, Poetry, Film and Folklore


A. Analysis and Criticism: Cultural Representations of the
     Vietnam War.

Anderegg, Michael A., ed.  Inventing Vietnam: The War in Film and
     Television.  Culture and the Moving Image.  Philadelphia:
     Temple University Press, 1991. 
Auster, Arnold and Leonard Quart.  How the War Was Remembered:
     Hollywood and Vietnam.  New York: Praeger, 1988.
Beidler, Philip.  Re-writing America: Vietnam Authors in their
     Generation.  Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1991.
Dittmar, Linda and Gene Michard, eds. From Hanoi to Hollywood:
     The Vietnam War in American Film. New Brunswick, NJ:
     Rutgers, 1990.
Gilman, Owen W. and Lorrie Smith, eds.  America Rediscovered:
     Critical Essays on Literature and Film of the Vietnam War. 
     New York: Garland, 1990.
Gotera, Vince.  Radical Visions: Poetry by Vietnam Veterans. 
     Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1994.
Gruner, Elliott.  Prisoners of Culture: Representing the Vietnam
     P.O.W.  New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1993.
Hellmann, John.  American Myth and the Legacy of Vietnam.  New
     York: Columbia University Press, 1986.
Lomperis, Timothy J.  Reading the Wind: The Literature of the
     Vietnam War. With bibliographic commentary by John Clark
     Pratt.  Duke University Press.
Louvre, Alf and J. Walsh, eds.  Tell me Lies About Vietnam: 
     Cultural Battles for the Meaning of the War.  Philadelphia: 
     Open University Press, 1988.
Martin, Andrew.  Receptions of War: Vietnam in American Culture.
     Oklahoma project for discourse and theory, v. 10.  Norman,
     OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993.
Melling, Philip H.  Vietnam in American Literature.  Boston:
     Twayne Publishers, 1990.
Searle, William J. ed.  Search and Clear: Critical Responses to
     Selected Literature and Films of the Vietnam War.  Bowling
     Green: University Popular Press, 1988.
Shafer, D. Michael, ed.  The Legacy: The Vietnam War in the
     American Imagination. Boston: Beacon Press, 1990.


CB. Novels: Representations of the Vietnam War.

Baber, Asa.  The Land of a Million Elephants.  2nd ed. reprint.
     Vietnam Generation Series. Burning Cities Press, 1992.
Bao Ninh.  The Sorrow of War.  London: Martin Secker and Warburg,
     1993; New York: Pantheon.
Browne, Corinne.  Body Shop.  New York: Stein and Day, 1973.
Bunting, Josiah.  The Lionheads.  New York: George Braziller,
     1972; Popular Library, 1972.
Buonanno, C.  Beyond the Flag.  New York: Tower Publications,
     1981.
Burdick, Eugene and William Lederer.   The Ugly American.  New
     York: McGraw-Hill, 1958.
Butler, Robert Olen.  The Alleys of Eden.  New York: Horizon,
     1981; Ballantine, 1983.
Cassidy, John.  A Station in the Delta.  New York: Charles
     Scribner's Sons, 1979.
Clark, Alan.  The Lion Heart.  New York: William Morrow and
     Company, 1969.
Corder, E.M.  The Deer Hunter.  New York: Exeter Books, 1978;
     Jove, 1979.
Coonts, Stephen.  Flight of the Inruder.  Annapolis: Naval
     Institute Press, 1986.
Crumley, James. One To Count Cadence.  New York: Random House,
     1969.
Danziger, Jeff.  Rising Like the Tucson.  New York: Doubleday,
     1991.
Del Vecchio, John.  The 13th Valley.  New York: Bantam, 1982.
Duong Thu Huong.  Paradise of the Blind.  New York: Morrow, 1993;
     Penguin, 1994.
Durden, Charles.  No Bugles, No Drums.  New York: Viking, 1976.
Eastlake, William.  The Bamboo Bed.  New York: Simon & Shuster,
     1969.
Fleming, Thomas.  Officers' Wives.  Garden City, NY: Doubleday &
     Co., 1967.
Ford, Daniel.  Incident at Muc Wa.  New York: Doubleday & Co.,
     1967.
Greene, Graham.  The Quiet American.  New York: Viking, 1955.
Halberstam, David.  One Very Hot Day.  New York: Avon, 1967.
Haldeman, Joe.  War Year.  New York: Holt, 1972.
Hasford, Gustav.  The Short Timers.  New York: Harper & Row,
     1980.
Heinemann, Larry.  Close Quarters.  New York: Farrar, Straus,
     Giroux, 1977.
Heinemann, Larry.  Paco's Story.  New York: Farrar, Strauss and
     Giroux, 1986.
Huggett, William Turner.  Body Count.  New York: G.P. Putnam's
     Sons, 1973.
Kalb, Bernard and Marvin Kalb.  The Last Ambassador.  Boston:
     Little, Brown & Co., 1981.
Mason, Bobbie Ann.  In Country.  New York: Harper Row, 1985.
Merkin, Robert.  Zombie Jamboree.  New York: Harper & Row, 1986.
O'Brien, Tim.  Going After Cacciato.  New York: Delacorte Press,
     1980; Dell, 1980.
O'Brien, Tim.  The Things They Carried.  New York: Penquin, 1990.
Pratt, John Clark.  The Laotian Fragments.  New York: Viking
     Press, 1974.
Rubin, Jonathan.  The Barking Deer.  New York: George Braziller,
     1974.
Stone, Robert.  Dog Soldiers.  Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974.
Webb, James.  Fields of Fire.  Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-
     Hall, 1978.
Wright, Stephen.  Meditations in Green.  New York: Charles
     Scribner's Sons, 1983.


C.  Poetry

Anderson, Doug.  The Moon Reflected Fire.  Cambridge, MA: Alice
     James Books, 1994.
Baladan, John.  After Our War.  Pittsburgh: University of
     Pittsburgh Press, 1974.
Balaban, John.  Vietnam Poems. Oxford: Carcanet, 1970.
Berry, D. C.  Saigon Cemetery.  Athens, GA: University of Georgia
     Press, 1972.
Ehrhart, W. D. A Generation of Peace.  New York: New Voices,
     1975.
Ehrhart, W. D. To Those Who Have Come Home Tired.  New York:
     Thunder Mountain, 1984.
Ehrhart, W. D. ed.  Carrying the Darkness: The Poetry of the
     Vietnam War. Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 1989.
Mc Donald, Walter.  Caliban in Blue.  Lubbock, TX: Texas Tech
     Press, 1976.
Miller, Stephen P. An Act of God (Memories of Vietnam).  Eureka,
     CA: Northcoast View Press, 1987 
          Post Office Box 1374, Eureka, CA 95502.
Rottman, Larry, Jan Berry, and Basil T. Paquet, eds.  Winning
     Hearts and Minds.  Perkasie, PA: East River Anthology, 1972.
Shea, Dick.  Vietnam Simply.  Coronada, CA: Pro Tem, 1967.
Van Devanter, Lynda  and Joan A. Furey, eds.  Visions of War,
     Dreams of Peace: Writings of Women in the Vietnam War.  New
     York: Warner Books, 1991.


D. Folklore.

Written:

Clark, Gregory.  Words of the Vietnam War.  The Slang, Jargon,
     Abbreviations, Acronyms, Nomenclature, Nicknames,
     Pseudonyms, Slogans, Specs, Euphemisms, Double-talk, Chants,
     and Names and Places of the Era of United States Involvement
     in Vietnam.  Jeferson NC: McFarland and Co., 1990.
Dane, Barbara and Silber, Irwin.  The Vietnam Songbook.  New
     York: Guardian, 1969.
          Songs from the anti-war movement
Tuso, Joseph F.  Singing the Vietnam Blues: Songs of the U.S. Air
     Force in Vietnam.  Texas A & M Univesity military history
     series, v 19. College Station: Texas A and M Press, 1990.

Recorded:

In Country.  Saul Broudy, Chip Dockery, Bull Durham, Bill Ellis,
     Toby Hughes, Dick Jonas, Chuck Rosenberg.  Flying Fish
     Records, 1991.

----------------------

Index:  4823      Reference:  
From: vietnam-request@panix.com (John Tegtmeier, Moderator)
Subject: soc.history.war.vietnam FAQ: Australian Involvement (1/3)
Date: 15 Feb 1996 15:06:52 -0500
Organization: PANIX Public Access Internet and Unix, NYC
Summary: This FAQ is the first of three parts dealing with the Australian
     participation in the Vietnam War.  This section deals with the military
     involvement.

Archive-Name: vietnam/australia/part1
Last-modified: 1996/02/15
Posting-Frequency: monthly (15th)

Frequently Asked Questions: soc.history.war.vietnam

Copyright 1996 by Brian Ross.  Permission to use this document is expressly
     given for use in Usenet newsgroup discussions and any other educational
     purpose, as long as the source is clearly identified and there is no
     fee.  All other rights are reserved.

The FAQs on the Australian involvement in Vietnam were written by Brian Ross.
There are three sections, the first covering military involvement and the
last two dealing with political issues.

Australia's Military Involvement in the Vietnam War

     This posting is the first of two intended to provide an
overview of Australian military operations in Vietnam, commencing from the
deployment of the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam in 1962 until
1969, when Australian forces began withdrawing, consistent with the Nixon
Doctrine of phased withdrawal from the mainland of Asia and the policy of
Vietnamization. 

     While the second will deal primarily with the political decisions
to become involved in the Vietnam war, suffice to say for the moment, that
the Australian commitment to Vietnam was largely dictated by political
concerns and was therefore limited by the same concerns. The
predominant theory of defence during the sixties was the containment of
communism and "Forward Defence". Both of these policies relied heavily on
the presence of America in Southeast Asia combating the perceived Chinese
threat. In Vietnam, this translated into the policy of supporting
American military involvement and encouraging the continuation of this
involvement until such time as China was sufficiently dissuaded from any
further adventurism or Australia could more capably defend itself.


Australian Army Training Team Vietnam

     Australia's initial commitment to supporting the American stance
in Vietnam consisted of the deployment of a team of military advisers. On
26th July, 1962, the Minister for Defence announced Australia's intention
to send 30 instructors to the Republic of Vietnam, 4 going to the Military
Aid Council Vietnam (MACV) Headquarters in Saigon, 22 to regional
locations in the Hue area and 4 to Duc My.(1) This team would be headed
by Colonel F.P. Serong, previously the Commanding Officer at the Jungle
Training Centre, Canungra, Queensland and would fall under the command of
the Australian Army Forces, Far Eastern Landing Forces Headquarters in
Singapore.(2) The AATTV arrived in the Republic of Viet Nam in August,
1962. 

     AATTV advisers served with ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam)
units, including infantry, artillery and armoured divisions, independent
regiments in the I Corps area (the northern province of RVN),regional and
provincial headquarters, the Viet Nam Police Field Force, US Special
Forces, Montegnard Special Forces and CIA operations.(3) with the
escalation of Australian forces in Vietnam in 1966, Australian advisers
also served with 1 Australian Task Force (1ATF) at Nui Dat. 

     The primary role of the AATTV was to train ARVN and other forces
in the use of weapons, jungle warfare, tactics and strategy. In addition,
especially after the Australian government allowed them to serve in
battalion and smaller size formations, they took liaison roles, calling
for airstrikes and arranging logistical support and medevac facilities.(4)
They usually operated as individuals or in small groups of two or three.
After 1963, the AATTV came wider the operational control of MACV HQ in
Saigon. 

     It was intended that the AATTV would represent Australia's
commitment to the American operations in Vietnam, and as such, would not
have a significant military impact, however, the success of Australian
advisers, not the least Captain Peterson's training of the Montegnard
Special Forces in Dar Lac Province, became quickly known throughout
Vietnam. Peterson established Armed Propaganda and Intelligence Teams
(APIT)from amongst Montnegard tribesmen in Ban Me Thout, designed to
disseminate propaganda, collect information and establish a network of
informers, disrupt Viet Cong infiltration and supply routes, conduct small
scale raids, ambushes and similar minor operations and to conduct long
range patrols into Viet Cong 'safe areas', rescuing captured Monteg nards
and liberating equipment and ammunition.(5) Building on these gains,
Peterson established a 'People's Army' just prior to his departure, which
at that stage had effectively regained control over much of southern Dar
Lac. Despite the inadequacies of the ARVN forces in protecting pacified
areas, and the racial problems between Montegnards and ARVN personnel,
Peterson had succeeded in regaining the upper hand in the Ban Me Thout
region. 

     AATTV techniques and method of operations were significantly
different to many of those employed by their American allies. Experience
in the jungles of Malaya and Borneo and limitations on the number of and
facilities available to personnel had combined to produce very different
tactics. Whilst American instructors expounded the virtues of the rapid
deployment of large numbers of troops, massive fire power and decisive
battles, Australians concentrated on individual marksmanship, the
independence of platoons from battalion HQs, small scale patrols and
ambushes. These differences frequently bought Australian advisers into
conflict with their American superiors. The Australian policy of 'economy
of effort' was directly opposed to the American idea of 'concentration of
force'.(6)

     The AATTV served with distinction in Vietnam. During AATTV's tour
of duty, members were awarded two Victoria Crosses, several Military
Crosses and several Military Medals.(7) It was the first Australian force
to arrive and the last to leave. After the initial deployment of 30
instructors, it was increased in size by 30 in May 64, by 23 in June 64
and then by 17 in January 65, bringing it to a total strength of 100. It
was restricted from further increases by the introduction of a National
Service Act ( 1965) in Australia which required large numbers of
instructors. The last instructors were withdrawn from Phuoc Tuy Province
in December 1972. 


The First Deployment of Australian Ground Forces

     In April 1965, consistent with President Johnson's deployment of
US Marines to protect airforce bases in Vietnam, Prime Minister Robert
Menzies announced his intention to send 1 Battalion, Royal Australian 
Regiment (1 RAR) to assist in the defence of American bases. 1 RAR was 
restructured into a tropic warfare organisation, similar to that employed 
by the American army and was to serve under the US 173rd Airborne Brigade
(Separate) (US 173 Abn Bde)defending Bien Hoa airforce base.(8) Initially
it was intended that 1 RAR would only be used in defence of the base but
by December offensive operations had begun in conjunction with 173 Abn
Bde.(9) During 1 RAR's tour of duty, 22 major operations were conducted,
usually within 10-20 miles from Bien Hoa. 

     Like the AATTV, significant problems were encountered in operating
with US forces. These were compounded by poor equipment, including WWll
Owen machine guns and boots, and no decent preparation before
embarkation.(10) The operational problems they encountered will be
discussed below, suffice to say here that they were not sufficiently
resolved until 1 ATF was established with its relative independence.
Despite these limitations, however, the Australian regiment was
successfully integrated into the 173rd Abn Bde until it's tour of duty was
completed in June 1966. 


1 Australian Task Force, Phuoc Tuy Province

     In March 1966, the Australian government announced its intention
to create a single and relatively independent Australian Task Force. This
came largely as a result of political pressure on the Australian
government by Washington but was also consistent with the dominant
foreign and defence policy trends within Canberra at the time. However,
there was good reason to create the Task Force from a military point of
view also. Not only would Australians regain some control over their
troops, they would also b e permitted to conduct operations in a manner
consistent with their experiences and techniques. Consideration was also
given to the limited resources available to the Australian command in
Vietnam and the need to pool these in order to have a more visible
effect.

     Phuoc Tuy Province was situated in III Corps Tactical Zone and had
a population of 160,000. At the time the Australian Task Force arrived, it
was a relatively wealthy province, agriculturally rich and had a
comparatively prosperous costal economy.(11) It had been a base for
anti-French activities after WWII and was familiar with the Viet Minh
presence that accompanied these activities. Despite having two large
Catholic migrant towns, it was also a popular base for Viet Cong
activities throughout the peri od of Diem's authority.(12) Operational in
Phuoc Tuy were the 274th and 275th NLF Regiments and D445 Provincial
Mobile Battalion, a local force with strong links to the population, an
intimate knowledge of the area and assured supplies.(13) Phuoc Tuy was
chosen because there was a reasonable amount of enemy activity, no risk of
border violations in the pursuit of the enemy and it had excellent air and
sea access ensuring adequate supplies and an assured evacuation route. The
terrain was not dissimilar from that often encountered by Australians in
Malaya and Borneo.(14) In addition to this, the pacification of Phuoc Tuy
was essential to the Republic of Viet Nam because of it's wealth and to
the MACV because of the significance of Vung Tau port and the supply line
(Route 15) to Saigon and Bien Hoa. 

     The exact placement of the Task Force was to be Nui Dat, a hill on
Route 2, heading north through the centre of the province, and was an
obvious challenge to the NLF and NVA forces in the area. The Logistics and
Supply Group (1 ALSG) was to be situated in Vung Tau where it had good
access to American supply groups and where it was hoped that it would be
somewhat safer from large scale attack.(15)

     The Task Force was to be comprised of 2 infantry battalions (5/6
RAR were the first to serve in 1ATF), artillery (including some New
Zealand elements), engineers, signals and administrative support, under
the command of Brigadier O.D.Jackson. 1 ALSG, situated in Vung Tau,
consisted of 176 Air Dispatch Company, 2 Field Ambulance, 33 Dental Unit,
2 Composite Ordnance Depot and the 101 Field Workshop of Royal Australian
Electrical and Mechanical Engineers.(16) Since August 1964, No.35
Transport Squadron R AAF had been situated at Vung Tau and one year after
the arrival of 1 ALSG, (June 1966) No.9 Helicopter Squadron was also
situated in Phuoc Tuy.(17)

     1 ATF's objectives in Phuoc Tuy were never very clear. Because it
came under the operational command of US II Field Forces Vietnam (II FFV)
but under the National command of Headquarters Australian Forces Vietnam,
the Commander 1 ATF had to reconcile sometimes inconsistent objectives.
Westmoreland told Jackson to "take over Phuoc Tuy" (18) this representing
the sum of operational commands to 1 ATF whilst from COMAFV, directions
were only a little more specific. The aims of 1 ATF were defined as the
security and domination of 1 ATF's assigned area, the security of Route
15, the conduct of other operations as required, conduct operations
anywhere in II Corps Tactical Zone and in Bin Thuan Province, II Corps
Tactical Zone, as required and agreed up on by COMAFV.(19) The actual
practicality of these aims was hard to assess but it seems that this meant
1 ATF was to act in both a pacification role as well as a large unit to
counter main force activity. COIN operations would require frequent
contact and close coordination with ARVN forces and the civilian
administration, yet the advisory positions in ARVN and the administration
were dominated by Americans. Alternatively, large scale operations against
main force units required more manpower, mobility and fire support and
could not adequately be completed by two battalions, one of which would be
required for base security at all times.(20)

     This obscurity when it came to the nature of operations 1 ATF was
to engage in did provide the Commander with some degree of operational
freedom. It was not long before the Australian forces had applied their
own style of operation. The base at Nui Dat, whilst its presence was
readily felt in the area, was not cleared as were American bases and few
ARVN personnel and no indigenous Vietnamese were allowed in to the base.
This meant that troop strength at any one time was hard to gauge and
security was excellent.(21)

     It was D Company of 6 RAR that first encountered the enemy in
strength at Long Tan on the 18th August, 1966. In engaging and severely
damaging D445 Regiment, 1 ATF had established a moral and later physical
victory over the NLF in Phuoc Tuy. The TET offe nsive of February 1968
also contributed to the relative demise of the VC 5th Division (274 and
275 Regiments) in the region, due to the heavy casualties they took. In
order to combat the decreasing strengths of the pre-existing NLF forces in
the province D440 was created in 1967, however, this too proved relatively
ineffective, not being a local force so much as comprising large numbers
of NVA personnel.(22)

     In November 1967, 1 ATF was increased in size by an extra
battalion (including of NZ artillery) and was reinforced by a squadron of
Centurion tanks. This was largely in response to the deteriorating
military situation in Vietnam and the possibility of a TET offensive.
General Vincent(COMAFV, Jan. 67 to Jan. 68.) was enthusiastic to increase
Australian forces either to enable them to take responsibility for all of
Phuoc Tuy or alternatively to allow 1 ATF to operate more tangibly outside
Phuoc Tuy Provinc e.(23) As a result, in January 1968, 1 ATF was ordered
to occupy an area 12 km north of Bien Hoa airforce base with a view to
preventing any expected TET assault. 1 ATF successfully engaged and
defeated the enemy in February (as it did an offensive in Baria at the
same time) and returned to Nui Dat. It was again called on to help defend
Bien Hoa in May.(24)

     If Vincent was enthusiastic about Australia's role in the war,
then McDonald, his successor, was passionate. McDonald was keen not to see
Australian operations limited to "[saving] the odd house from being burned
to the ground" in Phuoc Tuy. In gaining U S support for operations against
the VC in the Long Hai Hills in March 1968, McDonald believed the US was
attempting to hasten Australia's victory over the enemy in Phuoc Tuy so as
to get 1 ATF operational in areas of more strategic importance.(25)

     By 1969 and the beginning of the US withdrawal from South Vietnam,
II FFV had re-prioritized its aims and instructed the then COMAEV, General
Hay, that 1 ATF should do likewise. First priority was to be given to
pacification, second to upgrading ARVN for ces and thirdly to military
operations. Pacification operations began in May 1969 however, hampered by
unenthusiastic ARVN forces, they proceeded slowly. The success of the ATF
in forcing the withdrawal of NLF mainforce units and the provincial
battalions (the remnants of D445 and the newer but understrength D440) was
countered by the maintenance of the VC infrastructure in the villages.(26)
Thus, as the Task Force withdrew in December 1971, the remaining AATTV
members presided over the gradual return of NLF in Phuoc Tuy. 

The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) in
Vietnam

     As part of the policy of encouraging American involvement in
Vietnam, and as a result of his convincing victory at the polls in
November 1966, Menzies decided to increase Australia's military commitment
to Vietnam to include elements of all three service s. The commissioning
of two Charles F. Adams guided missile destroyers in 1965 and the
impending replacement of Canberra bombers by F-111s had made available to
COMAFV additional sources for Australian expansion in Vietnam.(27)


RAAF:

     Since August 1964, elements of No.35 Squadron (Transport) consisting
of fixed wing Caribous, had been stationed at Vung Tau in order to assist
in the movement and supply of 1 RAR. With the establishment of 1ATF and 1
ALSG in June 1966, No.9 Squadron (Helicopters) were deployed to provide
logistic support, troop movement and medevac facilities for the Task Force.
Both of these commitments were relatively insignificant except in so far as
they represent a desire to have Australians supporting Australians in Phuoc
Tuy. Both units served as essential support for 1 ATF but added little to
the ongoing American involvement. 

     Perhaps one of the most significant RAAF contributions to the
Vietnam war was the deployment of No.2 Squadron (Canberra Bombers) to Phan
Rang in April 1967. The Australian 5th Airfield Construction Squadron had
completed the provision of Australian facil ities by the time the first
eight of ten bombers arrived. The bombers were to under go usual
maintenance in Phan Rang but had additional facilities at Butterworth, in
Malaysia for major maintenance.(28) The entire contingent consisted of
approximately 300 men and came under the command of USAF 35th Tactical
Fighter Wing.(29)

     At the height of Australia's military involvement in Vietnam, RAAF
personnel numbered around 800 people from three squadrons. The Canberra
Bomber squadron was the first summoned home in March 1971 followed by the
remaining RAAF personnel in August. 


RAN:

     The Royal Australian Navy's contingent to the Vietnam war was
somewhat more substantial. The first RAN personnel to see action were the
six members of Clearance Diving Team 3 . CDT 3 was initially part of the
Inshore Undersea Warfare Group 1, based at Ca m Ranh Bay but itself was
assigned to Vung Tau from February 1967. It was largely responsible for
assisting in harbour defence, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), harbour
patrols and port command and communications during Operation Stabledoor
(1967-1970). (30) In addition to these responsibilities, CDT 3 was called
on to conduct marine salvage operations, especially where EOD might be
called for, river clearing in preparation for riverine military operations
and recovery of enemy ammunition. 

     The largest RAN contribution however was supplied by the
deployment of Australian destroyers to Vietnam. The destroyers came under
the command of COMNAVFORV, primarily operating with the US Seventh meet
and in March 1967, HMAS Hobart, was the first to see action.(31) HMA Ships
Hobart and Perth alternated sixth month deployments until March 1969 when
Australia's newest DDG, HMAS Brisbane arrived. Brisbane was replaced by
Vendetta, a Daring Class Destroyer which was in turn replaced by Perth and
Hobart respectively before completing RAN participation in the Vietnam
conflict.(32)

     Hobart, being the first RAN vessel to arrive in Vietnam under
combat conditions, participated in Operation Rolling Thunder's maritime
equivalent, Operation Sea Dragon. This was designed primarily to intercept
Water Borne Logistic Craft (WBLC) and bomb military and logistic targets
north of the DMZ. Sea Dragon was suspended in November 1968 during Perth's
second deployment. After this, RAN vessels' primary task was to provide
Naval Gunfire Support (NGFS) for ground operations near the coast. 

     Whilst the threat of naval or air assault on Australian vessels
was not very large (33), as was the threat of sea borne mines. However,
during inshore operations against WBLCs and in support of amphibious
assaults, the ships were somewhat exposed to ground fire. In September
1967 Perth was hit by fire from a shore battery whilst in the pursuit of
WBLC. Australian vessels were also used in conjunction with 1 ATF in Phuoc
Tuy. In May 1970 Hobart relieved USS St Paul and provided NGFS for
Australian troops in the Long Hai Hills.(34)

     The Royal Australian Navy also played a considerable role in the
deployment of Australian troops and supply to 1 ATF and RAN vessels in the
Gulf of Tonkin. Primary amongst these was HMAS Sydney, an aircraft carrier
converted into a troop transport. 1 RAR was despatched aboard HMAS Sydney
from Sydney to Vung Tau in May 1965. HMA Ships Jeparit and Boonaroo acted
as supply ships for Australian forces in Vietnam and were particularly
important in supplying HMAS Vendetta with ammunition during its
deployment. (35)

     Other aspects of RAN involvement in Vietnam included the dispatch
of 8 pilots and support staff for retraining and posting with US 135th
Aviation Company at Vung Tau in October 1967. The RAN Helicopter Flight
Vietnam (RANHFV) was used for troop insertion and as gunships for support
fire. The RAN also provided pilots as part of a detachment to No.9
Squadron RAAF at Nui Dat, operating in cooperation with 1 ATF.(36)

     The Royal Australian Navy personnel in Vietnam totalled 2800. As
far as possible RAN forces were directed to operate in cooperation with 1
ATF in Phuoc Tuy Province, consistent with the concept of having an
Australian sphere of influence. Whilst operational command was reserved
for COMNAVFORV, the degree of integration with Australian forces was
maintained until the last RAN vessel, HMAS Sydney departed from Vung Tau
in February 1972. 


Assessment of Australian Military, Operations

     AATTV: Quite obviously if the general method of operations
practiced by Australian forces was significantly different to those
employed by US forces, then so to would the training techniques. The
AATTV, in instructing Vietnamese officers, often found themselves
contradicting or being contradicted by US advisers. In addition to this,
such was the social status acquired by being an officer in ARVN that
Junior officers were discouraged from humiliating their seniors by
learning more than they. Particularly if one trained junior officer was
expected to serve under an untrained (by AATTV or others) senior
officer.(37) AATTV advisers serving with Montegnard units found that
ethnic rivalry between Montegnards and the Vietnamese often resulted in
'no shoot' a greements being made with the NLF and VC forces entering
Vietnam via Laos or Cambodia. Peterson's Montegnard Special Forces at one
stage in 1964 even rebelled, marching on ARVN forces in Ban Me Thout.(38)

     AATTV operations under COMMACV were quite successful. There were
few problems in the actual command system, save that their were
disagreements over methodology when it came to instruction. AATTV's only
real problems came from working with the ARVN forces , whom they
frequently found to be unenthusiastic, lazy and often corrupt. 

     1 RAR and US 173rd Abn Bde: There were again general differences
of opinion between these two units as to the conduct of operations. The
Airborne Brigade was designed for large deployments and heavy firepower
whereas 1 RAR, even though restructured to suit the American style, with
its COIN experience in Malaya operating individually from larger units was
unfamiliar and uncomfortable with these type of tactics.(39) One such
example of this was 1 RAR's training with helicopters. In Malaya, up to
4 helicopters, primarily for medevac purposes, was all a company could
expect or need. There was no requirement for the calling of air strikes
and little for artillery strikes. Yet at Bien Hoa, the latter of these two
were frequently practiced, due to the number of enemy being engaged, and
up to 40 helicopters were effectively at the disposal of the battalion.(40)
Unlike subsequent Australian forces, there was little association with ARVN
forces and no reliance on them. 

     Australian Task Force: 1ATF met with mixed successes during its
five years in Phuoc Tuy. Initially, 5 & 6 RAR encountered large scale
opposition and attempted to combat NLF political structure. Given the
limitations under which 1 ATF worked (poor equipment, ambiguous
objectives and unfamiliar combat environment), it could be asserted that
it was quite successful in doing this.(41) Long Tan and the subsequent
follow up missions severely damaged NLF main force units in the region,
however, it is was apparent that the relative speed with which the NLF
reasserted itself in the years of ATF's withdrawal indicates the failure
to win the hearts and minds of the people, a tactic essential to the
defeat of communist terrorists in Malaya and Borneo. 

     The increase in size of 1 ATF in November 1967 introduced new
problems and new challenges to the Australians. From January, 1 ATF
operated in engagements outside of Phuoc Tuy. These were again large scale
operations and required some degree of integratio n with American forces.
Similar problems to those experienced by 1 RAR in 1965 were encountered,
somewhat lessened in effect by the larger size of 1 ATF (two battalions
were distributed through three bases; Balmoral, Coogee and Coral) and its
increased independence from ll FFV HQ. The defence of Bien Hoa during the
TET offensive in February 1968 was successful in so far as 1 ATF
maintained a relatively high enemy body count and weren't themselves
overrun. However, the nature of the war was such that victories in large
scale battle counted for little. It was hoped that 1 ATF could secure a
credible victory in Phuoc Tuy, one similar in nature to Australia's
military experience in Malaya, where the enemy was totally wiped out, the
people supportive of the Australian presence and the province safe from
subversion. an effect, a lasting and significant impact on the province,
culminating in the battle of Binh Ba in June 1969. 1 ATF returned to Phuoc
Tuy, after several redeployments to Bien Hoa, and engaged in the third
phase of their operations, the pacification of Phuoc Tuy.(42)

     This phase, from about mid-1969 to 1971, met with mixed success
also. Although carrying out operations which Australian troops were more
familiar with, the degree of success encountered was somewhat less than
expected. The reasons for this relative failure include not only the
ineptitude of ARVN forces, cooperation with whom was essential in
maintaining an allied presence in any given area, but also several rather
glaring deficiencies in Australian planning. An ambitious project by
Vincent in 1867 to cr eate a minefield barrier from Dat Do to Phuoc Hai,
described by Westmoreland as "imaginative", had resulted in a substantial
number of casualties (almost thirty) in operations in the Long Hai hills
in May 1969 and again by 8 RAR in January 1970.(43) Whil st it may have
been the responsibility of ARVN forces to patrol the minefield, it was
apparent that Vincent was remiss in expecting them to do so. In addition
to this, Larsen identifies one major deficiency in the Australian civil
aid program, claiming t hat lack of coordination with local administration
often resulted in poor planning and inadequate maintenance of completed
projects.(44)

     Quite clearly the major reason for the failure of 1 ATF to
complete a total victory in Phuoc Tuy was the lack of cooperation between
ARVN and 1 ATF and the failure of the civil aid program to win the support
of the populace away from the NLF. Australia's attempts to train and equip
RVN local units and their reluctance to allow these units any significant
participation in the pacification program, coupled with the failure of
these local units to perform adequately, destined Phuoc Tuy to be returned
to the influence of the NLF on the ATF's withdrawal. 


Conclusion

     The Nixon (Guam) Doctrine announced in July 1969 and the British
decision to quit East Of Suez by 1971 led to a radical rethinking of
Australian defence and foreign policy in Southeast Asia. Consistent with
the withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam, Australia also withdrew,
the last Australian troops to leave being the AATTV. The defeat of the
Liberal-Country Party coalition government coincided with this final
withdrawal. Australia had spent ten years actively involved in the
conflict in Vietnam, s ending almost 47 000 men, almost 500 of whom were
killed and about 2 400 wounded. Australia paid its own way through
Vietnam, employed its own tactical methods, adopted its own province and
pursued its own political ends. Australian's were noted to have h ated
everybody, the truth of which may lay under a mixture of racial prejudice
and discontent at the limitations they were placed under compared to the
excesses of their American allies. 

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--
Endnotes 
1) p.8, Australia's Military Committment to Vietnam, Paper tabled
in accordance with the Prime Minister's Statement in the House of
Representatives on 13 May 1975. 

2) p.1, Horner, D.M., Australian Higher Command in the Vietnam War,
Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No.40, Strategic and Defence
Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1986. 

3) p.38, McNeill, I., "Australian Army Advisers: Perceptions of Enemies
and Allies", in Maddox, K., &, Wright, B., (eds), War: Australia and
Vietnam, Harper & Row, Sydney, 1987. 

4) p.39, Ibid. 

5) pp.35-36, McNeill, I., "Peterson and the Montegnards: An Episode in the
Vietnam War", Journal of the Australian War Memorial, Oct.1982, No.1. 

6) pp.56-58, McNeill, I., "Australian Army Advisers: Perceptions of
Enemies and Allies". 

7) p.311, McNamara, E.G., "Australian Military Operations in Vietnam",
Journal of the Royal Institute for Defence Studies, Nov.1968, Vol.113,
No.652,. 

8) p.30, Breen, R.J., "Problems of an Expeditionary Force - First
Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment, 1965", Defence Force Journal,
Sept/Oct.1986, No.25. 

9) p.44, McNeill, I., "An Outline of Australian Military Involvement in
Vietnam: July 1962-December 1972", Australian Defence Force Journal,
Sept/Oct. 1986, No.1. 

10) pp.30-32, Breen, R.J., op.cit.

11) p.312, McNamara, E.G., op.cit.

12) pp.60-61, Frost, F., "Australia's War in Vietnam: 1962-1972", in King,
P., (ed), Australia's Vietnam: Australia in the Second Indo-China War,
Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1983. 

13) p.62, Ibid.,

14) p.45, McNeill, I.., ., "An Outline of Australian Military Involvement
in Vietnam: July 1962-December 1972". 

15) p.313, McNamara, E.G., "Australian Military Operations in Vietnam".

16) p.61, Brodie, S., Tilting at Dominoes: Australia and the Vietnam War,
Child & Assoc., Brookvale, 1987. 

17) p.17, Fairfax, D., Navy in Vietnam: A Record of the Royal Australian
Navy in the Vietnam War 1965-1972, AGPS, Canberra, 1980. 

18) p.7, McAuley, L., The Battle of Long Tan, the legend of ANZAC upheld,
Hutchinson, Hawthorn, 1986. 

19) p.15, Horner, D.M., Australian Higher Command in the Vietnam War.

20) pp.64-65, Frost, F., "Australia's War in Vietnam: 1962-1972".

21) p.9, McAuley, L., The Battle of Long Tan, the legend of ANZAC upheld.

22) p.314, McNamara, E.G., op.cit.

23) pp.31-32, Horner, D.M., op.cit.

24) p.314, McNamara, E.G., op.cit.

25) pp.34-35, Horner, D.M., op.cit.

26) p.50, McNeill, I., "An Outline of Australian Military Involvement in
Vietnam: July 1962-December 1972". 

27) p.96, Larsen, R.L., &, Collins, J.L., Allied Participation in Vietnam,
Dept. of the Army, Washington D.C., 1975. 

28) p.97-98, ibid.

29) pp.17-18, Fairfax, D., Navy in Vietnam: A Record of the Royal
Australian Navy in the Vietnam War 1965-1972. 

30) pp103-105, ibid.,

31) pp.97-98, Larson, et.al, op.cit.

32) Fairfax, D., Navy in Vietnam: A Record of the Royal Australian Navy in
the Vietnam War 1965-1972. 

33) Perhaps with the exception of air assault from USAF jets, Hobart was
struck by three missiles in June 1968, killing two and wounding several. 
The fighters also attacked two patrol craft, sinking one. 

34) pp.59-61, 85, Ibid.

35) pp.170-173, Vendetta used British ammunition which had to be shipped
from Sydney. 

36) p.99, Larsen, et.al., op.cit.

37) pp.43-47, McNeill, I., "Australian Army Advisers: Perceptions of
Enemies and Allies". 

38) pp.37-40, McNeill, I., "Peterson and the Montegnards: An Episode in
the Vietnam War". 

39) pp.34-35, Breen, R.J., "Problems of an Expeditionary Force - First
Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment, 1965". 

40) p.312, McNamara, E.G., op.cit.

41) pp.65-66, Frost, F., "Australia's War in Vietnam: 1962-1972".

42) pp.66-67, ibid.

43) pp.41-42, Horner, D.M., op.cit.

44) p.113, Larsen, et.al, op.cit.,

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------
Bibliography

Australia's Military Commitment to Vietnam, Paper tabled in accordance
with the Prime Minister's statement in the House of Representatives on May
13, 1975. 

Breen, Maj. R.J., "Problems of an Expeditionary Force - First Battalion,
The Royal Australian Regiment in 1965", Defence Force Journal,
(Sept./Oct., 1980), No.60. 

Brodie, S., Tilting at Dominoes: Australia and the Vietnam War, Child and
Associates, Brookvale, 1987. 

Fairfax, D., The Navy in Vietnam: A Record of the RAN in the Vietnam War.
1965-72, Australian Government Printing Service, Canberra, 1980. 

Frost, F., "AustraIia's War in Vietnam: 1962-72 ", in P. King (ed.),
Australia's Vietnam: Australia in the Second Indo-China War. George Allen
& Unwin, Sydney, 1983. 

Horner, D.M., Australian Higher Command in the Vietnam War. Canberra
Papers on Strategy and Defence No.40., Strategic and Defence Studies
Centre, Australian National University, 1986. 

Larsen, S.R. & Collins, J.L., Allied Participation in Vietnam, Department
of the Army, Washington D.C., 1975. 

McAulay, L., The Battle of Long Tan: The Legend of ANZAC Upheld,
Hutchinson of Australia, Hawthorn, 1986. 

McNamara, E.G., 'Australian Military Operations in Vietnam", Journal of
the Roval Institute for Defence Studies, (Nov. 1968), Vol. 113, No.652. 

McNeill, I., "Australian Army Advisers: Perceptions of Enemies and
Allies", in K.Maddox & B. Wright (eds.), War: Australia and Vietnam,
Harper & Row Publishers,Sydney, 1987. 

McNeill, I., "An Outline of Australian Military Involvement in Vietnam:
July 1962 -December 1972 ", Defence Forces Journal. (Sept./Oct. 1986),
No.60. 

McNeill, I, "Peterson and the Montagnards: An Episode in the Vietnam War",
Journal of the Australian War Memorial. (Oct. 1982), No.1. 

Pemberton, G., All the Way: Australia's Road to Vietnam, Allen & Unwin,
Sydney

- -Brian Ross------------------------------------------------------
              "For I will work the work in your days which ye will 
not believe, though it be told to you"
------------------------------------------Habakkuk, 7th Century BC- 

----------------------

Index:  4824      Reference:  
From: vietnam-request@panix.com (John Tegtmeier, Moderator)
Subject: soc.history.war.vietnam FAQ: Australian Involvement (2/3)
Date: 15 Feb 1996 15:07:52 -0500
Organization: PANIX Public Access Internet and Unix, NYC
Summary: This FAQ is the second of three parts dealing with the Australian
     participation in the Vietnam War.  This section is the first part
     dealing with the political issues.

Archive-Name: vietnam/australia/part2
Last-modified: 1996/02/15
Posting-Frequency: monthly (15th)

Frequently Asked Questions: soc.history.war.vietnam

Copyright 1996 by Brian Ross.  Permission to use this document is expressly
     given for use in Usenet newsgroup discussions and any other
     educational purpose, as long as the source is clearly identified and
     there is no fee.  All other rights are reserved.

The FAQs on the Australian involvement in Vietnam were written by Brian
Ross. There are three sections, the first covering military involvement and
the last two dealing with political issues.

Australia's involvement in the Vietnam War, the political dimension

     This is the second post promised analysing why Australia entered the
Vietnam War.  American readers should be warned that because it looks
primarily at the domestic political scene in Australia at the time, it does
as a consequence refer to characters and events which most of you
will not be aware of.  However, I have included a short preface, attempting
to identify most of the major players and the themes which ran behind the
scenes in Australian society.

Preface:

     There were, during the 1950's and 1960's three main political parties
in Australia.  They were:

     The Australian Labor Party (ALP).  A mildly left-of-centre, socialist
party, the ALP was concieved, like its British and New Zealand counterparts
to represent the rights of the workers against those of the employers.  It
held power during the years 1941-1949, being defeated after a series of
disasterous Communist led coal strikes which had crippled the economy and
because of fears within the electorate that its plan to nationalise the
banks in 1949 meant that it was moving too far to the left.

     The Liberal Party.  A mildly, right-of-centre, conservative party, the
Liberals (a misnaming if ever there was one IMO), were created out of the
remains of the United Australia Party, which had dissolved as a consequence
of losing government in 1941 as the result of a no-confidence motion in the
then Prime Minister, R.G.Menzies.   Menzies had then been re-elected in
1949 after skilfully making use of the electorate's fears of Communism. 
This "kicking the Communist can" as it became known was an electoral tactic
which the Liberals used time and time again successfully as a means of
keeping the ALP in Opposition.

     The Country Party.  A party which was and still is basically a mix of
elements of both left and right and designed to represent the interests of
the country dwellers and farmers of Australia.  It held government in
coallition with the Liberals during the period udner examination and
for a short period (second shortest on record) its leader, John McEwin was
the PM after the accidental death by drowning of the Liberal PM in 1967.

Background History:

     Australia has long suffered from a sense of unease about its position
as the only European settled country in Asia.  Australian society has long
(and still does, unfortunately amongst some sections) harboured a fear of
the "yellow hordes" waiting to "descend upon Australia" and steal it away
from the privileged few white colonialists living here.  While this fear
could perhaps be best described as being a form of cultural paranoia (well,
considering that until the end of WWII and the start of Government
sponsored migration the population had stabilised at around the 7 million
mark you can understand why most Australians feared the possible invasion
by potential "hordes").

     This fear had resulted in the formulation of one of the most
restrictive immigration policies the world has seen entitled "The White
Australia Policy" which was designed to prevent Asian migration and only
allow in whites which were deemed by the government of the day as being
suitable (thankfully that has been consigned to the dustbin of history). 
This fear seemed to have been proven well founded when the Japanese
advanced to within comparative spitting distance of the continent in 1942.

     Because of its large size and small population Australia had long
relied upon what have become known as, and in some circles derided as,
"great and powerful friends" to provide for its defence.  First Great
Britian and then America, successive Australian governments have seen the
ability of the country to integrate itself into an alliance system where
defence is collectively shared and Australian defence spending kept under
tight control allowing the civilian population to share unrivalled
prosperity (Australia before WWI had the highest standard of living per
capita in the world).  With the collapse of the British Empire, and perhaps
most importantly the loss of the fortress of Singapore, Australia turned to
the new power in the Pacific, America.  A treaty formalising the new
relationship between it, Australia and New Zealand called the ANZUS Pact
was concluded in 1951.

     However, the ANZUS Pact was designed from an American viewpoint to
first reassure Australian and New Zealand concerns about a possibly rearmed
and resurgent Japan and secondarily to tie America in the defence of the
two former Dominions.  From the Australian viewpoint, on the otherhand,
it was designed to tie America first and foremost into the defence of
Australia, despite the pertinant clause only requiring the three parties to
"consult" in case of an attack on the others rather than necessarily having
a clause like in the NATO treaty where an attack on one party is considered
an attack on all parties.

     So we have, by 1965, two radically different interpretations of the
treaty which formed the major plank of Australian defence during the
preceeding decade.  This was to prove important as will be explained.


Why Australia became involved in the Vietnam War:

     The reasons as to why Australia became involved in the Vietnam War
have been traditionally painted in the colours of "collective security" and
as part of the anti-Communist "crusade" to contain a world wide communist
threat. However, the decision to become involved was not one take in
isolation by the government of the day in Canberra.   Rather it was the
culmination of a long period of tension and unease, not as one might
believe, over the idea of communist expansionism in Asia, but rather
because of what was considered the unsatisfactory relationship which had
developed between Canberra and Washington.   The key to that relationship
had been Indonesia and its relations with Australia over first Dutch West
New Guinea (now Irian Jaya) and then Malaysia.   Indeed as Greg Pemberton
points out, "Australia's defence and foreign policy during the post war
period cannot be fully understood without reference to Indonesia."1

     In particular there was the problem of Dutch West New Guinea and
Australia's relations with Indonesia.   The Labor government under Chifley
in the immediate post-war years had looked favourably upon Indonesia's
claim to self-determination, reflecting a deep commitment to the Atlantic
Charter of 1941 and also a desire to perhaps displace the Dutch as the main
influence in the archipelago.   Indeed when the Dutch attempted to use
force to reassert their domination of the islands after the war, the
Australian government sided with the new Republic.   This annoyed both
Washington and London which desired to see that the territories to
Australia's north should remain in "friendly"  (ie.colonial) hands.   This
was, according to Pemberton, "the highpoint of Australian-Indonesian
relations in the post-war world and led Foreign Minister Dr. Subandria"
later to describe Evatt and the Labor government as the 'mid-wife' of the
Indonesian Republic."2

     This attitude quickly changed when a new Liberal-Country Party
coalition government took office in 1949. While it shared the same desire
as its predecessor to maintain good relations with the new Republic, its
past history of a vigorous opposition to the perceived threat of Communism,
both at home and now abroad meant that it was quickly charting a collision
course with Indonesia.

     The Liberal and Country parties which constituted the government
during this period had created their policy on this matter while in
opposition at the end of the forties. Many of the conservative politicians
who made up these two parties had been suspicious of the ambitions of the
last Labor Government's Minister for External Affairs, Dr.H.V.Evatt, while
the ideological affinity that was shown between the ALP and new Indonesian
republic had aroused alarm.   The refusal of the Communist dominated
Waterside Worker's Union to load Dutch ships, bound for Indonesia, during
the new republic's struggle for independence had been important in creating
pro-Dutch sentiments amongst the coalition's leaders.   This apparent
collusion between the Indonesians and the Australian Communists was enough
cause for grave suspicion amongst the soon to be elected opposition
leaders, about the new republic's political alignment.3

     Menzies could have perhaps overcome earlier prejudices, had it not
been for Australia's perception of the strategic importance of the island
of New Guinea.   With the near run result of 1942 still fresh in their
minds, when the Japanese onslaught had only just been stayed north of Port
Moresby, it was not unusual that the new Liberal Minister for External
Affairs, P.C.Spender would declare that New Guinea was, "an absolutely
essential link in the chain of Australian defence" and added Australia has,
"the duty of ensuring by every means open to us that in the island areas
immediately adjacent to Australia, in whatever direction they lie, nothing
takes place that can in any way offer a threat to Australia".4

     Despite this declaration, it would have been perhaps logical that the
Government would have re-evaluated its perception of the importance of New
Guinea to Australia, particularly in the light of having just signed the
ANZUS agreement in 1951.   Article V of which guarantee.  11 the integrity
of both Australia's and New Zealand's Pacific territories.   This would
have meant that New Guinea was no longer essential to Australia as a buffer
against a possibly expansionist Indonesia as Australia's integrity was now
apparently guaranteed.

     So for strategic reasons, even if perhaps mistaken, the Australian
government desired a continuing Dutch presence in West New Guinea.   It
tried to achieve this by both cooperation with the Dutch and by lobbying at
the United Nations, in an effort to frustrate Indonesian claims to the
island.

     However, neither of these policies was pursued with any consistency.  
In November 1957, the Governments of  Australia and the Netherlands
declared a policy of close cooperation in New Guinea since,

     "The territories of Netherlands New Guinea, and the
     Australian Trust Territory of New Guinea and Papua are
     geographically and enthologically related...  future
     development of their respective populations must
     benefit from cooperation in policy and administration."5

     This policy of cooperation was actually only minimal for Australian
policy makers knew that this principle of joint development might prove
embarrassing unless it was certain that Indonesia would not be able to
realise her claims to any part of New Guinea, either by force or by a
Dutch withdrawal.

     Throughout the fifties Australia's support for the Dutch in West New
Guinea had rested upon one main assumption; that both the United States and
Britain were tacitly in favour of a continuing Dutch presence there.
However events were to prove this assumption wrong.   The British Prime
Minister, Harold MacMillan, in a joint press conference with the Australian
Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, in 1958, said that Britain was only willing
to support Australia's views only on, "the plain of the UN."6  Similarly
American support was appearing to wane when both the they, and the British,
resumed arms shipments to Indonesia, despite protests from both the
Netherlands and Australia.7

     When it was obvious that there was going to be no guarantee of
American support for Australia's stance, the Government attempted to adopt
a less rigid attitude.   They invited the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Dr
Subandrio, to Canberra for talks with the Australian Minister for External
Affairs, R.G.Casey.   At the end of these talks a communique was issued
that indicated the Australian Government's willingness to adopt a more
passive role if any agreement was reached between the Netherlands and
Indonesia.8

     With the issue of this communique the Government came under attack
from many sections of the community, particularly the press.99  In the face
of this strong domestic opposition to the idea of Indonesian possession of
West New Guinea, Prime Minister Menzies concluded that it would be
politically disadvantageous, or even suicidal for him not to continue with
the established policy.   It should be remembered that at this time the
Government's majority in the lower house consisted of one seat, and Menzies
always remembered the collapse of his 1941 Government when a no confidence
motion was passed against him.

     Pemberton also raises the point that perhaps Menzies's government
never had any real intention of modifying its real stance over the matter
of West New Guinea.   He suggests that these, "events were possibly part of
a deliberate attempt to set up a legal smokescreen which would obscure
Australia's true position."10 While stating that Australia would accept any
peaceful settlement, the government could not or would not, disassociate
itself from the Dutch hard line and appear sympathetic to the Indonesia
claim while also appearing unable to do anything to help them.

     However as can be pointed out, this had one unintended consequence: by
adopting a softer line the Australian government might well have encouraged
the Indonesians to press their claims even harder on the Dutch.   In June
1958, the Indonesian Government gave notice that it was no longer
interested in legal means to settle the dispute, but would rather now
concentrate, "on a contest of power" to resolve the problem.   Australia's
seeming intractability, despite the "new face" which Canberra had assumed
over the problem after the visit of Dr.Subandrio to Canberra, was also
proving to be a great irritant to Jakarta, By late 1961 the question of a
continuing Dutch presence in West New Guinea had become a burning national
issue.

     The proceedings at the United Nations General Assembly session of 1961
left the problem even more confused.   The Dutch Government, sickening of
the matter, tried to hand the problem over to the UN, which refused it.  
The United States, and most other nations were obviously unwilling to
support any move that would keep the territory from the possession of
Indonesia, for Dr. Sukarno commanded considerable influence amongst third
world

     At the same time India had just ended Portugal's colonial presence in
Goa through the use of force.   When the impotence of the UN to take action
was shown, the attitudes of Indonesia, the Netherlands and the United
States abruptly changed.   The day after India's invasion of Goa, President
Sukarno ordered a general mobilisation.11  He also sent a letter to
President Kennedy warning that Indonesia would use force if necessary to
resolve the matter.   The US Government attempted to head off armed
conflict by trying to get both countries to the conference table.   Kennedy
pressed the Dutch to drop their preconditions to negotiations and made his
Government available as a mediator.12

     Though the Dutch Government steadfastly refused to drop its
precondition of the principle of self-determination for the natives of West
New Guinea, by the end of 1961 it seemed that the Dutch had reconciled
themselves to the idea that they would have to bow to Indonesian military
and American diplomatic pressures.13

      Australia however continued with its hardline policy towards the
problem.   With the issue of a stern note to the Indonesian Ambassador
Menzies made a final effort to press Indonesia to a settlement without
resort to force, and Australia moved even further from the reality of the
situation.   Sukarno's reply showed that his Government was not impressed
by Australia's declarations.

     Sir Garfield Barwick, the new Minister for External Affairs, quickly
realised that a continuation of this policy without backing from America,
would leave Australia open to nothing but ridicule and enmity from its
nearest neighbour. He issued a statement to attempt to defuse the
situation. In it he reversed the earlier strategic assessment of the
importance of West Guinea to Australian interests.   He "saw no evidence
whatever of any present threat to Australia or to any Australian
interest."14

     While helping in calming the situation with Indonesia to some extent
the statement aroused a considerable storm of protest in some sections of
the community.   The Opposition leader, Arthur Calwell, called it,
"...abject appeasement...A betrayal as great as Munich had been."15

     But what had cause this sudden volte face of Government policy? Hanno
Wiesbrod,16 suggests that the Government had received from the Chiefs of
Staff a strategic reassessment of the importance of West New Guinea, in the
light of article V of the ANZUS agreement.   The Military reported that the
possession of West New Guinea by the Indonesians would not be a threat to
Australia because, 

     1) Indonesia's offensive potential was rated as very
     low.   It was considered to be difficult, if not
     impossible for Indonesia to mount and sustain a large
     scale invasion force.

     2) The rugged remoteness of the terrain would also be
     an inhibiting factor for direct invasion as well as
     subversive activities.   (Subversive activities were
     rated to have only nuisance value.  )

     3) In the event of a large scale conflict with a
     Communist and/or Communist supported Indonesia the
     American guarantee under ANZUS would operate.   A
     repetition of a World War II experience would be
     unlikely since the United States had a preponderance of
     naval power in the Pacific.17
     
     With the Indonesian threat destroyed by their "expert" advisers the
only remaining question facing the Government was whether or not it was
still in Australia's interest to continue with its opposition to
Indonesia's claim.

     As American support was lacking, Australia would have stood alone.  
Sir Garfield Barwick's argument against the standing hard line policy,
still favoured by his fellow cabinet members, was that such a move would
have been against the best interests of Australia, and would only have
prolonged the dispute.   Since the Australian half of New Guinea was
guaranteed under ANZUS, it appeared dangerous and short sighted to incur
the further enmity of Indonesia.

     With India having set the example in Goa it was only a matter of time
before Indonesia would be in conflict with the Dutch forces present in
Dutch West New Guinea.   The idea of Australia becoming involved in such a
conflict would have been ludicrous, Australia lacked both the manpower
under arms and the weapons to prosecute a conflict with Indonesia.  
Australia would also have become isolated in what would have appeared to be
an anti-colonialist struggle. It would have embarrassed and alienated the
US and would have weakened any claim Australia might have had on American
assistance if eastern New Guinea had been attacked.   While finally for the
cabinet members who felt that Australia would have been letting down the
Dutch, Barwick pointed out that the Dutch had already declared their
willingness to give up their administration of the territory, at the
session of the UN assembly the previous year.

     So it was that Australia quickly bowed out as a major participant in
the dispute.   It did however still remain involved with attempts to get
the Indonesians and the Dutch to negotiate over the matter.   After several
armed clashes, usually with the Indonesians coming off second best, an
agreement was reached on 15 August 1962 with the result that the UN took
over administration for a short period.   This quickly ended and Indonesia
assumed control of the western half of the island.

     Australia finally gave into the Indonesians on the matter by
justifying it to itself that it was better that the Indonesians gained the
island, than the possibility of an armed conflict which would, "threaten
world peace and could well bring disaster to South-East Asia by its
encouragement of Communist activity and intervention."18  There was also
the fear that if the Indonesian government came under the pressure of
promoting a war that the influence of the PKI (Communist Party of
Indonesia) might become more powerful.

     The result of this mishandling of the West New Guinea affair was most
certainly a failure of Australian foreign policy for the Liberal-Country
Party Government of the period.   The Government had not attempted to point
out the realities of the situation to the people, with the result
that the Casey-Subandrio communique issued in 1959, which would have
modified Australian policy in line with the realities of the situation, was
not well received by either the public or the Opposition.   This forced the
Government to continue with its unrealistic policies until forced to
either back them with some form of force or change them.  It was only with
the appointment of a new Minister for External Affairs, that Menzies was
wakened to the dangerous position that his policies had placed the
Government in.  Being unable to back this hardline policy with either
Australian or perhaps more importantly, American muscle, meant that
Australia became open to ridicule, particularly when Indonesia resorted to
force.

     Indeed Renouf suggests that the failure of Australia's policy towards
West New Guinea had fateful consequences for her Indonesian relations.
"When on 17 August 1963 Sukarno acclaimed his 'Year of Triumph', he knew
that his victims included Australia."19  He had achieved his goal by doing
whatever he liked in the teeth of Australia's opposition. Australia,
Indonesia concluded, was no mat ch for them and, in case of trouble between
the two countries, Indonesia did not have to be unduly preoccupied with the
reactions of Australia's protector, the United States.

     This then forced the Government to back down and most certainly
damaged our standing in Indonesian eyes and contributed to the formulation
of a policy of "confrontation" by Dr.  Sukarno as a method by which
Indonesian interests could be furthered.

     As we have seen Australia was unable to back its rhetoric against
Indonesian expansion in New Guinea with force.   One of the reasons why she
was unable to do so was because the small Australian Army, which surely
numbered only four Battalions of infantry plus some supporting units
was already committed to other overseas countries, as well as the defence
of the Australian mainland.   In April 1955 Menzies had committed one of
these Battalions to the defence of Malaya, where it was stationed as part
of the Strategic Commonwealth Reserve.

     After the success of Indonesia's policies in the matter of West New
Guinea, Dr.  Sukarno decided to apply them against the newly formed state
of Malaysia, which consisted of Malaya, Sarawak, North Borneo, Singapore
and initially Brunei.   Indonesia had at first wished Malaysia all success
but by the end of 1962 Jakarta had changed its tune.   While it admitted it
had no territorial claim upon Malaysia, Subandrio said, Indonesia could not
remain indifferent to its formation because the Federation would have a
common boundary with Indonesia.   Just afterwards Indonesia supported a
revolt in Brunei, which while not connected with the proposal for the
Sultanate to join the new federation, was used as a causus belli for the
need for confrontation on the behalf of the people of North Borneo by
Jakarta.

     On 20 January 1963 Subandrio announced "confrontation" with Malaysia,
because Malay was not fully independent but rather "neo-colonialist".  
Other Indonesian leaders explained that Malaysia did not really represent
the wishes of the people of North Borneo, or Sabah as it is now known,
and also Sarawak.20

     At first only with words , then anti-British and anti-Malaysian
demonstrations and riots, it quickly became a small scale war with the
beginning of the infiltration by Indonesian troops across the borders of
North Borneo.  Britain reacted by ordering its troops into North Borneo to
defend it against Indonesian infiltrators.   Australia was quick to follow,
desiring to ensure that Britain remained tied into guaranteeing the
stability of the region.21  This left only two Battalions for the defence
of mainland Australia and its widespread territories.

     In November 1963, Menzies held a snap election with defence as the
major issue.   The items under discussion were the joint Communications
base at North West Cape, the Fiji procurement decision and the Labor
party's proposal of a Nuclear free Southern Hemisphere.   Menzies
successfully argued that Labor's policy on all three represented a danger
to Australia's security.  After winning an extra seven seats in Parliament
the Government believed that the public supported a policy on Forward
Defence and by 1965 Australian troops were fighting the Indonesian
insurgents in Sabah and Sarawak.


--- This article is continued in soc.history.war.vietnam FAQ: Australian
Involvement (3/3) ---

_______________________________

- -Brian Ross------------------------------------------------------
              "For I will work the work in your days which ye will 
not believe, though it be told to you"
------------------------------------------Habakkuk, 7th Century BC- 

----------------------

Index:  4825      Reference:  
From: vietnam-request@panix.com (John Tegtmeier, Moderator)
Subject: soc.history.war.vietnam FAQ: Australian Involvement (3/3)
Date: 15 Feb 1996 15:08:35 -0500
Organization: PANIX Public Access Internet and Unix, NYC
Summary: This FAQ is the third of three parts dealing with the Australian
     participation in the Vietnam War.  This section is the second part
     dealing with the political issues.

Archive-Name: vietnam/australia/part3
Last-modified: 1996/02/15
Posting-Frequency: monthly (15th)

Frequently Asked Questions: soc.history.war.vietnam

Copyright 1996 by Brian Ross.  Permission to use this document is expressly
     given for use in Usenet newsgroup discussions and any other
     educational purpose, as long as the source is clearly identified and
     there is no fee.  All other rights are reserved.

The FAQs on the Australian involvement in Vietnam were written by Brian
Ross. There are three sections, the first covering military involvement and
the last two dealing with political issues.

--- This is the continuation of the article in soc.history.war.vietnam FAQ:
Australian Involvement (2/3) ---


     The Labor party, once more consigned to the opposition benches in
Parliament, pointed out that Australia was not bound in any way to help
Malaysia, Australia being only committed to the defence of Malaya under the
ANZAM agreement.   They would have preferred a formal treaty between the
two states as to what sort of commitment that Australia was to make to
Malaysian defence.   This was however defeated in parliament along party
lines when it went to the vote.

     Although the confrontation consisted of counterinsurgency operations
in North Borneo, the Government was worried about a direct attack by
Indonesia against Australian territory, in particular New Guinea.   When in
may 1964 Sukarno called upon "21 million volunteers" to crush Malaysia, and
his Government told Australia not to interfere in what was basically an
Asian problem, warning that if Australia did become involved then the
responsibility would be Australia's alone.22

     After this was announced there followed a discussion on 21 April 1964
in Parliament, as to whether an attack by Indonesians on Australian troops
in Borneo would activate the terms of the ANZUS agreement, leading to the
involvement of America.   After criticism from the opposition leader Arthur
Calwell, who' said that, "America does not believe that its commitment does
include the protection of Australia troops already in Malaya".23

     The Prime Minister, Robert Menzies replied that while the letter of
ANZUS does not cover Australia troops stationed abroad, the intent did.  
He suggested that,

     "The United States of America did not even withdraw its
      support for Malaysia.   It has recognised Malaysia, and
      it wants Malaysia to be maintained...  [but] That when
      it came to the immediate defence of Malaysia this was
      perhaps primarily a Commonwealth responsibility."24

     Despite the brave words the government was worried. It feared the
possibility of the confrontation escalating and that as its troops were
already in contact with the Indonesians in North Borneo, that the United
States would not come to its aid "25

     With defence becoming more of important in the thinking of the
Government, selective compulsory conscription was introduced before
Parliament on 10 November 1964.26 This was to increase the Army to an
effective strength of 37,000. The reason being given was a lack of
sufficient volunteers, due to a period of full employment and economic
expansion in the civil sector.   This build up of the Army was required
for, Menzies said,

      our deteriorating strategic: situation.   We expect
      a continuing requirement to make our forces available 
      for cold war and counterinsurgency tasks.   We must
      have forces ready as an immediate contribution should 
      hostilities occur.27

     The small Australia Army was over-extended by its commitments both in
Malaya and Borneo and the result was that only two Battalions to defend
Australia.   The Army was also committed to providing "advisers" as part of
an aid package to the Government of South Vietnam in its war against
Communist insurgents and this was stretching its limited resources to the
maximum.   Obviously more manpower was required if a credible defence was
to be mounted against the threat of Indonesian aggression and the only way
that could be achieved was through conscription.

     Then it was announced that Australian combat troops in the form of one
infantry Battalion, with supporting elements, would be committed to the war
in South Vietnam, on 29 April 1965.   The Govt.   was criticised by the
Opposition as well as by a strong vocal middle-class minority which could
not be dismissed as Communist or pro- Communist in their views.

     This vocal minority was made up of numerous dignitaries, including
Bishops of various denominations, who were extremely critical of the
policies of the rapidly changing South Vietnamese Governments.   They
believed that the Australian Government should seek a negotiated settlement
of the conflict, rather than sending more military aid.28

     As a result of this decision Australian conscripts would, for the
first time serve outside Australia or its territories and north of the
Equator.   This had not even occurred in World War II, and it particularly
incensed the Opposition leader who held to the ALP's longstanding
opposition to conscription for service not in the direct defence of
Australia.29

     This initial commitment of an Infantry Battalion quickly grew to
become a Task Force (or Brigade ) of three or four Battalions with
supporting units of Armour, Engineers, Artillery and Logistic support, as
well as RAAF units flying Canberra's and helicopters and also naval units.  
The tasks of these units quickly changed, from guarding and defensive ones
to offensive operations against the Vietnamese Communists.   At its height
the Australian commitment to Vietnam reached 8,000 men in 1968-69.

     Australia's involvement in Vietnam was prompted by three main factors. 
Perhaps most important of these was a very poor perception by the
Government of world affairs at that time.   Throughout the late fifties and
sixties Australian diplomatic circles were firmly convinced of a subversive
"Communist Threat" outside Australia.   This threat, initially directed by
Moscow, and later by Beijing, dominated Australian diplomatic thought for
approximately fifteen years.

     It had though, roots which went much further back than that.   As
Frank Cain mentions,30 the members of the coalition government gained
anti-Communist convictions well before the second world war.   He suggests
that the "the road to Vietnam was not only paved with anti-radical and
anti-communist rhetoric and actions but that the non-Labor forces came to
be prisoners of such rhetoric."31

     As a consequences of their repeated successes in federal elections,
they were convinced of the appropriateness of these policies.   In fact
when they failed to "kick the Communist can" as they did in 1961, the
coalition nearly lost office.   As a consequence the anti- Communist policy
of the government under Menzies became electorally self-rewarding and they
sought to use it where ever possible.   This does not deny that they were
not totally convinced for the best of reasons but that they also managed to
convince the electorate that Communism must be opposed where ever possible

     As Cain suggests, when Menzies made his statement suggesting that "the
takeover of South Vietnam would be a direct military threat to
Australia,"32 the anti-Communist convictions developed over the previous
five years were now convincing them to intervene and this action led
Australia into the "quagmire of the Vietnamese civil war."33

     Even after the departure of Menzies in 1965, the ideological crusade
to which the Coalition was committed carried it to greater electoral
victories.   In the 1966 election Harold Holt's government was returned by
an even greater majority by an electorate who believed in the necessity to
remain in Vietnam.

     However as the middle-class became more convinced about the dangers of
their sons being conscripted to fight overseas in Vietnam, they switched
their vote to the Labour Party in response.   It was ironic that the
coalition by using anti-Communist rhetoric to maintain electoral support
now lost office by not taking note of it in the election which led to their
defeat in 1972.

     The coalition government's doubts about Indonesia's political
alignment had been reinforced over the years by the acceptance of large
quantities of military and civil aid by Jarkata from initially Moscow, and
then later Beijing. While in retrospect it is obvious that Sukarno was
playing the East off against the West in an effort to gain what he wanted,
it raised fears in Canberra that Sukarno was increasingly coming under the
control of the local Communist members of his government.   This was
further reinforced when Sukarno threatened to nationalise the three major
oil companies operating in Indonesia (Shell, Caltex and Stanvac) which
represented over $US500 million in investment.34 This fear of a Indonesia
becoming a Communist country on Australia's doorstep further reinforced the
already rigid anti-communist stance of the coalition's leaders.35

     This perception of an aggressive Communist threat in Asia prompted
Australian foreign Policy planners to support American policies in Asia
almost completely blind to the realities of the situation facing them.  
The war in Vietnam was not perceived as a local rebellion or civil war,
caused by discontent, or even as a war of "national liberation" from the
last vestiges of colonial rule as it perhaps should have been.   Instead,
it was perceived by the then Minister for External Affairs, Paul Hasluck',
as he related in his policy speech on 23 March 1965, as a conflict where,
"the application of the methods of and doctrines of Communist Guerrilla
warfare first evolved in China and then successfully in North Vietnam."36
In his judgement the South Vietnamese were not dealing simply with a
situation of local unrest, but with a "large scale campaign of
assassination and terrorism", the direction of which was coming from
"outside".37

     This "outside" direction was perceived most definitely as from
Beijing.   Gregory Clark suggests that this perception of Chinese
aggression was carried to the point of "Sinophobia".38 He relates the story
of how Hasluck visited Moscow in October 1964.   He was seeking to enlist
Soviet aid in preventing the success of this perceived Chinese aggression
in Vietnam.   Needless to say the Soviets turned the discussion to things
of more interest and use to them.39

     This fear of Communist aggression was not, only confined to the
Ministry of External Affairs.   The Prime Minister, Sir Robert Menzies,
said in his policy speech on 29April 1965 that,

      the takeover of South Vietnam would be a direct
      military threat to Australia and all the countries of
      South and South-East Asia.   It must be seen as a part
      of a thrust by Communist China between the Indian and
      Pacific Oceans.40

     The fear of this Communist aggression was founded upon what was
referred to as the "Domino Theory" by its exponents.   Unless this
aggressive action by China was stopped in Vietnam, ran the theory, then
after Vietnam had fallen, the surrounding countries would follow, just like
a row of Dominoes.   These countries, which tended to be neutral in their
outlook, favouring neither east or west, might become embroiled in another
war like Vietnam, or they might defect to the Communist line.   It was
feared that this "domino" action would eventually lead to Australia's
shores and then the policy of forward defence would mean Darwin instead of
Vietnam.

     While it was in confrontation with Indonesia the government had the
added fear that, as Renouf suggests, "Indonesian success with confrontation
could lead to a reverse Domino Theory - from south to north - with
Singapore, a strategically placed island, being an early victim,"41 and
with Australia being perhaps the next target.

     Perhaps more significant than this as to why Australia became involved
in the Vietnam War, was the Government's policy of relying on "great and
powerful friends" for Australia's defence.   The Government was afraid that
if the problems with Indonesia came to armed conflict then Australia would
be abandoned by America and Britain.   The response of its two major
allies, Great Britain and the United States, to the problems of West New
Guinea and to a lesser extent Borneo, had convinced the government that
they did not share Australia's deep concern about Indonesia. The United
States was unwilling to support Australia's stand with anything more
substantial than words.

     Both Britain and the United States had seen it against their interests
to provoke Indonesia, who commanded considerable power amongst other third
world countries and because of the large amounts of investment both
countries had tied up there.   They feared the danger of Sukarno
nationalising their interests without compensation.42

     In addition when Australia had asked the United States for , an
unequivocal commitment under the ANZUS treaty, that it was willing to
guarantee Australia's defence in case things with Indonesia blew up first
over Dutch West New Guinea and then later/ in Borneo.   While Pemberton
suggests that in Washington's mind it was fully committed to Australia, in
Canberra the lack of a public sign or declaration to that effect weighed
heavily on Menzies's mind.43

     So it was that Australia was seeking a method by which America could
be "locked into" the defence of both Asia and in particular Australia,
against this feared Communist Aggression.   The opportunity presented
itself when America proposed that Australia provide more advisers and some
air and naval aid to Vietnam.44  Australia however seized upon the chance
to offer troops, particularly with the expansion of the Army to meet "a
continuing requirement for cold war and counter- insurgency tasks".45 
While William Bundy, the Assistant Secretary of State for SE Asia, noted
the offer of troops, he was more hopeful of receiving advisers instead. As
America at this time was not willing to commit her own troops to Vietnam.

     As Sexton suggests, this would seem to indicate that the Australians
believed the Americans were not taking a tough enough line.   They had
allowed political events, both at home and abroad to influence their
actions.   The Australians believed that the Americans needed their resolve
stiffened.46

     So it was that Australia offered the use of ground troops on 18
December 1964.   Although the announcement that this offer had been
received and accepted by both the Americans and the Parliament until 29
April 1965. Although, as Sexton points out, the request that Menzies
referred to in Parliament was not received by the Australian Government's
representatives in Saigon until that very day had to be almost forced out
of the South Vietnamese government.47

     Talks on the matter had taken place well before this date, on 22
April, between the Australian and the Americans. This announcement came
before an American decision to commit ground troops had occurred.   So it
was that at Australian insistence, Australian troops were committed to take
part in the Vietnam War not, as was always stated, on the basis of an
American request.48

     So it can be seen from these short accounts that Indonesia's policy of
Confrontation over West New Guinea and Malaysia was a major contributing
factor in the Australian Government wishing to become involved in a war far
from Australian shores.   Other factors that contributed to this wish to
become involved in an Asian war were the fear of the Domino theory, the
seeming lack of American commitment to the defence of Asian and Australia
in particular, and the fear of a perceived threat of Communist

     As both Sexton, and Cooksey, point out, Australia was not happy with
the United States' performance over the West New Guinea and Borneo affairs,
so in an effort to build up a "credit of goodwill" with America that could
be drawn upon in time of need it would seem that Australia decided to enter
the Vietnam war.49  There is an old American political adage that says "not
what you have done for me, but what have you done for me lately"? So
Australia became involved to show the Americans that if we were willing to
help them, they would then perhaps be willing to help us if it ever came to
the point of war with Indonesia.

----------------------------------------
ENDNOTES

1 p.70, Pemberton, G., All the Way, Australia's Road to
Vietnam, Allen E; Unwin, Sydney, 1987.
2 p.71, Pemberton, G., All the War, Australia's road to
Vietnam.
3 p.24, Wiesbrod, H., 'Sir Garfield Barwick and Dutch New
Guinea, Australian Quarterly, June 1967.
4 p.628, 'Policy Speech on External Affairs', Commonwealth
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 9 March
1950.
5 p.881-2, Current Notes, Vo1.28, November 1957.
6 quoted p.26, Wiesbrod, H., 'Sir Garfield Barwick and Dutch
New Guinea'.
7 pp.76-9, Pemberton, G., All the Way.
8 pp.80-1, Ibid.
9 p.29, ibid.
10 p.80, ibid.
11 P.99, Pemberton, G., All the Way.
12 p.428, Renouf, A., The Frightened Country, Macmillan,
Melbourne, 1979.
13 idem.
14 p.889, 'Ministerial Statement on West New Guinea, ' ,
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of
Representatives, 15 March 1962.
15 pp.1151-1161, 'Debate on International Affairs' ,
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of
Representatives, 21 April 1962.
16 Wiesbrod, H., 'Sir Garfield Barwick and Dutch New Guinea,
Australian Quarterly, June 1967.
17 p.30, Ibid.
18 p.21, Current Notes, Vo1.33, No.  3, 1962.
19 p.431, Renouf A., The Frightened Country.
20 pp.431-2, Renouf, A., The Frightened Country.
21 p.436, ibid.
22 p.157, Andrews, E.  M., A History of Australia's Foreign
Policy: from dependence to i n dependence , Longman Cheshire
, Melbourne, 1979.
23 p.1279, 'Debate on International Affairs', Commonwealth
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 21 April
1964.
24 p.2718 `Defence Review Debate' , Commonwealth
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 10 November
1964.
25 pp.174-5, Pemberton, G., All the Way.
26 p.2718 `Defence Review Debate' , Commonwealth
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 10 November
1964.
27 p.2718, 'Defence Review Debate' , Commonwealth
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 10 November
1964.
28 p.113, Watt, A., Vietnam, An Australian Analysis, F.  W.
Cheshire, Melbourne, 1983.
29 p.114, Watt, A., Vietnam, An Australian Analysis.
30 Cain, F.,`Australia's road to Vietnam - Non-Labour and
Anti-Communism 1920-1966', original manuscript supplied by
the author
31.p.1, ibid.
32 pp.1060, `Vietnam - Ministerial Statement', Commonwealth
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 29 April
1965.
33 p.161 Cain F., `Australia's road to Vietnam - Non-Labour
and Anti-Communism 1920-1966'.
34 p.178, Pemberton, G., All the Way.
35 pp.436-7, Renouf, A., The Frightened Country.
36 p.2381 'Debate on International Affairs', Commonwealth
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 23 March
1965.
37 ibid.
38 pp.19-20, Clarke, G., 'Vietnam, China and the Foreign
Affairs Debate in Australia, a personal account', in King,
P., (Ed.  ), Australia's Vietnam, Allen g Unwin, Sydney,
1983.
39 ibid.
40 pp.1060-1, "Vietnam - Ministerial Statement', Commonwealth
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 29 April
1965.
41 p.436, Renouf, A., The Frightened Country.
42 p.99, Pemberton, G., All the Way.
43 p.188, Pemberton, G., All the Way.
44 p.61, Sexton, M., War for the Asking, Australia's Vietnam
Secrets, Penguin Books, Ringwood, 1981.
45 p.2718, `Defence Review Debate' , Commonwealth
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 10 November
1964.
46 p.69, Sexton, M., War for the Asking.
47 pp.140-145r Sexton M., War for the asking.
48 pp.165-171, Sexton, M., War for the Asking
49 p.47, Cooksey, R., 'Assumptions of Australia's Vietnam
Policy', World Review, October 1966.

----------------------------------------
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources:
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of
Representatives.

Current Notes, Vo1.28, November 1957

Secondary Sources:
Andrews, E.M., A History of Australia's Foreign Policy: from
dependence to i n dependence , Longman Cheshire , Melbourne,
1979.

Cain, F.,`Australia's road to Vietnam - Non-Labour and Anti-
Communism 1920-1966', original manuscript supplied by the
author

Clarke, G., 'Vietnam, China and the Foreign Affairs Debate
in Australia, a personal account', in King, P., (Ed.),
Australia's Vietnam, Allen g Unwin, Sydney, 1983.

Cooksey, R., 'Assumptions of Australia's Vietnam Policy',
World Review, October 1966.

Renouf, A., The Frightened Country, Macmillan, Melbourne,
1979.

Pemberton, G., All the Way, Australia's Road to Vietnam,
Allen E; Unwin, Sydney, 1987.

Sexton, M., War for the Asking, Australia's Vietnam Secrets,
Penguin Books, Ringwood, 1981.

Watt, A., Vietnam, An Australian Analysis, F.  W.  Cheshire,
Melbourne, 1983.

Wiesbrod, H., 'Sir Garfield Barwick and Dutch New Guinea,
Australian Quarterly, June 1967.
_______________________________

- -Brian Ross------------------------------------------------------
              "For I will work the work in your days which ye will 
not believe, though it be told to you"
------------------------------------------Habakkuk, 7th Century BC- 

----------------------

Index:  4826      Reference:  
From: vietnam-request@panix.com (Moderator - shwv)
Subject: On This Date - February 15
Date: 15 Feb 1996 15:09:42 -0500
Organization: PANIX Public Access Internet and Unix, NYC
Keywords: Medal of Honor recipient; Willett, Louis E.

On February 15, 1967, 21 year old Private First Class Louis E. Willett
of Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division gave
his life in action in Kontum Province, RVN.  He was born on June 19,
1945 in Brooklyn, NY.  For his actions, he was posthumously awarded
the Medal of Honor.  What follows is the citation for that award:

"For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life
above and beyond the call of duty.  Pfc. Willett distinguished himself
while serving as a rifleman in Company C, during combat operations. 
His squad was conducting a security sweep when it made contact with a
large enemy force.  The squad was immediately engaged with a heavy
volume of automatic weapons fire and pinned to the ground.  Despite
the deadly fusillade, Pfc. Willett rose to his feet firing rapid burst
from his weapon and moved to a position from which he placed highly
effective fire on the enemy.  His action allowed the remainder of the
squad to begin to withdraw from the superior enemy force toward the
company perimeter. Pfc. Willett covered the squad's withdrawal, but
his position drew heavy enemy machinegun fire, and he received
multiple wounds enabling the enemy again to pin down the remainder of
the squad.  Pfc. Willett struggled to an upright position, and,
disregarding his painful wounds, he again engaged the enemy with his
rifle to allow his squad to continue its movement and to evacuate
several of his comrades who were by now wounded.  Moving from position
to position, he engaged the enemy at close range until he was mortally
wounded.  By his unselfish acts of bravery, Pfc. Willett insured the
withdrawal of his comrades to the company position, saving their lives
at the cost of his life.  Pfc. Willett's valorous actions were in
keeping with the highest tradition of the U.S. Army and reflect great
credit upon himself and the Armed Forces of his country."

**********************************************************************
"No 'healing', no apologies, no memorials, nothing can possibly
compensate for the damage done and the pain inflicted....The only
thing we can possibly do, twenty years too late, is to try and tell
the truth."  - Eric Bergerud.
**********************************************************************

----------------------

Index:  4827      Reference:  4600, 4786
From: Edwin E. Moise 
Subject: Re: Events of 1963
Date: 15 Feb 1996 15:10:26 -0500
Organization: Clemson University
Keywords: Harkins, Gen. Paul; McNamara, Robert S.; Race, Jeffrey
     Thayer, Carlyle

In article <602144786@panix3.panix.com>, gmoore3501@msn.com (George
Moore) wrote:
GM>      The story, in Sheehan, about the "whitewashed" reports sent to
GM> Washington by General Harkins too seems mere trivia. No US general is
GM> going to send to his President reports to the effect that a war effort
GM> is not going well. He would be fired immediately and replaced by a
GM> General would could get the job done. Is this not, in effect, what
GM> eventually happened to General Harkins?

George -

I don't think Douglas MacArthur tried to conceal from President
Roosevelt the fact that he had been utterly defeated in the
Phillippines in 1941-42, or from Truman the fact that he had been
defeated in North Korea at the end of 1950.  He did not get fired
for being defeated either time, though Truman did later fire him for
other reasons.  I think the degree to which Harkins falsified
the reporting on the situation in South Vietnam was very important,
and I don't think it was just what any general would have done, though
it may be true that quite a lot of generals would have done the same.

GM>      John Paul Vann, and the string of reporters who followed him
GM> around, reported on such issues as the transfer of American supplied
GM> guns at the "outposts" and the Diem technique of winning the war by
GM> leaving an escape route open to the enemy, to say nothing of the
GM> question of how many "red" spots there should or should not have been
GM> on the maps, but there does not seem to have been any follow up on
GM> these issues in American circles. Indeed, discussion of them was
GM> actually supressed in Washington in 1964.

There was not the discussion there should have been of exactly how
the war was going badly, but the fact it was going badly was
discussed in Washington in 1964.   I quote the minutes of a
meeting in the White House:
   "Secretary McNamara said that where our proposals are being carried
out now, the situation is still going to hell.  We are continuing to
lose.  Nothing we are now doing will win."

GM>            But I have still not been able to find any readily
GM> accessible information about the Viet Minh for the years 1954 to 1963.
GM> I know the information is out there somewhere. I will continue to look
GM> for it and would sincerely appreciate any help.

The books John recommended in response to this question earlier should
give you what you are looking for.  I particularly recommend those by
Jeffrey Race and Carlyle Thayer.

Ed Moise
eemoise@clemson.edu

----------------------

Index:  4828      Reference:  4748, 4785
From: Brian 
Subject: Re: KMT In Laos
Date: 15 Feb 1996 15:11:05 -0500
Organization: Australian National University
Keywords: KMT; Laos; SEATO; Pathet Lao; Eisenhower, Dwight D.; Opium trade
     McCoy, Alfred W.; Thailand; Taiwan; Burma

On Wed, 14 Feb 1996 in article<602144785@panix3.panix.com>, Dien Phan
wrote:
DP> In article <602124748@panix3.panix.com>, Edwin E. Moise
DP>  says:
DP>
DP>EM> As far as I can tell checking index references in Dommen, there
DP>EM> is no reference to any of these KMT troops being known to have
DP>EM> fought in Laos.

     Correct me if I'm wrong Ed, but I've always been under the 
impression that the Laotion "crisis" of 1960 was considered by some 
scholars now to have been a bit of a media "beat-up" and perhaps never
really occurred (in that no actual fighting or very little fighting 
actually occurred).  Its been some time since I last studied the event
and most of the books I had available to me seemed to concur that
while perhaps something happened, it was no where near as critical as
was made out by the US Government at the time.

DP> The struggle in Laos in 1960 involved the entire communist block
DP> and the Western block. 

     Mmmm, somehow I think Dien you are letting exaggeration get the 
better of you.  While the US was slightly involved and the USSR 
apparently slightly more (by the mounting of supply flights to the
Pathet Lao), not many more of either side's "bloc" was really
involved.  Essentially it was not viewed as being significant by any
of the other major western powers (much to Eisenhower's annoyance at
the time when he attempted to invoke the SEATO treaty and failed [but
then the SEATO treaty didn't have Laos as a signatory and it only had
that country mentioned as a corrollary to the treaty as part of the
area of "special interest" to the signatories]).  While the USSR was
reported as being only too glad to see the matter die down in the
manner it did.  Only the Vietnamese had a major interest in the events
(along with the Thai Junta which was heavily involved in the
drug-running from the region according to McCoy).

DP> So the existence of KMT troops in Laos
DP> may help to counterweight the presence of North Vietnamese troops.

     I think the evidence is against this view Dien.  Just because 
there were some KMT troops there, it does not automatically follow
that they would have been involved in the fighting (if any). 
Remember, their raison de'entre was against the PRC, not the Pathet
Lao or the North Vietnamese.

DP> There were no document regarding their activities in Laos, nor
DP> the duration. The only document I found here cited their arrival
DP> from Burma. I recollect other information I read in Vietnam
DP> that these KMT actually put military pressure on the Pathet Lao
DP> in the Dong Chum (Plain of Jars) area. My question is if KMT troops
DP> only need to go back to Taiwan, why chose Ban Houi Sai in Laos? Why
DP> not Thailand which is next to Burma and an ally of Taiwan and US?

Thailand was not an "ally" of Taiwan in the slightest.  There were not
and still are not, any formal alliances between Thailand and Taiwan
Dien.  I believe the reason why the KMT fled into Laos was because the
Thais were unwilling to host them _at_all_ for fear of arousing PRC
wrath.

DP> Thailand had many larger air bases and would be a much better
DP> place to pickup troops if airlift is the main purpose. So the
DP> presence of KMT troops in Laos may not be just for departure.
DP> May be they were there for many years.

     I'd suggest having a look at a good map of the region Dien.  You 
might dicover that there isn't much of value on hte Laotion-Chinese 
border and the terrain is _incredibly_ difficult.  The Burmese-Chinese
section is difficult but a little bit easier and much closer to the 
tradtional avenues of invasion of southern China.  The KMT was pushed
out of Yunnan by the Communists, into Burma.  There was no point in
going into Laos, particularly during the French-Vietn Minh Indochina
war.

     In addition, their main source of income was the opium grown in 
Burma where they were well established.  Once more, there was little 
reason to go to Laos, once they had been established in Burma for a
few years.

--Brian Ross---------------------------------------------------------------
"There can be no more melancholy, nor in the last result, no more degrading 
spectacle on earth than the spectacle of oppression, or of wrong in whatever
form, inflicted by the deliberate act of a nation upon another
nation..Gladstone

----------------------

Index:  4829      Reference:  4662, 4797
From: Brian 
Subject: Re: USAF Gunships
Date: 15 Feb 1996 15:11:48 -0500
Organization: Australian National University

In article <602144797@panix3.panix.com>, Spectre Gunner says:
SG> On 8 Feb 1996 10:29:01 -0500, rufrmtx@aol.com (Kyle Ramsey) posted:
SG>KR> Hmm.. My previous info shows the AC-47 with 3-7.62mm miniguns side 
SG>KR> mounted near the cargo door area.  Did they carry 20mm as well?  What 
SG>KR> type of gun was it?
SG> 
SG> You are right, I'm wrong.  
SG> [Sound of one idiot thumping himself in the forehead]
SG> Darn it, I know better than that -- I can be SOOOOOO dumb at times.

     Well, you're not _completely_ wrong.  I seem to remember the
Cambodians operated some C47's armed with 4 x 20mm Vulcans, so there
were some in the region using that weapon.  How, or where they were
mounted I have no idea. 

--Brian Ross---------------------------------------------------------------
"There can be no more melancholy, nor in the last result, no more degrading 
spectacle on earth than the spectacle of oppression, or of wrong in whatever
form, inflicted by the deliberate act of a nation upon another
nation..Gladstone

----------------------

Index:  4830      Reference:  4813
From: vietnam-request@panix.com (Moderator - shwv)
Subject: Re: On This Date - Feb. 13
Date: 15 Feb 1996 15:12:27 -0500
Organization: PANIX Public Access Internet and Unix, NYC

In article <602144813@panix3.panix.com>, StarMadnes wrote:
SM> In article <602134771@panix3.panix.com>, vietnam-request@panix.com
SM> (Moderator) writes:
SM>MOD> n safety as he fearlessly dashed across the fire-swept terrain and
SM>MOD> was seriously wounded by enemy fire.  At the same time, a grenade was
SM>MOD> thrown into the gully where he had fallen, landing between him and
SM>MOD> several companions.  Fully realizing the inevitable results of his
SM>MOD> action, L/Cpl. Creek rolled on the grenade and absorbed the full 
SM>MOD> force of the explosion with his body, thereby saving the lives of 5 
SM>MOD> of his fellow marines.  As a result of his heroic action, his men... 
SM> 
SM> Is this "On This Date" posted daily?  Never noticed it before if so. 
SM> I can't even describe how things like this make me feel when I read
SM> them!  Thanks for posting it.

February 13 ws the first time that I posted OTD.  As of now, I'm doing
it on a sort of trial basis to see what the reaction and "demand" is
for the postings.  There was another one posted today.  Whether I
continue to cross-post to other newsgroups will also depend upon the
feedback I get - may just keep it at "home" in soc.history.war.vietnam
and not the others.

Regards,
John Tegtmeier
Co B, 3/21, 196th LIB and Aeroscout Company, 123rd Aviation Battalion
Americal - 1967/1968

**********************************************************************
"No 'healing', no apologies, no memorials, nothing can possibly
compensate for the damage done and the pain inflicted....The only
thing we can possibly do, twenty years too late, is to try and tell
the truth."  - Eric Bergerud.
**********************************************************************

----------------------

Index:  4831      Reference:  4763, 4811
From: Edwin E. Moise 
Subject: Re: "So-called" anti-war movement
Date: 15 Feb 1996 15:13:10 -0500
Organization: Clemson University
Keywords: Anti-war movement, US

In article <602144811@panix3.panix.com>, Craig Thompson
 wrote:
CET> I remember it as being a "Get America Out of Vietnam and To Hell with
CET> the South Vietnamese" movement.

Craig -

The anti-war movement was a lot of different things, as you
commented later in your post.  My own motive for joining was
that the United States was killing a lot of South Vietnamese
for what I regarded as no good reason.  I thought the United
States should stop doing this.  Bear in mind that throughout
the period I was active in the movement (1964-67), the
proportion of native-born South Vietnamese was higher among
the forces fighting on the Communist side in South Vietnam
than it was among the forces on the anti-Communist side.
The people the U.S. was shooting were mostly South Vietnamese.

By the time you were in Vietnam, U.S. firepower had thinned out
the South Vietnamese component of the Communist forces a lot,
resulting in a higher proportion of North Vietnamese among those
forces.

CET> I was an anti-war puke in 1966-67 (true there wasn't much of a
CET> movement in Northern Idaho at the time but what little there was I was
CET> a part of) I thought that the war in Vietnam was just a civil war and
CET> the Viet Cong were the equivalent of our own American revolutionaries.
CET. . .
CET> I wish to hell that they had been right; that when Saigon fell, the
CET> commies would have let bygones be bygones, that the Vietnamese could
CET> have granted amnesty to one another and gone on to build a prosperous
CET> and happy nation.  And I wish that we could have seen that happen and
CET> would have helped them like we did with the Marshall plan after WW2.
CET> But there was no amnesty, there was no forgiveness, there was no
CET> compassion, was there?

I expected the Communists to establish a dictatorship about as
bad as the one that actually exists today in Vietnam.  It is now
about average, as dictatorships go, although a few years ago
(late 1970s and early 1980s) it was worse than average.

I did not feel in the 1960s that the United States was morally
entitled to kill hundreds of thousands of South Vietnamese in
order to ensure that South Vietnam would have a dictatorship
satisfactory to the U.S., rather than a Communist dictatorship.
I still feel the same.

If the United States had been fighting to support a democracy
in South Vietnam, or even a high-grade dictatorship (as good
as the one the U.S. was supporting at the time on Taiwan),
I might have taken a different attitude.

Ed Moise
eemoise@clemson.edu

----------------------

Index:  4832      Reference:  4789, 4815
From: Edwin E. Moise 
Subject: Re: Tonkin Gulf Incident
Date: 15 Feb 1996 15:13:45 -0500
Organization: Clemson University
Keywords: Tonkin Gulf incident; USS Turner Joy; McNamaa, Robert S.
     USS Maddox

In article <602144815@panix3.panix.com>, STourison@aol.com (Sedgwick
Tourison) wrote:
ST> And so, to understand why the Gulf of Tonkin incident took place and
ST> who provoked who, it is important to establish what Ha Noi knew about
ST> our plans and intentions. . . .
ST>
ST> What Ha Noi knew in 1964 was that it appeared the covert operations
ST> were winding down, the CIA having sent 40 percent of the force into
ST> the North in 1963 and lost them all,

Wick -

During 1964, the force available for covert operations by sea against
North Vietnam was greatly expanded--more men, more boats, bigger
boats. The actual number and scale of operations by sea against North
Vietnam during the four months preceding the Tonkin Gulf incidents
was higher than it had ever been in the past.

According to Appendix 1 of your book _Secret Army Secret War_,
there were 67 agents dropped into North Vietnam by air during
the four months preceding the Tonkin Gulf incidents (April to July
1964).  This was more than had been dropped in the whole second half
of 1963.

Please explain how covert operations by sea running at all-time record
levels, and covert operations by air running at unusually high levels
(even if not matching the levels of June 1963) would have added up, in
Hanoi's eyes, to "it appeared the covert operations were winding
down."

ST>                                     McNamara is calling for a U.S.
ST> withdrawal,

Please cite a source.  I am not aware that McNamara was calling for
withdrawal in 1964, and I have checked pretty closely.

ST>             and Ha Noi is increasing its infiltration.  Thus, by
ST> attacking the Maddox, Ha Noi was assured that we would strike the
ST> North and thus do more than its own propaganda to persuade its
ST> citizenry that the U.S. military wanted war in Viet Nam.

The United States did not strike at North Vietnam in retaliation
for the attack on the Maddox August 2, 1964.  President Johnson
met with the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
and others on August 2, and they reached an explicit decision not
to retaliate.  The United States struck at North Vietnam in
retaliation for the reported attack on the Maddox and Turner Joy on
August 4, 1964.  If you are going to credit the Vietnamese for
provoking the strike, you need to argue that the North Vietnamese
really did attack the Maddox and Turner Joy on August 4.  Do you argue
that?  If so, on what basis?

Ed Moise
eemoise@clemson.edu

----------------------

Index:  4833      Reference:  4820
From: Edwin E. Moise 
Subject: Re: Anti-war and Nuclear Threat
Date: 15 Feb 1996 15:14:28 -0500
Organization: Clemson University
Keywords: Nuclear threat; China

In article <602144820@panix3.panix.com>, tegtmeie@panix.com (John 
Tegtmeier) wrote:
JT> 1.  How credible was the risk of the use of nuclear weapons, tactical
JT> or strategic, by any of the powers directly or indirectly involved in
JT> Vietnam?

John -

There was never a time when anyone came close to using nuclear
weapons in that war.  It is very hard to tell whether there was
ever a time when a different path could have been taken, which
might have led, several years later, to a very different situation
than any that actually existed, one that could have led to use
of nuclear weapons.  I can see two issues worth examining; there
may be others I don't see.

a) It seems clear in retrospect that the Chinese were not bluffing
about their willingness to enter the war directly if the US
went too far against North Vietnam.  A direct war between ground
troops of two countries both of which had nuclear weapons would
be something to be nervous about, though it would not automatically
have led to the use of nuclear weapons.  But it is not obvious how
far would have been too far, in the statement above that the
Chinese would have come in if the US went "too far", so it is
hard to be sure how great the danger actually was the the US would
go too far.

b) There were elements in the US military who thought that nuclear
weapons were appropriate for use even in fairly small wars.
They never came close to getting their view accepted by the
government as a whole, but I don't have an opinion on the
question whether it was inevitable that the overall climate of
opinion in the US government was going to develop in such a
fashion that these people's views would end up getting pretty
much ignored.

Ed Moise
eemoise@clemson.edu

----------------------

Index:  4834      Reference:  4400, 1739
From: Edwin E. Moise 
Subject: Re: Ignorant of Democracy?
Date: 15 Feb 1996 15:15:08 -0500
Organization: Clemson University
Keywords: Election, Vietnam 1968

In article <602124739@panix3.panix.com>, sdotctho@olywa.net (Craig
Thompson) wrote:
CET> During my tour, a little more than two years before Kerry's
CET> statement, a national election was held in Viet Nam (Thieu was elected
CET> Premier).  My unit assisted in guarding the polling places from the
CET> very real danger of Viet Cong attacks AND provided escort for voters
CET> travelling from outlying rural hamlets to the polls. (A bit of irony
CET> here, I was too young to vote in the American Presidential election of
CET> 1968 but was not too young to put my neck at risk safe-guarding the
CET> rights of the South Vietnamese to vote under their own constitution).
-snip-
CET> Craig Thompson
CET> B 2/503d 173d ABN BDE (SEP)
CET> RVN 6/68 - 6/69

Craig -

I believe you must be mistaken about the exact nature of the election
you saw.  Thieu was never Premier.  There were two elections in which
he was elected President: he was originally elected September 3, 1967,
and re-elected in 1971.  Neither of these fits the dates you were in
Vietnam.

I believe the election you saw was probably for some office(s?) at
provincial level or below.  This is an aspect of Vietnamese government
about which I know hardly anything, so I cannot judge to what extent
the voters were voting because it made some difference to them who
won, and to what extent they were voting simply because the dangers of
government retaliation against those who did not vote outweighed the
dangers of Communist action against those who did vote.

Ed Moise
eemoise@clemson.edu

----------------------

Index:  4835      Reference:  
From: "Acacia Press, Inc." 
Subject: Kennedy Assassination Article
Date: 15 Feb 1996 15:30:36 -0500
Organization: Crocker Communciations (crocker.com)
Keywords: Website; Freemasons; Kennedy, John F.

Acacia Press has an article which uses the criteria suggested by Noam 
Chomsky in his book, Rethinking Camelot, to build a case to show 
American Freemasons probably organized the Kennedy assassination and 
cover-up. It is well documented. There are more historical texts on 
American Freemasonry at the Acacia Web site.

Take a look at the article. 

http://www.crocker.com/~acacia/article.html

Acacia Press, Incorporated
http://www.crocker.com/~acacia/index.html
PO BOX 154, Montague, MA 01351

----------------------

Index:  4836      Reference:  4645, 4809
From: baguio@ix.netcom.com (Spectre Gunner)
Subject: BIN: sa7_hit.jpg (1/1)
Date: 15 Feb 1996 16:17:41 -0500
Organization: Baguio Technology Group
Keywords: JPEG; AC-130E, Spectre Gunships (USAF); SA-7 SAM (PAVN)

Here is the picture of the AC-130 that got hit by the SA-7!

[Moderator's note: The following binary image file, sa7_hit.jpg is
     uuencoded for distribution on the newsgroup - JT]

Frank Vaughan
Spectre Gunner

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Opium trade; Ngo Dinh Nhu; Vang Pao; Hmong; KMT; Dalai Lama; Tibet Pathet Lao; Air America; Xieng Khouang Air Transport; Long Tieng Khun Sa; Li Mi; Colby, William; Nguyen Cao Ky Below are citations from two of McCoy's books re the Politics of Heroin. I have never personally encountered situations or believed stories that the CIA itself engaged in drug smuggling. However, the CIA's large-scale paramilitary and political action programs accepted the drug trafficking by those it supported apparently believing its political goals were more important than stopping the traffic. What happended around the illegal Iran/Contra entities is another question. Ralph McGehee Burma, Laos, U Ba Thein a covert action ally. At peak of power in mid 60s one of most impt Shan leaders. He had organized commando ops for British in WWII. After fled Burma in 58 he contacted Dr. Tom Dooley, operating a free clinic in Laos. Story of U Ba Thein's affiliation with CIA. CIA Listening posts near Mong Yang and Ving Ngun depended on Shan having good arms. Agency's logistics link with two bases was Shan national army opium caravans. Young admitted this benign neglect was CIA policy in N. Laos. CIA afraid to pressure local commanders to quit traffic as it might damage effectiveness of pm work. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 345. Laos, 64-68 Laotian air force T-28s became key to clandestine ops along North Vietnam border and Ho Chi Minh trail and providing close air support for secret army ops in northeast. Invention of an early version of AC-47 Gunship. Gen Thao Ma armed C-47 transports with .50 caliber machine guns. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 332. Laos, 55-65 Several hundred French war vets, colonists, and gangsters stayed on in Laos. Corsicans started number of small charter airlines called "Air Opium." phc 294. Nhu in Vietnam became secret partner in Corsican charter airline named Air Laos Commerciale, managed by Francisci. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 296. Laos, Xieng Khouang air transport, 67 Laos Vang Pao's airline formed with CIA money. McCoy, A.W. (1972). The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia. 278. Vietnam, 58-62 Ngo Dinh Nhu used Vnese intel in Laos and Indochina's Corsican underworld's charter airlines to ship opium. In 61-62 he also used First Transport Group (which then flying intel missions into Laos for CIA under control of Gen Ky) to ship raw opium to Saigon. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 197. Vietnam, 61 CIA incorporated Aviation Investors, fictitious parent Company in D.C. to provide cover for Vietnam Air Transport in Op Haylift. (Viat) hired Ky and his First Transport Group to fly commandos into north VN via Laos. One of airline's employees, S.M. Mustard, reported to a senate Committee in 68 that Ky used situation to fly opium from Laos to Saigon. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 205-6. France. In Marseille, CIA sent agents and a psywar team to Marseille where They dealt directly with Corsican leaders thru Guerini brothers. CIA supplied arms and money to Corsican gangs for assaults on communist picket lines. During month long strike CIA gangsters and purged Crs police units murdered a number of striking workers. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 60. Afghanistan, Pakistan, 80-90 By early 90 CIA's Afghan op had proved doubly disastrous. After 10 years covert ops at a cost of $2 billion U.S. had Mujaheddin warlords whose skill as drug dealers exceeded their Competence as military commanders. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 459. Burma, air op, early 50 CIA planes began making 5 parachute drops a week to kmt forces mong hsat. McCoy, A.W. (1972). The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia. 129. Burma, ambassador, 50-51 Ambassador not told of CIA op with kmters in North Burma. Top ranking officials in state dept also kept in dark and it Hidden even from CIA's own ddi. McCoy, A.W. (1972). The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia. 129. Burma, with apparent CIA support 52 Kmt began invasion east Burma. 3 white men's bodies found after military op to defeat kmters. McCoy, A.W. (1972). The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia. 132. Cambodia, CIA sponsoring anti-Sihanouk mercenaries along cambodian border In south VN. McCoy, A.W. (1972). The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia. 26. China, 64-65 Sending teams yao and lahu into China to collect intel. Teams tapped telephone lines, monitored road traffic. Ph 301-2. Teams spent 3 or 4 months inside China. McCoy, A.W. (1972). The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia. 307. China, overseas Chinese. NSC paper said re osc: continue acts to encourage Oc in sea: a) organize and activate anti-commie groups; b) resist effects Parallel pro-commie grps; c) increase orientation to free world; and, d) to (Be sympathetic toward kmt). McCoy, A.W. (1972). The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia. 139-40. China, Tibet, 59-61 CIA's Tibetan op began 8/59 when 20 Khamba tribesmen Arr. Camp Hale, colorado. They served as cadre in guerrilla army which Devoted most resources to mining major roads. CIA hoped to strengthen role Dalai Lama. Ops curtailed may 60 when there 42,000 khambas fighting for Cia. McCoy, A.W. (1972). The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia. notes 426. Laos, 68-72 When Vang Pao's forces began losing control of Sam Neua in early 68, CIA decided to deny population to Pathet Lao by evacuating all. During next 3 years Pathet Lao winter-spring offensives continued to drive Vang Pao back and make tens of thousands of Hmong, refugees. Migration Exceeded air america's capacity and many on forced marches. Many recruits were boys 30% were 14 or less; 30% fifteen or sixteen; remaining 40% were over 45. The rest all dead. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 321. Thailand, 51-57 Gen Phao used [CIA-created] power to take over vice Rackets, expropriated Bangkok slaughterhouse, rigged the gold exchange, collected protection money, etc. Using expanded police force he mounted massive repression of all dissidence. Created net of informants, organized Police Political Affairs Bureau with CIA support, and conducted mass arrest Of 104 leading intellectuals in 52. C.l. Sulzberger of nyt called him a superlative crook and a Thai diplomat called him worst man in whole history Of Thailand. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 184-5. China, Burma, Thailand, 50-52 Op paper began on 7 feb 51, when 4 cat air Transports brought to Thailand weapons from Okinawa. Two Americans, opc's Joost and businessman willis bird met with gen Chinat gen li mi. Unmarked C-47 transport aircraft making at least 5 parachute drops a week to KMT Forces in mong hsat. In june 51 li mi attempted conquest of Yunnan province With troops and 2 CIA advisers. Troops captured Kengma. PLA counterattacked. KMT suffered huge casualties and several CIA advisers Killed. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 168-69. China, Burma, Thailand, 51-52 In late 51 KMT, assisted by American engineers, opened landing strip in mong hsat so large aircraft could land. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 170. China, Thailand, 54 Thru gen phao CIA tried to steer overseas Chinese in all of southeast asia away from PRC and toward KMT. A nsc paper of 54 said: Continue ops designed to encourage overseas Chinese in sea a) to organize Anti-communist groups; b) resist effects pro-communist groups; c) increase orientation towards free world; and, d) to extend sympathy towards [KMT]. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 185-6. Laos, 59 16 August 59 after successful Kong Le coup, Souvanna Phouma announced he forming neutralist gvt. Phoumi broke off negotiations and Returned to Savannakhet where he announced formation of a revolutionary Committee. Dozens of unmarked Air America transports began landing loaded with arms, soldiers, and American advisers, Laos plunged into 3-way civil war. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 310. Laos, 60-73 When CIA began organizing secret army in 60 they found Vang Pao. Thomas Clines was commander of CIA's secret base at Long Tieng. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 308. Laos, 63 In northwest Laos, William Young, assisted by ivs volunteer, Joseph Flipse, led Yao commandos in an attack on Pathet Lao villages. Tony Poe became new CIA man at Long Tieng. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 316. Turkey, Greece, France and Italy, 47-48 Funds used overtly in Turkey and Greece and covertly in France and Italy to support democratic parties. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 57. Burma, 51 After delivering arms to kmt in Burma, an unknown number cat Pilots loading KMT opium for return flight to Bangkok. One of these, Jack Killam, was murdered in 51 after an opium deal went wrong and was buried in an unmarked grave by CIA agent Sherman Joost. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 178. Burma, 53 Burmese troops attacked Li Mi's KMT forces and found bodies of 3 white men who bore no identification other than personal letters with Washington and new york addresses. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 174. Burma, early 50 Burma april 51 2000 KMT soldiers attempted reconquest Yunnan and crossed border accompanied by CIA advisers and supplied by regular airdrops. Several CIAers killed. McCoy, A.W. (1972). The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia. 129-31. Laos, 65 CIA officer, objibway, died in helicopter crash in summer 65 and he replaced by Tony Poe. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 337. Laos, 62 U.S. and USSR signed Geneva agreements and thus terminated Military ops. Although green beret and military advisers departed by October, CIA used deceptions to continue clandestine acts. All CIA personnel moved to adjacent areas in Thailand and returned daily. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 315. In 72 Cord Meyer a CIA official visited harper's owner to request he suppress McCoy's book, politics of heroin. Canfield refused but he allowed CIA to review it prior to publication. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic xvii. Afghanistan, Pakistan, 80-90 17 DEA agents assigned to U.S. Embassy in Islamabad. DEA reports identified 40 significant narcotics syndicates in Pakistan. Despite high quality dea intel, not a major syndicate investigated by Pakistani police in a decade. Hekmatyar himself controlled six heroin refineries. Without fear of arrest heroin dealers began exporting product to Europe an America, capturing more than 50% of both markets. When Pakistani police picked up Hamid Hasnain, v.p. Of gvt's Habib Bank, they found in his briefcase the personal records of president zia. Phc 455 blatant official corruption continued until Gen Zia's death in an air crash. Typical of misinfo that blocked any U.S. action against Pakistan's heroin trade, the state dept's semi-annual narcotics review in September called Gen Zia a strong supporter of anti-narcotics activities in Pakistan. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 456. Afghanistan, Pakistan, 89 As foreign aid declined in 89, Afghan leaders expanded opium production to sustain guerrilla armies. A scramble among rival Mujaheddin leaders occurred. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 458. Burma, 67-90 Story of Khun Sa. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 363-382. Burma, China, Laos, 61-65 After KMT troops chased out of Burma into Northwest Laos those that not resettled to Taiwan (2,000 to 3,000) KMT regulars were left behind in Laos. CIA hired them to strengthen rightist position. Per W. Young these troops placed under nominal command of Gen Phoumi Nosavan and became Bataillon Speciale 111. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 349. Burma, Laos, Thailand, vietnam, 50-90 American impact on region's drug trade wether cover complicity or active suppression, relied on relations with local allies. Since CIA covert ops demand alliances with powerful warlords or tribal leaders who necessarily deal in drugs, agency has repeatedly enmeshed its covert ops with region's opium trade. By investing leaders with the authority of its alliance, CIA provides protection that a drug lord can use to expand his share of traffic. Thru alliance he gains access to international transport or commercial contacts that facilitate movement and marketing of drugs. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 385. Burma, Thailand, 68-90 Khun Sa, armed by the CIA, trained by the KMT, and protected by the Burmese and Thai gvts, Khun Sa has drawn strength from the complicity of powerful states and their intel agencies. If Khun Sa were to fall, the same forces that empowered him would soon create another opium warlord in his place. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 435. Burma, Thailand, China, 51 In an interview with U.S. Ambassador Rankin, Chinat gen Li Mi gave a pessimistic account of his [CIA-sponsored] ops and showed pressures were leading him into drug trade. During his first invasion of China from 6 june to 15 july 51 his troops rcvd 5 cat airlifts inside Yunnan totaling 875 rifles with 40 rounds each and 2000 carbines With 50 rounds. He lost 800 men in PLA counterattack. He withdrew with some 30,000 to 40,000 able-bodied men. At suggestion of 2 American officers with his forces in Burma he traveled to Bangkok for a conference. Americans unhappy he had withdrawn. Li Mi had 4 contacts with Gen Frank Merrill a wartime leader. He instructed Li Mi to try to bring karens closer to Burmese gvt. Later Merrill stopped contact and money from this channel. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 171-2. CIA involved in drug traffic at three levels: 1. Coincidental complicity by Allying with groups engaged in traffic; 2. Support of traffic by covering up known traffickers and condoning their involvement; 3. Active engagement in transport of opium and heroin. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 23. France, 47-50 CIA joined forces with Corsicans to break hold of Communist Party over city gvt and to break two dock strikes - that threatened efficiency of Marshall Plan and 1st IndoChina war. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 25. France, Laos, 87 Prince Sopsaisana of Laos to Paris in april. One of his suitcases contained 60 kilos of high-grade Laotian heroin worth $13.5 million in New York. French refused to accept his credentials and he recalled to Vientiane in June. According to DEA, Sopsai's venture was financed by Gen Vang Pao, and the heroin had been refined in lab at Long Tieng, CIA's hqs for ops in n. Laos. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 284-5. Burma, 50-59 CIA activities Burma (with KMT) helped transform shan States into largest opium-growing region in world. KMT shipped heroin to North Thailand where sold to Gen. Phao Sriyanonda of Thai police, a CIA Client. McCoy, A.W. (1972). The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia. 127. Laos. Beginning in 64 Vang Pao became drug lord of Hmong. Per Ouane Rattikone, commander of Laotian army, and Gen Thao Ma, then commander Laotian air force, Air America began flying Hmong opium to markets in Long Tieng and Vientiane. Tony Poe, a CIA officer who worked with Vang Pao, said Vang Pao made millions in drug traffic. Air logistics for opium trade further improved when CIA and usaid gave Vang Pao financial assistance in forming his own air line, Xieng Khouang Air Yransport. Formed in late 67 With two C-47s acquired from air American and Continental Air Services. Company's schedule limited to shuttle flights between Long Tieng and Vientiane. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 318. Laos, 61-75 CIA intervention in Laos changed narcotics traffic. Corsican Charter airlines forced out of business in 65, then CIA's airline, Air America, began flying Hmong opium out of hills to Long Tieng and Vientiane. CIA cross-border ops into China in 62 when Shan rebels who organized forays began financing Shan nationalist cause by selling Burmese opium to another CIA protege, Laotian Gen Phoumi Nosavan. Prior to that time much heroin sent to Bangkok. In late 60s air force bombing disrupted Laotian opium production and forced Hmong to become refugees. But Laotian labs, major suppliers of g.i.'s in Vietnam, simply increased imports of Burmese heroin. CIA analysis identified 21 opium refineries in tri-border area. 7 capable Of producing near pure heroin located in border area of Burma and Thailand Where paramilitary groups closely identified with CIA ci and intel ops Since 50s. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 288. Laos, 60-75 CIA created secret army of 30,000 Hmong tribesmen to battle Communists. Hmong's main cash crop opium, so CIA allowed gen Vang Pao to use CIA Air America to collect opium from scattered villages. In late 69 CIA's various clients opened a net of heroin labs in golden triangle. In first years they exported high-grade #4 heroin to U.S. troops in Vietnam. After their withdrawal, golden triangle labs exported directly to U.S., Capturing 1/3 of American market. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 19. Laos, Vietnam, 56-62 Nhu est two pipelines from Laotian poppy fields to Svn. Major one was Air Laos Commerciale, managed by Corsican gangster Francisci. Nhu also used vnese air force transports. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 203-4. Southeast asia has achieved dual distinction of becoming world's largest Producer of raw opium and the major source of America's illicit heroin. In Feb 90 the DEA announced that Southeast Asia was the source of 45% of all heroin consumed in the U.S. up sharply from only 18% 3 years before - Details of world production. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 387. Southern Asia, 80-90 During 80s CIA ops in afghanistan transformed s. Asia from self-contained opium zone to major supplier heroin on world Market. Phc 441. Saudi arabia delivered their aid directly to client Guerrilla groups inside afghanistan, most allied agencies, the CIA Included, worked thru gen zia's [of pakistan], the inter service intel (Isi). CIA relationship with isi complex, CIA commanded vast arsenal funds And high-tech weapons that dwarfed isi's meager budget. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 49. Thailand, Burma, 72 Media spectacle staged by dea on behalf of cia. Before u.s. Tv cameras in march 72, gen li's KMT troops delivered a hundred Mules laden with "opium," and publicly renounced the drug trade. Thai Military soaked with gas and burned 26 tons opium. With covert funding from Cia, the Thai military then paid the general $1,850,000 for his "last" Opium shipment. Opium pyre was neither KMT's last shipment nor entirely Opium. 5 tons had been opium the other 21 tons was "fodder, other plant Matter, chemicals." mccoy, a.w. (1991). The politics of heroin: CIA Complicity in the global drug traffic 417. Vietnam, 58-62 Ngo dinh nhu used VNese intel in Laos and indoChina's Corsican underworld's charter airlines to ship opium. In 61-62 he also used First transport group (which then flying intel missions into Laos for CIA Under control of gen ky) to ship raw opium to saigon. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 197. Early 50 CIA recruited corsican gangsters to battle commie strikers. Both Sicilian mafia and corsican underworld played key role in europe's post war Heroin traffic and provided most heroin in us for next two decades. CIA did Not dabble in drugs to finance its ops, CIA's role simply inadvertent Consequence its cold war tactics. McCoy, A.W. (1972). The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia. 7-8. Laos, 70-71 Commander CIA's secret army had opium refined at long tieng Hqs for CIA ops north Laos. Ph 244. Air America began flying opium to long Tieng. McCoy, A.W. (1972). The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia. 263. Thailand 50-59 CIA support invaluable asset gen phao in managing opium Traffic. Gave police aircraft, naval vessels, motor vehicles and logistic Capability to move opium from fields to sea lanes, etc. Ph 144. By end 50s In 70 report of bureau narcotics, Burma, Laos and Thailand massive producer And source more than half world's present illicit supply. McCoy, A.W. (1972). The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia. 138, 145. Thailand, sea supply corporation, 51 Ssc delivered naval vessels, arms, Armored vehicles and aircraft to general phao's police. Phao called worst Man in whole history Thailand. Phao's alliance with CIA gave him extensive KMT contacts--he built virtual monopoly Burmese opium exports. McCoy, A.W. (1972). The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia. 138. Vietnam, 68-70 CIA avoids gathering info high level (vn) officials Involved drug smuggling. McCoy, A.W. (1972). The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia. 218. Vietnam, 61-62 Nhu used first transport group (which then flying Missions into Laos for CIA and under control ky) to ship opium to saigon. McCoy, A.W. (1972). The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia. 153. Laos, 59 Gen phoumi nosavan began rise to power in april 59 national Assembly elections. Election so blatantly rigged it aroused resentment. American involvement in fixing election obvious - there reports CIA Financed vote buying. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 310. Laos, april 59 National assembly election blatantly rigged. American Involvement obvious. McCoy, A.W. (1972). The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia. 269. Thailand, 57 Gen sarit's forces overthrew cia-backed police gen phao. Police armored and paramilitary units disbanded and all CIA agents attached To phao's police force were thrown out of country. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 188. Australia, 75-80 As nugan hand bank expanded, michael hand recruited some Of most famous names in u.s. National security circles: admiral earl yates; General leroy j. Manor; general edwin black; dr. Guy pauker, Asia expert of Rand corp; walter mcdonald, retired CIA deputy dir for economic research; Dale holmgren, former chairman of CIA's civil air transport; william colby, Retired dci. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 469. Australia, 76-80 The nugan hand bank. Sometime in 65-66 michael jon hand Joined the CIA for two years as a contract operative with Hmong in north Laos. He met cos shackley, and crack Air America pilot, kermit "buddy" King. Key figure in bank's history is texan maurice bernard houghton. Among Houghton's guests at club were the CIA's australian station chief from 73-75, john d. Walker. In pretoria south africa, hand incorporated a Trading company, murdoch lewis proprietary ltd, to take delivery of arms Shipments. Houghton made direct contact with former CIA agent edwin wilson, Then working for task force 157, a covert arm of oni. In early 75 or 76 a Dennis schlachter, a world marine employee first learned of african arms Deal when two CIA agents, james hawes and robert moore, called on wilson at World marine in d.c. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 461-468. China CIA backed KMT invasions yunnan province from Burma early 50 Based Assumption that once KMT in China "enslaved masses" would rise up against Mao. McCoy, A.W. (1972). The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia. 131. Vietnam, 68-70 CIA avoids gathering info high level (vn) officials Involved drug smuggling. McCoy, A.W. (1972). The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia. 218. China, Burma, 49 after est of prc in 49, CIA gathered remnants of Chinat Army who had fled to shan states in Burma. CIA hired harold young to gather Intel on China. Young in turn called on u ba thein to organize team of Christian lahus for intel work inside China. A group sent to chiangmai, Thailand where harold's oldest son, gordon, trained them in radio. They Then sent to Burma\China border and sent info to gordon who passed it on to Local CIA operative working under cover as American vice consul. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 339. Laos, Burma, China, 64-66 William young removed from command of pm ops in 64. In 65 CIA ordered him back to nam tha to continue supervising yao and Lahu intel teams being sent deep into yunnan province, China. Teams Wandered mountains of yunnan tapping telephone lines and monitoring road Traffic. Young had begun sending teams into China since 63. By time young Quit in 67 He had opened three major radio posts with in Burma's shan State, built a special training camp that was graduating 35 agents every Two months, and sent hundreds of teams deep into yunnan. Phc 339. Modus Operandi changed little from 62 Until nixon ordered them stopped in August 71 McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 341. France, 47 When french communists attacked marshall plan in 47, thru afl Split european labor by funding leon jouhaux, socialist leader, who then Led his force ouvriere out of communist-dominated cgt. Phc 58. With funds From dubinsky's union, lovestone and irving brown, organized force Ouvriere. CIA payments on order one million a year gave socialist party Strong electoral base in labor. With help of u.s. Military attache, moch, Called up 80,000 reserves and mobilized 20,000 troops to battle strikes. Cgt called off strikes. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 59. France, 47-50 CIA joined forces corsican underworld to break hold Communists over marseille city gvt and to break to dock strikes one in 47 Other in 50--that threatened efficiency of marshall plan and first IndoChina war. McCoy, A.W. (1972). The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia. 16, 38-57. France, 47 During month long strike breaking efforts marseille CIA Psywar team prepared pamphlets, radio broadcasts and posters to discourage Workers from continuing strike. McCoy, A.W. (1972). The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia. 44. France, 47 Sat. Even. Post braden wrote of individual with international Ladies' garment workers union using funds from that union organized force Ouvriere, a non communist union which CIA began to fund. Thus began secret Subsidy of free trade unions which soon spread to italy. McCoy, A.W. (1972). The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia. 42-3. France. Braden of CIA in sat even post 50 Wrote CIA supplied 15,000 to Pay strong arm squads in mediterranean ports so American supplies re vn Could be unloaded against opposition commie dock workers. Recruited elite Criminal terror squad. This ops had unintended consequence leading to Marseille growth as America's heroin laboratory. McCoy, A.W. (1972). The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia.. 46. Laos, deaths, 65 CIA man died in helicopter crash. McCoy, A.W. (1972). The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia. 300. Laos, 72 As repeated losses reduced Vang Pao's army to about 30,000, CIA Imported 20,000 Thai mercenaries. Phc 330. In 75 After some 3,000 Hmong Flown across mekong, Vang Pao and his CIA case officer, jerry daniels, flew Out of long tieng eventually to missoula, montana. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 331. Laos, Burma, China, 64-66 William young removed from command of pm ops in 64. In 65 CIA ordered him back to nam tha to continue supervising yao and Lahu intel teams being sent deep into yunnan province, China. Teams Wandered mountains of yunnan tapping telephone lines and monitoring road Traffic. Young had begun sending teams into China since 63. By time young Quit in 67 He had opened three major radio posts with in Burma's shan State, built a special training camp that was graduating 35 agents every Two months, and sent hundreds of teams deep into yunnan. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 339. Thailand, 51-57 Gen phao used [cia-created] power to take over vice Rackets, expropriated Bangkok slaughterhouse, rigged the gold exchange, Collected protection money, etc. Using expanded police force he mounted Massive repression of all dissidence. Created net of informants, organized Police political affairs bureau with CIA support, and conducted mass arrest Of 104 leading intellectuals in 52. C.l. Sulzberger of nyt called him a Superlative crook and a Thai diplomat called him worst man in whole history Of Thailand. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 184-5. Thailand, 51-57 In 51 CIA front org sea supply, began delivering large Quantities naval vessels, arms, armored vehicles and aircraft to phao's Police. Phao then able est police air force, maritime police, police Armored div, and police paratroop unit. By 53 CIA had at least 275 overt And covert agents working with phao's police. They had delivered $35 Million worth of assistance. Gave arms commo equipment, transport, CIA also Created two new paramilitary units, police aerial reconnaissance unit (Paru) and border patrol police. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 184. Cambodia CIA sponsoring anti-sihanouk mercenaries along cambodian border in South vn. McCoy, A.W. (1972). The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia. 266. China, early 50 April 51 2000 KMT soldiers attempted reconquest yunnan And crossed border accompanied by CIA advisers and supplied by regular Airdrops. Several ciaers killed. Mission failed. Another soon attempted and Failed. CIA redoubled efforts. Aug 52 KMTers penetrated yunnan until driven Out. No further attempts. Forces confident that masses would rise up Against mao. McCoy, A.W. (1972). The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia. 129-131. Laos, 61 With gen phoumi once more in control in vientiane, CIA began Sending green berets, cia-financed Thai police into region ii to build up Hmong army under Vang Pao. William young one of CIA operatives sent to Padoung in january. Details of recruiting and building up Vang Pao's army. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 312-3. Laos, Thailand, Vietnam. Edgar buell, tony posepny and william young had Personal imprint on secret war. Tony poe in 58 was one of two operatives Sent to support separtists revolt in indonesia. His first assignment with Anti-sihanouek mercenaries along cambodian border in s. Vietnam. In Laos he Offered one dollar for an ear of enemy and more for a head and cap. Details Re pop buell. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 306-7. France, braden of CIA in sat even post 50 Wrote CIA supplied 15,000 To Pay strong arm squads in mediterranean ports so American supplies re VN could be unloaded against opposition commie dock workers. Recruited elite criminal terror squad. This ops had unintended consequence leading to Marseille growth as America's heroin laboratory. McCoy, A.W. (1972). The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia.. 46. Vietnam, air op. First transport group 61-62 Nhu used (which then flying missions into Laos for CIA and under control Ky) to ship opium to Saigon. Support resistance ops NVN. McCoy, A.W. (1972). The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia. 153, 163. Vietnam, assassinations, 68 Names of five VNese killed on 2 June 68 by U.S. helicopter. They all supporters ky. McCoy, A.W. (1972). The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia. 178-9. Vietnam, Diem, Ngo Dinh handpicked by Americans to be premier svn. Ph Beginning 122. 55-56 Without u.s. support Diem certainly could not consolidate his hold on south. Without threat U.S. intervention svn could not refuse discuss elections called for in 56 in Geneva. Without U.S. aid Diem regime could not have survived. Based on Pentagon Papers. McCoy, A.W. (1972). The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia. 150. ---------------------- Index: 4838 Reference: 4739 From: Craig Thompson Subject: Re: Ignorant of Democracy Date: 15 Feb 1996 19:09:06 -0500 Organization: Lost Planet Airmen Keywords: Election, Vietnam 1968 I received the following from Ed Moise concerning my post "Ignorant of Democracy: EM> Craig - EM> Please check memory again in regard to exactly what happened, and EM> in regard to date. Thieu was never Premier. There were two EM> elections in which he was elected President: he was originally EM> elected September 3, 1967, and re-elected in 1971. Neither of EM> these fits the dates you say you were in Vietnam; neither fits EM> your specification of a little more than two years before Kerry's EM> April 1971 statement. EM> The Vietnamese equivalent of Congress, the National Assembly, EM> was in two components, the Lower and Upper houses. The Lower House EM> held national elections at four-year intervals: 1967 and 1971. EM> The Upper House held national elections at three-year intervals: EM> 1967, 1970, and 1973. No match to your dates. EM> I think something needs to be said about this on the list, but EM> I wanted to communicate with you b/c first, to figure out what is EM> going on. I do not think you just made the whole story up, but EM> I do think your memory is to some extent inaccurate. EM> You have my permission to quote this b/c message, or repeat it in EM> full, to the list or elsewhere. If you send me a b/c reply, please EM> specify whether I have permission to quote your reply to the list. EM> Ed Moise EM> eemoise@clemson.edu Well Ed was somewhat kind because it actually it looks like a whole lot of my memory was inaccurate. My response by e-mail was: CET> Thanks Ed, CET> CET> Must be a rusty memory on my part. Though frankly they didn't keep us CET> infantry types up on RVN current events all that well. CET> CET> I was in RVN 6-68 to 6-69 and some sort of election was held during that CET> time where we provided escort and security for the voters in Binh Dinh CET> Province as I described in my post. I know that this conflicts with the CET> facts you cite but I have no explanation for the discrepancy. -snip- CET> Go ahead and correct me, when I'm wrong I'm wrong. The only other thing I would care to add is that my most vivid memory of the incident was that as we were heading out to laager somewhere for the night, I could see that many sheets of colored paper had been thrown away behind the hootch where the balloting tables had been set up (actually the tables were outside -- one table where the citizens picked up the ballots and another containing the ballot boxes). In a letter home I wondered whether they were unused ballots or were evidence of fraud. The inaccuracies of my post are like due to a foggy memory of a faulty explanation to someone who had other things on his mind (such as staying alive). Craig Thompson B 2/503d 173d Airborne RVN 68-69 ---------------------- Index: 4839 Reference: 4785, 4828 From: Edwin E. Moise Subject: Re: KMT In Laos Date: 15 Feb 1996 19:09:45 -0500 Organization: Clemson University Keywords: Laos; Eisenhower, Dwight D. In article <602154828@panix3.panix.com>, Brian wrote: BR> Correct me if I'm wrong Ed, but I've always been under the BR> impression that the Laotion "crisis" of 1960 was considered by some BR> scholars now to have been a bit of a media "beat-up" and perhaps never BR> really occurred (in that no actual fighting or very little fighting BR> actually occurred). Its been some time since I last studied the event BR> and most of the books I had available to me seemed to concur that BR> while perhaps something happened, it was no where near as critical as BR> was made out by the US Government at the time. I would say a government rather than a media "beat-up", Brian, but otherwise I would agree with you. It seems to me that the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations both treated certain events in Laos as much more important than they really were. I don't think, however, that the media joined the government in this exaggeration. I am, however, pretty vague on this; I need to learn a good deal more about events in Laos sometime in the not too distant future. Some of what was going on clearly was important, and I would need to understand the overall pattern of events much better than I do in order to judge just how important. Ed Moise eemoise@clemson.edu ---------------------- Index: 4840 Reference: From: jaques@lclark.edu (Derek Jaques) Subject: REQ: Phoenix Program Date: 15 Feb 1996 19:10:42 -0500 Organization: Lewis & Clark College, Portland OR X-Followup-To: poster Hello, I am enthralled by the Phoenix Program. I have spoken with two veterans, who claim that they were involved with the Progam. Both of them had contradicting stories. They agreed on the goal of the plan, but the methods and results explained to me varied drastically. One claimed that it was the CIA's assasination sqaud, that tortured many innocent people to death, but was very effective in disrupting the "Shadow Government." The other person said that the goal of the Phoenix Program was to neutralize the shadow government, which included capture, convert, or kill. Which one of these views is true, or are they both. I would appreciate any reply that you feel inclined to give. I would be forever grateful if any veteran of the Program would reply. Please send the information to my E-mail, I have limited access to this newsgroup. Thanks a million! Derek Jaques jaques@lclark.edu.com ---------------------- Index: 4841 Reference: 4815, 1832 From: stourison@aol.com (Sedgwick Tourison) Subject: Re: Tonkin Gulf Incident Date: 15 Feb 1996 19:27:44 -0500 Organization: America Online, Inc. Keywords: Tonkin Gulf incident; Oplan 34A In Ed Moise response to my article, Moise write: "During 1964, the force available for covert operations by sea against North Vietnam was greatly expanded--more men, more boats, bigger boats. The actual number and scale of operations by sea against North Vietnam during the four months preceding the Tonkin Gulf incidents was higher than it had ever been in the past." Ed: In order to make this statement, you must be able to identify the number and scale of maritime operations forces into the Gulf of Tonkin prior to 1964. "Secret Army, Secret War" is the story of the covert operations as seen through the eyes of the agents sent into the North, primarily the long range agent agent teams, but including material from the marops teams as well. If you review the declassified Maritime Operations Appendix regarding the number of Vietnamese civilian and military personnel at Da Nang available to support the marops and compare it to the total number available to support marops in 1963, you will find that the number of marops team personnel available in 1964 was significantly less and for reasons that are spelled out and appear at various locations in "Secret Army, Secret War." What DID happen, however, was the arrival of the Nastys and Swifts which resolved the problems being encoutered by the slow-moving motorized junks and I have outlined them adequately, given the scope of "Secret Army, Secret War." Ed Moise writes: "According to Appendix 1 of your book...there were 67 agents dropped into North Vietnam by air during the four months preceding the Tonkin Gulf incidents... This was more than had been dropped in the whole second half of 1963." Ed: You are mixing apples and oranges. Appendix 1 is a scanned copy of a document from the MACSOG Documentation Study and is identified as such. Appendix 10, on the other hand, is a by name listing of all the agents in the teams sent into North Vietnam. In "Secret Army, Secret War" I note that the CIA did not provided the Pentagon with the identity of all the teams they sent into North Vietnam. If you compare Appendix 10 to Appendix 1, you will find there are many more teams of agents sent into the North and I explain why in my book. So, your figure, if based on Appendix 1 as you cite, is inaccurate. Furthermore, in the text of the book I give the specific number of teams, team by team, lost in the North, and that meshes with Appendix 10, the discrepencies being so noted and explained at the appropriate point. Ed Moise asks: "Please explain how covert operations by sea running at all time record levels, and covert operations by air running at unusually high levels...would have added up, in Hanoi's eyes, to "it appeared the covert operations were winding down." " Ed: As stated early on, the covert operations by sea were actually lower than those in 1963. You should check Appendix 7 in "Secret Army, Secret War" for the month-by-month operations attempted and successful for the covert operations during 1964 as scanned in from the MACSOG Documentation Study original document. If you compare it to the successful missions in 1963 you will find your statement is in error. I do not list the unsuccessful marops missions in 1963, for example, but have reconstructed many of them and they are so far above the operations in 1963 that Ha Noi would have perceived that the war was winding down. Also, as noted repeatedly in "Secret Army, Secret War," Ha Noi routinely interrogated all prisoners for the identity of teams in training at Long Thanh or elsewhere. Once MACSOG brought all the teams out of the safe houses in November 1963, they compromised the identity of all the teams, as I have noted in the appropriate chapter. Although you did not repeat what I had in my initial message, Captain Do Van Tien was passing the mission data to the North Vietnamese, as he admitted after my book was released, and Do Van Dien was the SVN deputy chief of the northern operations, had been since he was the deputy in 1955, coming from the old French 6eme Bureau, the CE service. I can offer further analysis but I think the point has been made. Ed Moise asks for citation of a source on the call for the withdrawal of U.S. forces in 1963. Ed: Check the cited references in "Secret Army, Secret War," and I note the dichotomy between what McNamara was calling for and what he was actually doing. Also recommend Vol. 2 of the Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition. Ed Moise asks for my rationale behind the position that the North Vietnamese attacked the Maddox on August 2, 1964, as a means of drawing the U.S. into the war. Ed: Read the appropriate chapter in "Secret Army, Secret War" the reviews this very point. I do not need to argue that the North Vietnamese attacked the Maddox and Turner Joy on August 4, and you know that quite well from reading my book and our discussions when I was at Clemson. Who may have attacked and why? Who did not attack (the North Vietnamese) and how/why have we covered it up? You already know I have explained that in "Secret Army, Secret War," so why are you asking the question if you already know the answer? Best regards. STourison@aol.com ---------------------- Index: 4842 Reference: From: Gregory Noller Subject: Americal Division Veterans Association Date: 15 Feb 1996 23:51:37 -0500 Organization: Americal.org Keywords: Unit association; Americal; Website [Moderator's note: This article has been cross-posted from soc.veterans for your ingormation - JT] Please visit the Americal Division Vet's home page. If you don't have a browser and want information about the association, contact Gary Noller, gnoller@aol.com, Senior Vice Commander. Welcome Home! -- _______________________________ <<<+)))SGM Greg Noller gnoller@servtech.com Fort Drum, NY http://www.americal.org ---------------------- Index: 4843 Reference: 4625, 4675 From: Phan@tigger.Stcloud.msus.edu (Dien Phan) Subject: Nixon's confess US mistake (Was: Diem's Assassination) Date: 15 Feb 1996 23:52:38 -0500 Organization: St. Cloud State University Keywords: Nixon, Richard M.; Ngo Dinh Diem In the book "1999 Victory Without War", Touchstone, 1988, Nixon wrote: "The worst mistake we made in Vietnam was to instigate the coup against Diem in 1963...", p. 123. And: "Two of the blackest pages in the history of Ameican diplomacy were our complicity in the murder of Diem and our ..." p. 258. ---------------------- Index: 4844 Reference: 4820 From: Michael Carley Subject: Re: Anti-war and Nuclear Threat Date: 15 Feb 1996 23:53:29 -0500 Organization: Dept. of Maths, Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland. Keywords: Nuclear threat; LeMay, Gen Curtis In article <602144820@panix3.panix.com>, tegtmeie@panix.com (John Tegtmeier) writes: JT> 1. How credible was the risk of the use of nuclear weapons, tactical JT> or strategic, by any of the powers directly or indirectly involved in JT> Vietnam? Given the insanity of Curtis LeMay, it couldn't be ruled out. I've an article wedged away somewhere on LeMay which sheds quite a bit of light on the whole thing. I'll try to remember to bring it in and type up some extracts. -- "You got your highbrow funk, you got your lowbrow funk, you even got a little bit of your pee-wee, pow-wow funk" (Dr. John) Michael Carley, Mech. Eng., TCD, IRELAND. m.carley@leoleo.mme.tcd.ie Home page ---------------------- Index: 4845 Reference: 4772, 4817 From: hollis6475@aol.com (HOLLIS6475) Subject: Re: Letters from a young marine grunt written in Vietnam Date: 15 Feb 1996 23:55:15 -0500 Organization: America Online, Inc. Paul, I don't read stats about the war...there was a few more prisoners taken in Idaho canyon...but then stats are stats...we were fortunate many bac biet, no or little cong.....and the ones were not very good.. thanks fot the info....I knew we were doin' a good job.... When I was in USNH Guam, met some bros, from down So. lots of scrapnel wounds...... I guess one man's mess was another's good place. chao Hollis ---------------------- Index: 4846 Reference: 4818 From: hollis6475@aol.com (HOLLIS6475) Subject: Re: PER NAR: The Worst Meal Date: 15 Feb 1996 23:56:10 -0500 Organization: America Online, Inc. Don't forget...the turtles..... Hollis Ps...short rats? ---------------------- Index: 4847 Reference: From: jakeb@cyberhighway.net (Jake Bartruff) Subject: REQ: Photo of the "grotto", Cam Ranh Bay Date: 15 Feb 1996 23:57:06 -0500 Organization: CyberHighway Internet Services Cam Ranh Bay Vets...... Remember the "Grotto" drinking bar cave built amoung the boulders at South Beach??? I'll pay $50.00 for a photograph of it. Contact : Vance Fowler 4090 Brush College Rd NW Salem, OR USA 97304 Or Call: In USA 1-800-298-8506 Outside USA call collect (503)362-0218 Thanks- Vance Fowler ---------------------- Index: 4848 Reference: From: Phan@tigger.Stcloud.msus.edu (Dien Phan) Subject: Antiwar movement, Clinton and Louis Farakahn Date: 15 Feb 1996 23:57:58 -0500 Organization: St. Cloud State University From ABC news this morning. Louis Farakahn (National of Islam) is in a tour of Iran and Lybia today. In a rally with people of Iran, he expressed his support to the bombing of the World Trade Center and criticize the US. However, no US flags were burned. US dept of state issues a warning to Farakahn about his speech against the US. This is very similar to Bill Clinton's action in the Soviet Union (and the same with Jane Fonda, Ramsey Clark, McGovern). Under the freedom of speech granted to US citizens, these individuals should have the freedom to protest against the US (and burn the flag). Until some of Farakahn's millions of followers decide to go underground (like the Vietnam anti-war movement) and bomb US targets, the US State Dept cannot harrass them. ---------------------- Index: 4849 Reference: From: drk2@world.std.com (Dave Kohr) Subject: Vietnam documentary on Chicago Public TV, Mon. Feb. 19 at 10 PM Date: 15 Feb 1996 23:58:47 -0500 Organization: The World Public Access UNIX, Brookline, MA Keywords: PBS documentaries I just saw a very good documentary about present-day Vietnam on a Chicago PBS station, WTTW (Channel 11). It is called "Vietnam: The Next Generation", and will be rebroadcast next Monday (Feb. 19) between 10 and 11 PM. It consists mostly of interviews with Vietnamese youth, Americans living/working in or travelling to Vietnam (including Vietnam War veterans), and overseas Vietnamese who have returned to Vietnam. I highly recommend it. Since it was a local production, it may not receive nationwide broadcast. However, it may be possible to order videotapes from the station. -- Dave Kohr ---------------------- Index: 4850 Reference: 4729, 4763 From: wakingup@postoffice.ptd.net (Frank Warner) Subject: Re: "So-called" anti-war movement Date: 16 Feb 1996 00:00:20 -0500 Organization: ProLog - PenTeleData, Inc. Keywords: Paris Peace Accords clements@u.washington.edu (S. Clements) wrote: SC> May I make a guess that you regarded it as a "keeping my own sorry SC> ass out of the war" movement? If so, I think you are quite wrong SC> about the motivation of those who protested the war, and wrong, SC> also, in that you may underestimate the effectiveness of the movement SC> in ending the war, while overestimating its effectiveness in SC> keeping its members out of it. Just a guess, mind you. We could debate all this for a million years. "Anti-war." "Ending the war." The terms mean too many different things. What allows some skepticism over the "anti-war" movement was that, as soon as American combat units left at the end of 1972, the movement all but dried up. From this some concluded, If Americans weren't dying, there was no war. But the war went on for more than two more years. There were no significant demonstrations in front of the Russian or Chinese embassies, or North Vietnamese offices, for supporting the continued war. And when the North Vietnamese Army overran Saigon, despite promising in the 1973 Paris Peace Accords they would not move forces any deeper into South Vietnam, there was virtual silence from the "anti-war" movement. To "end the war," the North Vietnamese leaders also promised free elections in the Paris Peace Accords. And 23 years later, too few are protesting that broken promise. No freedom, is that peace? Frank Warner ---------------------- Index: 4851 Reference: From: vietnam-request@panix.com (Moderator - shwv) Subject: On This Date - February 16 Date: 16 Feb 1996 09:37:41 -0500 Organization: PANIX Public Access Internet and Unix, NYC Keywords: Medal of Honor recipient; Monroe, James H.; Bong Son On February 16, 1967, 22 year old Private First Class James H. Monroe of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) gave his life in action in Bong Son, Hoai Nhon Province, RVN. He was born on October 17, 1944 in Aurora, IL. For his actions, he was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor. What follows is the citation for that award: "For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty. His platoon was deployed in a night ambush when the position was suddenly subjected to an intense and accurate grenade attack, and 1 foxhole was hit immediately. Responding without hesitation to calls for help from the wounded men Pfc. Monroe moved forward through heavy small-arms fire to the foxhole but found that all of the men had expired. He turned immediately and crawled back through the deadly hail of fire toward other calls for aid. He moved to the platoon sergeant's position where he found the radio operator bleeding profusely from fragmentation and bullet wounds. Ignoring the continuing enemy attack Pfc. Monroe began treating the wounded man when he saw a live grenade fall directly in front of the position. He shouted a warning to all those nearby, pushed the wounded radio operator and the platoon sergeant to one side, and lunged forward to smother the grenades blast with his body. Through his valorous actions, performed in a flash of inspired selflessness, Pfc. Monroe saved the lives of his two comrades and prevented the probable injury of several others. His gallantry and intrepidity were in the highest traditions of the U.S. Army, and reflect great credit upon himself and the Armed Forces of his country" ********************************************************************** "No 'healing', no apologies, no memorials, nothing can possibly compensate for the damage done and the pain inflicted....The only thing we can possibly do, twenty years too late, is to try and tell the truth." - Eric Bergerud. ********************************************************************** ---------------------- Index: 4852 Reference: 4703, 4744 From: Phan@tigger.Stcloud.msus.edu (Dien Phan) Subject: Re: Dawson's Pham Xuan An Date: 16 Feb 1996 09:39:25 -0500 Organization: St. Cloud State University Keywords: Pham Xuan An; Nyugen Van Thieu; Intelligence, PAVN [In reply to Ralph McGehee's article <602124744@panix3.panix.com>] There were too many VC spies in South Vietnamese government! Pham Xuan An was the one that cause great damage to the war efforts because of his influence to the mass media. It was hard to S. Vietnamese fight a war when friends working for enemy. If RVN jailed all of them, the world will cry brutality. If they were free to do what they wanted to, they eventually will destroy South Vietnam. Thieu was a weak president in dealing with spies inside his government: Catholic, Buddhist, ARVN generals, businesses organizations, all riddled with VC spies. It was tough to get rid of VC spies without criticism from the world. Pres. Diem died because of Buddhist uprising and after that Thieu was afraid of making the same mistake, even to save his country. In 1975, VC tanks waving Buddhist flag "liberated" Danang city and received the inside help from the Buddhist churches there. Only Pres. Diem believe that some Buddist monks were VC agents and he went after them. After the coup that overthrew him in 1963, Buddhist monks became the sacred cows that SVN Police were afraid to touch. Thanks for the information. Many people asked me about the name of the spy who worked for Time magazine but I could not remember the name in my previous post. ---------------------- Index: 4853 Reference: 4703, 4744 From: Phan@tigger.Stcloud.msus.edu (Dien Phan) Subject: Re: Dawson's Pham Xuan An Date: 16 Feb 1996 09:40:10 -0500 Organization: St. Cloud State University Keywords: Intelligence, PAVN; Pham Xuan An; Truong, David; Truong Dinh Dzu Nyugen Van Thieu; Huynh Tan Mam; University of Saigon [In reply to Ralph McGehee's article <602124744@panix3.panix.com>] Among the spies, Pham Xuan An's role was to poisoned the US efforts through Times magazine. It was people like him that made the mass media to be in favor of the DRV during the war. RVN counter-insurgency efforts were not very effectives. Due to corruption, special police were often stay out of high profile cases. Too often, requests for arrest of spies were blocked by Thieu's staff. Even if they were arrested, it was often hard to prove in court. SVN Police knew of Truong Dinh Dzu, the president candidate against Thieu, worked for VC but Thieu could not arrest him because of bad publicity (arrest political opponent). In 1977-1978, FBI arrested his son, David Truong, for spying in the US for VC. Although South Vietnam was not a democratic society in US standards, it granted citizens enough freedom and due process which made it vulnerable to VC infiltration (freedom of travel). Thieu was also weak in arresting close relatives and friends who worked for VCs. ARVN frequenty captured VC supplies and medicine which suggested Pharmacy La Thanh Inc. sold these to VC. But Thieu would not investigate his close friend La Thanh. Due process caused the supreme court of South Vietnam to throw away the sentence of the notorious VC Huynh Tan Mam, leader of the student anti-war movement at the Univ of Saigon. In May 1975, Mam helped NVA to organize the local police in Saigon. ---------------------- Index: 4854 Reference: From: Steve Cox Subject: CUR EVT: VA News Release Date: 16 Feb 1996 09:40:43 -0500 Organization: United States Internet, Inc. Keywords: Department of Veterans Affairs, US [Moderator's note: This article has been cross-posted from soc.veterans for your information - JT] Department of Veterans Affairs News Service, Office of Public Affairs (202) 273-5700 N E W S R E L E A S E FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE VA IMPLEMENTS GOVERNMENT INFORMATION LOCATOR SERVICE The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is announcing the establishment of a "virtual card catalog" of VA information holdings, available on the Internet, to help the public locate and access information. The initiative is in response to legislation and an Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requirement that agency- based information systems be on-line as part of the Government Information Locator System (GILS) by Dec. 30, 1995. VA's system was operational Dec. 15 on VA's Home Page, available through the Internet. The VA GILS Internet address is http://www.va.gov/gils/index.htm. GILS identifies public information resources throughout the federal government, describes the information available in those resources and provides instructions for obtaining the information. The catalog in VA GILS lists reports, pamphlets, and various other information on VA programs and services, produced by or for VA. Among the documents listed are: Education Benefits; Understanding the Appeal Process; Dependency and Indemnity Compensation; Disability Compensation; Disability Pension; Vocational Rehabilitation; Geographic Distribution of VA Expenditures; Privatizing Functions Under OMB Directive A-76; Data on Acquisition; Federal Assistance Awards Distribution System; Operation and Use of Information; Information Resources Management Program; Information Collections Tracking System; and VA Vendor Bulletin Board System. The number of locator cards on VA GILS will continue to grow as VA staff and program offices add information to the system. ### Feb. 14, 1996 (Dist: I, II, 5, 7, 9, 10) ---------------------- Index: 4855 Reference: From: hallmant@haven.ios.com (Taylor Hallman) Subject: PER NAR: Most Memorable VN Meal Date: 16 Feb 1996 09:41:23 -0500 Organization: Internet Online Services Keywords: Personal narrative, US veteran; National Police, RVN (White Mice) Food, Vietnamese Craig Thompson's personal narrative of his worst meal caused me to recall my most memorable meal in RVN. As a part of my duties as a Military Policeman attached to the 1st Infantry Div. I often worked with a group of QC (don't ask me to come up with the correct spelling) and National Police (these we called White Mice). Both were a generally sorry lot, but to be fair some did the best that they could under the circumstances. They usually wanted to eat at our mess hall as food there was free and plentiful, but one day they insisted on taking me to eat at a cafe in downtown Phu Cong. We sat and talked for a while drinking 33 beer. Then they ordered the food, telling me that they had ordered Vietnamese Soup' for me - Number One.' They giggled and nudged each other, so I knew something was up! So, when the soup came I started to spoon through looking for what ever the joke was. I figured it must be the meat, but I'll eat most anything that ain't moving - so what the hell. But to bug them out I refrained from eat the meat until I thought they would scream. The whole time I was trying to think of what this meat could be to cause such anticipated humor. Eventually, I ate a piece - sort of soft yet stringy, like liver, but it tasted more like beef - my hosts were beside themselves. I asked what the meat was, only to be told to guess. So, it guessed: water buffalo, no; snake, no; tiger, no; dog, no (but big laugh). Finally I gave up to even more laughter and the pantomiming of the action of a monkey!!!! Then I really disappointed then by digging in a finishing the soup! It was actually quite good. Smoke em if you got em Taylor RVN Class of 67-68 ---------------------- Index: 4856 Reference: 4826 From: Old Sarge Subject: Re: On This Date - February 15 Date: 16 Feb 1996 10:00:09 -0500 Organization: Infinity Creations Nice, however, it just brings back those terrible memories some of us had in Nam and would rather keep them in the back of our minds. I have been diagnosed with PTSD and whenever exposed to these things, it kinda tingles the senses a bit. I can't even talk about Nam at work without crying. I guess I'm more pissed off at our Government than "Charlie". He was just doing his job like we were doing ours. If we wrote about all of the casualties on a daily basis, it would serve no purpose but to keep us pissed off SOB's thinking. Most of us are now out of the service or retired, but the memories will haunt us for life. -- Rich Greene E-7 US Army Retired ---------------------- Index: 4857 Reference: 4826, 4856 From: vietnam-request@panix.com (Moderator - shwv) Subject: Re: On This Date - February 15 Date: 16 Feb 1996 10:18:13 -0500 Organization: PANIX Public Access Internet and Unix, NYC On 16 Feb 1996 in article <602164856@panix3.panix.com>, Old Sarge wrote: RG> Nice, however, it just brings back those terrible memories some of us RG> had in Nam and would rather keep them in the back of our minds. I RG> have been diagnosed with PTSD and whenever exposed to these things, it RG> kinda tingles the senses a bit. I can't even talk about Nam at work RG> without crying. I guess I'm more pissed off at our Government than RG> "Charlie". He was just doing his job like we were doing ours. RG> RG> If we wrote about all of the casualties on a daily basis, it would RG> serve no purpose but to keep us pissed off SOB's thinking. Most of us RG> are now out of the service or retired, but the memories will haunt us RG> for life. RG> RG> -- RG> Rich Greene E-7 US Army Retired Rich, The concept behind these posts is to honor those who won the nation's highest award, the Medal of Honor. It was also to remind folks of the sacrifice of these men, and of the all forces in the Vietnam War, a group which continues to have a very marginalized status in the US. This is not exactly a daily post of the names on the Wall. Still, your point is taken, and even if it would be fairly easy, considering the uniforn Subject: header for these article for those who wished to avoid them to do just that, the whole point of these postings is lost if it provokes negative response, especially from veterans. The article for today is already posted. However, this will be the last one to be cross-posted to any other newsgroups. Those who wish to read these article will find them posted to soc.history.war.vietnam Regards, John Tegtmeier Co B, 3/21, 196th LIB and Aeroscout Company, 123rd Aviation Battalion Americal - 1967/1968 ********************************************************************** "No 'healing', no apologies, no memorials, nothing can possibly compensate for the damage done and the pain inflicted....The only thing we can possibly do, twenty years too late, is to try and tell the truth." - Eric Bergerud. ********************************************************************** ---------------------- Index: 4858 Reference: 4785, 4807 From: Phan@tigger.Stcloud.msus.edu (Dien Phan) Subject: Re: KMT In Laos Date: 16 Feb 1996 11:09:48 -0500 Organization: St. Cloud State University Keywords: KMT; Laos; Thailand In article <602144807@panix3.panix.com>, Edwin E. Moise says: EM> In article <602144785@panix3.panix.com>, Phan@tigger.Stcloud.msus.edu EM> (Dien Phan) wrote: EM> -snip- EM>DP> My question is if KMT troops EM>DP> only need to go back to Taiwan, why chose Ban Houi Sai in Laos? Why EM>DP> not Thailand which is next to Burma and an ally of Taiwan and US? EM>DP> Thailand had many larger air bases and would be a much better EM>DP> place to pickup troops if airlift is the main purpose. So the EM>DP> presence of KMT troops in Laos may not be just for departure. EM>DP> May be they were there for many years. EM> EM> Dien - EM> EM> *You* are the one who first brought up page 193 of Dommen as a source EM> relevant to the question of KMT troops in Laos. Please look at it EM> again. It specifically and clearly describes Ban Houei Sai as a place EM> through which KMT troops passed when on their way to Thailand. EM> ---- -- ----- --- -- -------- EM> "Lucien Coudoux, a journalist, saw approximately 1,200 of these EM> irregulars at Ban Houei Sai, on the Laos side of the Mekong, EM> crossing the river into Thailand" Yes, in order to go back to Taiwan from Laos, Taiwanese troops cannot fly directly over North Vietnam's or China's air space. The logical route is through Bangkok, then over South Vietnam's air space to Hongkong and Taiwan. My question was if they were from Burma, they could have come to Thailand and stayed there for airlift rather than go to Laos, then back to Thailand. The map of nation layout from West to East looks like this: West Bangladesh Burma Thailand Laos Vietnam China Sea East ---------> -----> from Burma to Laos <----- KMT troops movement recorded My question is what made KMT troop make an extra trip to Laos then go back to Thailand? It does not make sense. Therefore part or the entire KMT troops must be in Laos for a long time for some mission before going back home by the Geneva accords in Laos signed. ---------------------- Index: 4859 Reference: From: Ralph McGehee Subject: Haass on Unleashing the CIA Date: 16 Feb 1996 11:10:24 -0500 Organization: CIABASE Keywords: CIA; Council on Foreign Relations (CFR); Haass, Richard N. Intelligence Reform Richard N. Haass, principal author of a study on the future of U.S. Intelligence published by the Council on Foreign Relations, has op-eds in both todays Washington Post and the Washington Times. The Post's op-ed is entitled "Don't Hobble Intelligence Gathering." In the article, Haass argues to abolish restraints on the CIA. He ignores the CIA's egregious intelligence failures and inabilities, the multi-year counterintelligence failure of the Aldrich Ames betrayal, the distribution of intelligence from known Soviet double agents that caused "incalculable" harm to the U.S.; and, the severe domestic and international impact caused by CIA covert operations. Haass argues for allowing the intelligence community to use the cover of the press, the clergy and the Peace Corps. He decries rules that discourage preemptive attacks on terrorists or support for individuals of unsavory reputation. He asks that orders prohibiting conspiring to engage in assassinations be repealed. Haass as the spokesperson for the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), has immense influence derived from that organization. Richard N. Haass, per a post on internet, apparently appeared recently on Frontline. He also is the author of the book, The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World. In the book he argues for military intervention unrestrained by a lack of popular support for any such action. He further states that any decision to intervene be made by the foreign policy elite. The CFR is at the apex of the corporate, academic, foundation, government structure and John Deutch, the current CIA Director is a member of the CFR as has been most CIA directors. CIA officers regularly brief CFR meetings that are more secret than even the Agency's own sessions. Most top officials in every presidential administration at least since the end of World War II have been members of the CFR as are many members of House of Representatives and the Senate. Reform of the CIA is the subject of three ongoing efforts, the House Intelligence Committee, the Senate Intelligence Committee, and the Presidential Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the Intelligence Community. These groups might as well plagiarize from the CFR report, issue it as their own and pack up their bags. The decisions have been made. All that remains to be done is a media barrage to sell the idea to the American people. Ralph McGehee CIABASE ---------------------- Index: 4860 Reference: 4682 From: gmoore3501@msn.com (George Moore) Subject: Re: Communist block prepared to take over S. Vietnam in Laos (1956-1962) Date: 16 Feb 1996 11:11:18 -0500 Organization: x Keywords: Dommen, Arthur J.; KMT In article <602094682@panix3.panix.com>, Phan@tigger.Stcloud.msus.edu (Dien Phan) wrote: DP> I would like to quote a paragraph DP> from the book entitled "Conflicts in Laos: The politics of DP> Neutralization" by Arthur J. Dommen, New York: Praeger Publishers, DP> 1964, 1971. DP> DP> 1. Taiwanese Nationalist forces in Laos: DP> Page 193: DP> "...Remnants of the Defeated Kuomintang armies, forced out of China DP> by the Communist takeover by 1949, had since subsisted in the DP> mountains of Northern Burma and reportedly had been supplied with DP> arms by aircraft from Taipei. When in 1961, the Burmese government DP> used force to dislodge them, several thousand of these armed men DP> drifted eastward into Thailand and Laos. No one knew exactly how DP> many... A month later, an official of the Chinese Nationalist DP> Consulate in Vientiane reported that Nationalist aircraft had DP> airlifted 4,000 Kuomintang troops from Nam Tha to Ban Houei Sai DP> (Foot note Source: UPI dispatch, April 12, 1961)". Your efforts to document this question are highly appreciated. Unfortunately, a quick look at a detailed map will reveal that Ban Houei Sai, also spelled Ban Houei Xay, is not at all close to the Lao border with Vietnam. It is on the Lao border with Thailand, just east of Mai Sai and just north of Chiang Rai and Chiang Mai. I rode a motorbike around in the area a couple of years ago. The "Golden Triangle" you know. It's a tourist attraction with many hotels and restaurants right on the river. Get your photo taken in front of a sign which says "Welcome to the Golden Triangle". This sign is on the Mekong River where the Burmese, Thai and Lao borders meet. I can assure you that it is not anywhere near the Lao border with Vietnam. The old KMT troops to which you refer made their way from northern Burma into the flatlands along the Mekong River, both sides of which were firmly controled but anti-communists forces in 1961. The story goes that they were eventually lifted out of Ban Houei Sai by China Airlines on a one way trip to Taiwan in 1963 or so. If you continue to look into this question and find somewhere that these old KMT troops moved from Ban Houei Sai to the front lines near the already well established NVA position at Sam Nua, I would appreciate a reference! George Moore gmoore3501@msn.com ---------------------- Index: 4861 Reference: 4645, 4809 From: baguio@ix.netcom.com (Spectre Gunner) Subject: Re: USAF Gunships Date: 16 Feb 1996 11:11:52 -0500 Organization: Baguio Technology Group Keywords: SA-7 SAM (PAVN); Ho Chi Minh Trail; Operation Barrel Roll AC-130E, Spectre Gunships (USAF) On 14 Feb 1996 10:54:39 -0500, ralphh@ic.gov (Ralph H) posted: RH> To supplement my learned gunship colleague..... Wow, I really like talking to this guy!!!!!! RH> Spectre Gunner (baguio@ix.netcom.com) wrote: RH> The AC-119G started out & stayed in SVN, & were turned over to the RH> VNAF around 71, I think. The AC-119K squadron was based in Thailand, RH> but had detachments of up to 5 a/c at DaNang & Bien Hoa in SVN. At RH> the latter place we mostly did Cambodia, which was quite a different RH> environment from the Trail proper, & also some An Loc support during RH> the Easter Offensive. How many of the 119's were converted? RH>SG> The AC-130E could take a tremendous pounding. I'll show you a RH>SG> pix of one that took a direct hit from a SA-7 and made it home. RH> RH> The 119 was much less resilient, but several took & survived hits up RH> to 37mm. What my colleague didn't mention is that, in spite of the RH> above reference, there was an SA-7 kill of an AC-130 up in I Corps RH> during the early part of the Easter Offensive (I think). Got nailed RH> while flying at 9500 AGL, two survivors. We believed that we lost 3 a/c in all to the SA-7. The loss of the first one, will all hands lost, was initially believe to have been the result of flying into a flack trap, but later we all realized that it must have been one of the first SA-7s, and we just didn't know about them at the time. We then had the bird hit in the ass, with no loss of life, and were finally able to "prove" to PACAF that there were, in fact, SA7's on the trail. We lost the other two shortly thereafter, with the entire crew recovered on one, and all of the back half, but none of the flight deck on the other. Shortly thereafter, we started carrying a dozen or so loaded very pistol on the back, and when the word SAM came over the intercom, we gunners dropped what we were doing and began pumping out star shells, which probably scared the hell out of the guys manning the AAA sites. Later, the very pistols were mounted around the waist of the A/C and were fired by pulling on a set of lanyards. RH>SG> Time-over-Target RH>SG> The AC-130E's average mission duration was 7.1 hours!!!! RH> RH> The AC-119K could fly for about 3 & 1/2 hours, giving a TOT on the RH> Trail of roughly two hours or so. The tough missions for us were way up north in the "barrel roll". a one-hour commute each way, then dodging karst and mountain tops, mostly on O2 'cause we were way above 10K altitude. During the rainy season, when the clouds hugged the mountains, we still had to go on station, and we'd put one engine out of synch then rattle around for 5 hours over known trails because the intel weenies said it "slowed down the traffic." We used to tear down the flack curtains from around the 20MMs and build a little shelter in the middle of the main deck just forward of the 105MM, bring our red sony rechargeable flashlights, and play cards, trying to keep warm and listening to the intercoms. Gawd, we prayed for a fire mission on those nights. RH>SG> Operating altitudes RH>SG> Face it, after a certain altitude, 7.62mm and 20MM will tumble. RH>SG> 40MM and 105MM don't tumble. Needless to say, we gunners used a lot RH>SG> of yellow walkaround oxygen bottles. RH> RH> The operating altitudes were letter-coded, alpha thru ?, referring to RH> AGL: alpha was 2500, bravo 3500, etc. AC-119K's usually operated at RH> delta or echo over the trail, & the AC-130s (as I recall) at echo or RH> one notch higher. The 7.62 were ineffective above 3500 AGL, so we RH> never used them along the Trail; the 20mm were good to about 5500 AGL, RH> as I recall. You know more about this that I do, since I wasn't allowed forward of FS-145! However my damaged brain cells seem to recall that we flew at much higher altitudes. I think that the "A" model AC-130s worked at the altitudes you mentioned, and when we worked in SNV and Cambodia, we worked lower, but we routinely had to dodge 57MM, occasionally 85MM (?) and rarely 101MM (?) [it is hell getting old, I used to know those numbers like the back of my hand]. RH>SG> Plus, the AC-130's attracted smarter, better looking gunners! RH> RH> Hey -- seven hours in the back of a C-130 & anyone might start looking RH> good!! I knew you'd understand! ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Vietnam Veteran AC-130E Spectre Gunships 16th Special Operations Squadron (USAF) "We were winning when I left." ---------------------- Index: 4862 Reference: 4729 From: ngowen@hkucc.hku.hk Subject: Re: Disproportionate Burden? Date: 16 Feb 1996 22:52:02 -0500 Organization: The University of Hong Kong Keywords: Strauss, William A.; Baskir, Lawrence M.; Racial ratios, combat Draft, US In article <602114729@panix3.panix.com>, sdotctho@olywa.net (Craig Thompson) writes: CET> As part of the "Vietnam Veterans Against the War Statement by John CET> Kerry to the Senate Committee of Foreign Relations" of April 23, 1971, CET> John Kerry stated: CET> CET> "We saw that many people in this country had a one-sided idea of who CET> was kept free by the flag, and blacks provided the highest percentage CET> of casualties." CET> CET> I just re-read Kerry's statement as recently posted to this newsgroup. CET> Most of it isn't worth commenting on; however, the above sentence CET> sticks out. It is one of the myths of the Vietnam War. That is, the CET> premise that black servicemen suffered casualties far out of CET> proportion to the population of blacks in American society. CET> CET> In 1971 I might have naive enough to have believed it and I imagine CET> Kerry was just parroting pseudo-facts that had been fed to him by one CET> of his pro-communist mentors rather than knowingly distorting the CET> truth. CET> CET> The problem is, as was discussed earlier in this newsgroup, the CET> percentage of black servicemen killed in Vietnam is roughly equivalent CET> to the percentage of blacks in the general population at the time. CET> About 9.8% of the men who served in Vietnam were black, about 9.8% CET> of the Americans killed in RVN were black, and the percentage of Could you please cite sources for these figures, which differ somewhat from those I have? I'm using Lawrence M. Baskir & William A. Strauss, _Chance and Circumstance: The Draft, the War, and the Vietnam Generation_ (Random House,1978) based on the (then) well-respected "Notre Dame Survey." What they say (p8) is: At the end of World War II, blacks comprised 12 % of all combat troops; by the start of the Vietnam war, their share had grown to 31%. In 1965, blacks accounted for 24% of all Army combat deaths. The Defense Department undertook a concerted campaign to reduce the minorities' share of the fighting. That share was reduced to 16% in 1966, and 13% in 1968. In 1970, the figure for all services was under 9%. They go on to say -- what is perhaps more relevant to the general topic: Over the course of the war, minorities did more than their share of the fighting and dying. Yet the most serious inequities were social and economic. Poorly educated, low-income whites and poorly educated, low-income blacks together bore a vastly disproportionate share of the burdens of Vietnam. They go on to document this fromt the Survey and other sources. Norman Owen ngowen@hkucc.hku.hk ---------------------- Index: 4763 Reference: 4510, 4736 From: jerry@microunity.com (Jerry Kreuscher) Subject: Re: Nomenclature Date: 16 Feb 1996 22:52:45 -0500 Organization: MicroUnity Systems Engineering, Inc. Keywords: Racial slur, Gook In article <602114736@panix3.panix.com> sdotctho@olywa.net (Craig Thompson) writes: CET> Well my father and uncles (WW2 and Korea vets) called the Koreans CET> "gooks" so I suspect you are correct or very nearly so. They also CET> differentiated between Koreans as "gooks" and Chinese as "chinks." I CET> think there was an "All in the Family" episode where Archie Bunker CET> explained reasoning behind the distinction. [ ... ] During his time in the Solomons and the Philippines during WW2 my father learned the habit of calling the people there "gooks". That predated significant contact between the US and Korea, and is consistent with the entry for the term in Ciardi's "Browser's Dictionary", which says it was a WW2 term for Pacific Islanders. Ciardi was uncertain of the origin of the term and glosses it as a crude noise. -- Jerry Kreuscher, MicroUnity Systems Engineering, 122 0 46 W, 37 24 10 N ---------------------- Index: 4864 Reference: 4763, 4811 From: dmanzer@wimsey.com (doug manzer) Subject: Re: "So-called" anti-war movement Date: 16 Feb 1996 22:53:24 -0500 Organization: Online at Wimsey In article <602144811@panix3.panix.com>, Craig Thompson wrote: -snip- CET> I wish to hell that they had been right; that when Saigon fell, the CET> commies would have let bygones be bygones, that the Vietnamese could CET> have granted amnesty to one another and gone on to build a prosperous CET> and happy nation. And I wish that we could have seen that happen and CET> would have helped them like we did with the Marshall plan after WW2. CET> But there was no amnesty, there was no forgiveness, there was no CET> compassion, was there? Oh, now I get it. It's a little known fact that after the American Civil War, the Washington regime imprisoned Jefferson Davis and all of his government, sent everyone who had served in the Confederate Army to a re-education camp, instituted a land reform in the South and renamed Richmond, Virginia to Abraham Lincoln City. Regards, D.M. ---------------------- Index: 4865 Reference: 4800, 4819 From: RDLU23A@prodigy.com (Michael Mullin) Subject: Re: REQ: vietnam war country lyrics Date: 16 Feb 1996 23:13:21 -0500 Organization: Prodigy Services Company Keywords: Cultural representations, music I thought the request was just country. The quintessential vn song was "Isabella" by Jimi Hendrix. Don't forget Country Joe and the Fish (one two three what are we fightin' for?). Johnny don't be a hero was the bubble-gum contribution. The real question is, what has happened to education which resulted in such insignificant songs being the subject of a paper. What course is this anyway? ---------------------- Index: 4866 Reference: 4729, 4763 From: "J. Calbreath" Subject: Re: "So-called" anti-war movement Date: 17 Feb 1996 12:41:46 -0500 Organization: University of Washington Keywords: Anti-war movement, US In article <602124763@panix3.panix.com>, S. Clements wrote: SC> In article <602114729@panix3.panix.com>, SC> Craig Thompson wrote: SC>CET> One of the things that has always irked me about the so-called SC>CET> anti-war movement .... SC> SC> Craig: SC> SC> But I do have a question regarding "so-called": SC> SC> If it wasn't an "anti-war movement", what was it? SC> SC> May I make a guess that you regarded it as a "keeping my own sorry SC> ass out of the war" movement? If so, I think you are quite wrong SC> about the motivation of those who protested the war, and wrong, SC> SC> Anti-war protester, 1968 SC> 25th Division grunt, 69-70 SC> Semper Fubar two-cents time.. In the Fall of '69 I started back to college, after my free trip to SE Asia. During that time there was an awful lot of anti-war activity. It was not my nature to join those activities, nor to broadcast my particular status. There were a lot of people in my classes and study groups that were pretty vocal on their stand against the war, our discussions tended to be rather short. Memory tells me that the desire to get "that whole thing over with before I get sucked into it" was a common thread of what I was hearing. I'm sure that there were people who honestly worked against the war for moral reasons. It's just that I heard more from people who were working against the war for their own reasons. Jim Calbreath Non protestor, 1969 18th Surgical Hosp VN 68-69 Health Science Academic Services & Facilities, UW Small world.. ---------------------- Index: 4867 Reference: 4729, 4776 From: Craig Thompson Subject: Re: Disproportionate Burden? Date: 17 Feb 1996 12:42:37 -0500 Organization: Lost Planet Airmen Keywords: Racial ratio, combat In article <602134776@panix3.panix.com>, karonc@airmail.net (Karon) writes (refering to the disproportionate number of minorities in the all volunteer military): KC> I do not think we conclude that an "all-volunter" military is more KC> racist, but I do believe a case can be that volunteer ratio in Desert KC> Storm is an indicator of the of the plight of the black ( and other KC> minorities) in our society today. Yep. This vet agrees. Between 1965 and 1967, 23% of the Americans killed in Viet Nam were black [NAM, 1995, Tim Page and John Pimlott editors]. I would speculate (that is I have no data to support what I'm going to say) that the pre-war military had a high proportion of minorities in it (compared to their numbers in the general population) for reasons analogous to the present day over-representation of minority groups in the military. I mentioned this in my original post, i.e., that it probably reflects the attractiveness of a military career to those on the lower end of the economic scale. As I pointed out in that particular bit of "right-wing ranting" there is no question that African-Americans make up a disproportionate share of the lower economic classes today. It seems pretty obvious to me at least that African-Americans lot was even worse in the early sixties than it is today. In any event, if the proportion of group X is 23% in the military and the proportion is 10% in the general population at the outbreak of a war; it certainly follows that the percentage of casualties of Group X will be comparable to its population in the military (i.e. about 23%) rather than that of its share of the general population (10%). The drivers behind this are the factors in the society as a whole that caused the military population to be over-represented by group X in peacetime, not the nature of the war being fought, not the location of the battlefield, not the identity or politics of the enemy. BTW: I'm somewhat surprised that the percentage of minorities killed in Vietnam wasn't higher. My rifle company was well over 23% minorities in 1969 (and quite likely might have been composed of 50% to 60% minorities). KC> You and I know that the man holding your life in his hands is just a KC> man holding your life in his hands. Race, color, creed, economics, KC> religion, can not enter or a life is lost. There are millions who KC> cannot understand this. Many millions will never care, because they KC> have never needed to care. KC> KC> I do not have an answer, only the dilemma. Well I have my own answer but its more properly posted to soc.religion.** than here. It starts out, There is neither Jew nor Greek nor Gentile . . I think most of us left our racial prejudices on the battlefield when we came home. Perhaps that's just wishful thinking on my part though. Sigh. Craig "Pretending its a chore to send us off to war . ." -- from the musical "Hair" ---------------------- Index: 4768 Reference: 4820 From: Brian Subject: Re: Anti-war and Nuclear Threat Date: 17 Feb 1996 12:43:21 -0500 Organization: Australian National University Keywords: Anti-war movement, US; Nuclear Threat; Khe Sanh; Dien Bien Phu In article <602144820@panix3.panix.com>, John Tegtmeier wrote: JT> Seems we have discussed a bit about the anti-war movement is the US JT> but rather ignored one of its major antecedents - the nuclear JT> disarmament movement of physicist Bertrand Russell, et al. (Quick JT> aside for those who don't know - the peace symbol was derived from the JT> semaphore signal for n and d - nuclear disarmament). JT> JT> Certainly the nd movement started well before the major US involvement JT> in Vietnam, and there was some overlap of membership between the two JT> movements. JT> JT> So, a couple of questions: JT> JT> 1. How credible was the risk of the use of nuclear weapons, tactical JT> or strategic, by any of the powers directly or indirectly involved in JT> Vietnam? As most are aware the matter was discussed, according to the records, several times during both the Indochina and the Vietnam wars. The first, during the siege of Dien Bien Phu, the second during the siege of Khe Sanh. Both were I believe discarded because of the expected backlash and the fear of a possibility of the outbreak of a general nuclear war with the USSR/China (after the PRC got the bomb). JT> 2. To what extent was the anti-war movement, especially in the early JT> formative days, influenced and shaped by the nuclear disarmament JT> movement or its leadership? Mmmm, a more difficult question. I rather suspect that both were aimed at the "Evil American Imprialists" more than anything else, so yes I expect that there was some overlap between the two. --Brian Ross---------------------------------------------------------------- "There can be no more melancholy, nor in the last result, no more degrading spectacle on earth than the spectacle of oppression, or of wrong in whatever form, inflicted by the deliberate act of a nation upon another nation..Gladstone ---------------------- Index: 4869 Reference: 4748, 4785 From: dawson@mozart.inet.co.th (Alan Dawson) Subject: Re: KMT In Laos Date: 17 Feb 1996 12:44:08 -0500 Organization: Institute for Important Studies Keywords: KMT; Laos; Opium trade; Air America; Houei Sai In article <602144785@panix3.panix.com>, Phan@tigger.Stcloud.msus.edu (Dien Phan) writes: DP> The struggle in Laos in 1960 involved the entire communist block DP> and the Western block. So the existence of KMT troops in Laos DP> may help to counterweight the presence of North Vietnamese troops. Not really, Dien. Laos had a lot of little, local wars that had very little to do with Great Affairs. One was the drugs problems, which involved Laos, Thailand and Burma but *not* communist or Western blocs. That's just an example. The Taiwanese were another. They were NOT ... I'd like to repeat that, that the Taiwanese were NOT involved in the communist-Western clashes in Laos. DP> from Burma. I recollect other information I read in Vietnam DP> that these KMT actually put military pressure on the Pathet Lao DP> in the Dong Chum (Plain of Jars) area. My question is if KMT troops That information, if you recall it correctly, was wrong. Flat statement. DP> only need to go back to Taiwan, why chose Ban Houi Sai in Laos? Why Check the map, Dien. Houei Sai is on the Thai border. During the war, Houei Sai was a Thai/American airbase. A small one, but effectively a US-Thai base, used by Air American C123/C47s and the Thai Air Force, mostly. It is a *handy* airbase to use, because you can walk to it from the Golden Triangle, which is where the Taiwanese were. Right today, Houei Sai is a place for tourists to enter Laos to see the sights, because it is the most accessible place from Northern Thailand. -- Alan Dawson Looks like I picked the wrong week to quit methamphetamine. ---------------------- Index: 4870 Reference: 4808, 4812 From: molsen@rio.com (Monte Olsen) Subject: Re: Announcing New Co-Moderator Date: 17 Feb 1996 12:44:44 -0500 Organization: Northwest Internet Services, Inc. My vote is also in agreement with Frank Vaughn. Ed and I don't agree on some things, but in my very humble opinion Ed will be fair and he will listen to opposing views and allow opposing views to be voiced. He is a true scholar in the best sense. He doesn't attack. He asks pointed questions. Monte Olsen ---------------------- Index: 4871 Reference: 4813, 4830 From: baguio@ix.netcom.com (Spectre Gunner) Subject: Re: On This Date - Feb. 13 Date: 17 Feb 1996 12:45:22 -0500 Organization: InternetMCI vietnam-request@panix.com (Moderator - shwv) wrote: MOD> February 13 ws the first time that I posted OTD. As of now, I'm doing MOD> it on a sort of trial basis to see what the reaction and "demand" is MOD> for the postings. There was another one posted today. Whether I MOD> continue to cross-post to other newsgroups will also depend upon the MOD> feedback I get - may just keep it at "home" in soc.history.war.vietnam MOD> and not the others. As a self-appointed pain-in-the-butt within alt.war.vietnam, I hereby formally request that you continue to cross post OTD into this newsgroup. I cherished the one you posted before, and believe that it would do my fellow inmates (on both sides of the war) a bit of good to read that not all VN vets were drug-crazed, machine-gun-toting, sexually-aggressive baby killers who amounted to little more than a blot on society. Frank Vaughan ---------------------- Index: 4872 Reference: 4808, 4812 From: ralphh@ic.gov (Ralph H) Subject: Re: Announcing New Co-Moderator Date: 17 Feb 1996 12:46:08 -0500 Organization: Express Access Online Communications, Greenbelt, MD USA No better choice than Dr. Moise... Ralph ---------------------- Index: 4873 Reference: 4703, 4744 From: Phan@tigger.Stcloud.msus.edu (Dien Phan) Subject: Re: Dawson's Pham Xuan An Date: 17 Feb 1996 12:46:43 -0500 Organization: St. Cloud State University Keywords: Anti-war movement, US; Nguyen Van Thieu; Spratly Islands; China Air war, US; Easter Offensive; An Loc [In reply to Ralph McGehee's article <602124744@panix3.panix.com>] Ironically, while it was illegal to work for communist in South Vietnam, whoever got caught will be punished by the law, it was LEGAL to work for communist in the US. So while South Vietnamese government was infiltrated by communist agents, these spy work could not be done in public. Anyone who burned RVN or US flags, or carrying NVA flags would imprisoned immediately. In the US, it was and is still legal. It was not the communist agents in Vietnam that brought down South Vietnam in 1975, but it was the communist agents and their followers in the US that did it, too many of them. With adequate US air support, South Vietnam could defend Quang Tri, An Loc as shown in 1972. Only after US congress passed the War power Act that terminated the vital blood line into the dying South Vietnam. Had the US been able to keep air support to South Vietnam for a few more years, the Chinese invasion of North Vietnam in 1979 would save South Vietnam from falling into North Vietnam. Unconfirmed sources stated that after the fight in Spartly islands in 1974, China released all captured ARVN POWs through Hongkong with a message to Pres Thieu that China wanted to help South Vietnam to defend against North Vietnam with some conditions. Thieu dismissed China's offer. After the fall of Saigon, China became disturbed with US forfeiture of the Vietnam war so quickly (see the book Victory without War by Nixon) and Chairman Mao ordered the retaliation, executed by Deng Xiao Ping in 1979. In P. 259, Nixon wrote: "loss in Vietnam, followed by the spread of Soviet through Indochina, was a devastating strategic blow to China, which suffered twenty thousand casualties in a 1979 war with Soviet-backed Vietnam..." Had US been able to provide air supports to S. Vietnam as it did in An Loc until 1979, China would take over and smashed North Vietnam to the ground. With both US and China attacked of both ends, North Vietnam would not survive. ---------------------- Index: 4874 Reference: From: pgrunts@aol.com (Pgrunts) Subject: PER NAR: Letters from 1968-1969: Letter 1 Date: 17 Feb 1996 12:47:57 -0500 Organization: America Online, Inc. Keywords: Personal narrative, US veteran; Danang (This is the first of 80 letters. Hopefully I won't tire from doing this and you, the world, won't get bored... I want to say that my father wrote me a letter every day while I was in Vietnam. He thought he'd never see me alive again. He said out loud as I got on the plane in Boston, headed for California and Vietnam, "There goes eighteen years down the shit chute.") --Pgrunt-- Letter 1 18 OCT 68 Hi everybody, Well I've been in the Nam for over 24 hours and it's been raining the whole time. I'm still in Da Nang so I don't have an address which you can write me at. I've been assigned to the 5th Marines 1st MarDiv. But because of the rain the helicopters cannot get us into the area. It could be one day or one week before I get to my unit. There's no hurry anyway cause right now 1/5 is being hit very hard by NVA. We seen a chopper come in from 1/5 with medevacs. Right now I'm sleeping on a cot with a roof over my head and a wooden floor so I'm doing all right. The air field is right beside my hut and those phantoms and skyhawks fly out of here 24 hours a day. About 80 go out an hour. On my flight out to Okinawa we stopped in Hawaii for 45 minutes. What I saw of Hawaii was little, but it was awful hot. I can say I've been at least. Okinawa was real nice and the weather was a cool 90. The towns were worse than Mexico so you know I had a real good time. I like places like that. You really learn a lot. About 5:00am today the lights went out on the air base and marine base. Then about three rocket rounds fell about 3 miles away. That's about the only thing I've seen so far. I'll write tomorrow. I don't want ya to worry cause I'm all right and can handle myself. Call Sharon and tell her I'm okay. Love, Paul ********************************************************************** (Sharon was a girlfriend...) Paul E. O'Connell ---------------------- Index: 4875 Reference: 4790 From: drcooley@cacd.rockwell.com (DUANE R COOLEY) Subject: Re: VN-War Exile's Appeal from Sweden Date: 17 Feb 1996 12:49:00 -0500 Organization: Rockwell International Corp Keywords: Anti-war movement, US; Draft resistance, US In article <602144790@panix3.panix.com>, nyt@nyxfer.blythe.org says... NYT> NYT> Via NY Transfer News Collective * All the News that Doesn't Fit NYT> NYT> APPEAL Rec'd February 11, 1996 NYT> NYT> Robertsfors, Sweden NYT> NYT> Dear Friends, NYT> NYT> My name is Robert Malecki and I need your help. I need the help of the NYT> members in your organisation. I need the help of all organisations who NYT> claim that they stand on the side of poor and working class people. -snip- Since I'm not old enough to have risked my neck in Vietnam, I'll not comment on this even thought I have some rather closely held views. I'd be curious to see what the Vietnam vets think about this though. ---------------------- Index: 4876 Reference: 4790 From: joverly@mast.net (Jim Overly) Subject: Re: VN-War Exile's Appeal from Sweden Date: 17 Feb 1996 12:50:44 -0500 Organization: A poorly-installed InterNetNews site Keywords: Anti-war movement, US; Draft resistance, US In article <602144790@panix3.panix.com> nyt@nyxfer.blythe.org (NY Transfer News Collective) writes: NYT> From: nyt@nyxfer.blythe.org (NY Transfer News Collective) NYT> Subject: VN-War Exile's Appeal from Sweden NYT> Date: 14 Feb 1996 02:22:51 -0500 NYT> Summary: Direct-action draft resister appeals for right to return to US -snip- I have two points to make regarding this "appeal". One: It appears that you still haven't learned to accept the fact that you did things that were and still are illegal; destruction of government records, business computers, alleged bombing conspiracy, etc. You show no remorse or attitude adjustment. There are legal ways, cumbersome and time-consuming as they may be, to change things that you don't like, and any other method is unacceptable to society. WE have made this the law to discourage those who would have things changed to please themselves at whatever cost to society. You had no right to do the things you did. Your thoughts, opinions and beliefs, expressed to others, and your vote, are your only tools for effecting change. Two: I served in Vietnam. My personal belief is that many of the anti-war protestors participated in the movement for one of two reasons; They were cowards who feared the possibility of injury or death while in the service; or they would rather not have their nice safe little world disrupted by a war that didn't directly hit home. In either case, the moral fiber that they so loved to claim as their justification for their actions was really missing to start with. You are were you should be. Don't ask forgiveness from those of us who did our duty as prescribed by law, regardless of the consequences to us. You chose to be the way you are and to do the things you did. You say that you accept responsibility for your actions. Do you? If the answer is 'yes' then I suggest that you have made your bed, lie in it. Don't darken the doorstep of a country with so many who gave so much, when you did everthing you could to bring disruption and chaos. ---------------------- Index: 4877 Reference: From: "Marcus L. Endicott" Subject: INFOTEC-TRAVEL> Vietnam "FAQ" Date: 17 Feb 1996 17:02:28 -0500 Organization: apc.org Keywords: Resources, Internet, Vietnam; Travel, Vietnam /* Written 9:58 AM Feb 14, 1996 by mendicott in igc:infotec.travel */ INFOTEC TRAVEL GUIDE TO VIETNAM ONLINE Version: 96.02.14 Copyright (c) 1996 M.L. Endicott All Rights Reserved Worldwide. FAQs: Newsgroups: rec.travel.asia,rec.answers,news.answers Subject: Vietnam Travel Guide (part */*) From: geiser.peter@ch.swissbank.com (Peter M. Geiser) Frequency: monthly Newsgroups: soc.history.war.vietnam,soc.answers,news.answers Subject: soc.history.war.vietnam FAQ: Admin Info and Posting Guidelines Subject: soc.history.war.vietnam FAQ: Recommended Reading List Subject: soc.history.war.vietnam FAQ: Australian Involvement (*/3) From: vietnam-request@panix.com (John Tegtmeier, Moderator) Frequency: monthly Date: 21 Oct 1995 02:44:00 -0400 Archive-name: vietnam/info-and-guidelines Summary: This FAQ contains administrative information on soc.history.war.vietnam, the location of the archives, the moderators names and address, and the posting guidelines as well as the appeal process for the newsgroup. It also contains a brief listing of other shwv FAQs. USENET: alt.politics.vietnamese alt.war.vietnam soc.culture.vietnamese soc.history.war.vietnam MAILING LISTS: CVA-L Cornell Vietnamese Association mail the command information CVA-L to listproc@cornell.edu vietnet The Vietnamese Distribution List mail the command information vietnet to listproc@usc.edu VWAR-L Viet Nam War Discussion List mail the command info VWAR-L to LISTSERV@UBVM.cc.buffalo.edu WEB-L Viet Web mail the command information WEB-L to listproc@cornell.edu >Date: Wed, 14 Feb 1996 09:01:33 -0800 >From: Majordomo@szebra.saigon.com >Subject: Majordomo results >-- >>>>> lists >Majordomo serves the following lists: > RCS > auco A^u Co+ > avc An Va Cho+i > bounces Majordomo Admin Bounces List > devilbunnies > dharma-talk Discussions about Dharma (Buddhism) > dharma-talk-digest Digest for Dharma Talk > flysd Fly Bay Area <--> San Diego Mailing List > hue Hue - Beautiful Ancient city of Vietnam > ov Open View Discussions > quotes Stock Quotes List > vacets-ba-sports VACETS Local SF Bay Sports List > vacets-dict VACETS Dict > vacets-local-bt VACETS Local Boston Chapter > vacets-local-dallas VACETS Local Dallas Chapter > vacets-local-hou VACETS Local Houston Chapter > vacets-local-mi VACETS Local Michigan Chapter > vacets-local-nc VACETS Local North Carolina Chapter > vacets-vtic VACETS VTIC Discussion List > vn-atnp A(n Tu.c No'i Phe't List > vn-biz VietNam Business and Entrepreneurs List > vn-chess > vn-families Gia -Di`nh VN > vn-families-digest Gia -Di`nh VN (digest) > vn-families-gen Gia -Di`nh VN (linh tinh) > vn-giaoly Bible Study discussion list > vn-invest Vietnamese Investment Discussion List > vn-literature Vietnamese Literature Discussion List > vn-singles VietNamese Singles List > vn-soc VietNamese Social List > vn-tech Technical Topics for Vietnamese > vn-trans VN Translation List > vnforum Vietnam Forum List > vnforum-digest VNFORUM Digest > vnforum-vn Vietnam Forum (VNese) List >Use the 'info ' command to get more information >about a specific list. WORLDWIDE WEB: A Visit to Vietnam To obtain further information on contributing materials for this section, please contact John on the Internet by using this form: jrossie@du. This gallery contains materials related to Vietnam and the war which may be helpful to both researchers and casual browsers. http://www.vietvet.org/visit.htm ASEAN Tourism Info Centre http://www.serve.com/ATIC/ Asia Resources: Vietnam Non-profit worldwide membership organization of Vietnamese professionals committed to the advancement of knowledge and contribution to the welfare of the people of Vietnam. Non-commercial, no-ad magazine (titled: NGUOI DAN WEB MAGAZINE) in Vietnamese & English. http://silkroute.com/silkroute/asia/rsrc/country/vietnam.html asiatour maps, photos, and information about Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia and more. (Regional:Regions:Asia:Travel) http://www.asiatour.com/ Atlas An online journal of photojournalism, design, illustration and multimedia art. The first isssue features work by photographers for National Geographic, The New York Times, and Passage to Vietnam. (Arts:Photography:Photojournalism) http://www.well.com/user/macrone/atlas.html Biking Resources on the Internet Bomb down a Rocky Mountain peak or coast the banks of Lake Superior Whatever your taste start pedaling here. Trails Tracks and Routes will start you out with some fine rides in the U.S. If you want to go farther afield check out Trips - Asia Africa and beyond. Drop down to regional and general resources to turn your crank all over the Web. Artwork - A Funscape by Jack Brodbeck U.S. National Lands ... http://www.gorp.com:80/gorp/activity/biking.htm Business in Vietnam http://www.ezbiz.com/afe1.shtml Cambodian Information Center Homepage Welcome to the. You are the 13,131st visitor to this page. Notes: This page is now: http://www.cambodia.org/, please revise all links to this page. This page is http://www.cambodia.org/ City.Net Vietnam Excite || Home || Contents || Regions || Countries || Index || Search Vietnam Cities. Vietnam Technology Events (The Computer Events Directory). http://www.city.net/countries/vietnam/ Country Information - Vietnam Country Information - Vietnam Travel Info Travel Info for Vietnam Scenes from Indochina Vietnam Pictures Archive Country Info Vietnam - National Biodiversity Profile Background Notes for Vietnam Human Rights Practices in Vietnam I-nodes in Vietnam World Factbook Info for Vietnam Country Archives http://emailhost.ait.ac.th/Asia/infovn.html Cycle Vietnam Travel story about cycling through Vietnam. (Regional:Countries:Vietnam:Travel) http://www.mindspring.com/~jrolls/cv.html Danny Yee's Book Reviews: Subject: Vietnam http://www.anatomy.su.oz.au:80/danny/book-reviews/s/Vietnam.html Databases and Useful Information The World Conservation Monitoring Centre World Wide Web page on Vietnam. Back to VietNET Home page For comments, questions and other requests, please send email to webmaster@netimages. http://www.saigon.com/databases.html Dentists For The World Dentists For The World is an association of concerned dentists acting in the public interest. We try to answer the question as concerned world citizens what can we do for the world? Our answer has been we can volunteer to serve by practicing dentistry among needy populations in countries where oral health care is not developed raise funds for undeveloped communities initiate social development pro... http://www.ultranet.com:80/~lynliss/A5.html Destination:Vietnam http://www.well.com:80/user/gdisf/index.html Digital Tourism & Travel travelguide for visiting Cuba, Seychelles, Dominican Republic, China, India, Vietnam. (Business and Economy:Companies:Travel:Tour Operators) http://qqq.com/dtt/ Doing Business in Vietnam - What, When, Why, Whom, How http://www.cgtd.com/global/directory/dbiv.html Don V Ho's Vietnam Links Collection Vietnam Trade and Industries - Business directories 95-96 series. Section to be placed in: News Information Society Business Connection Computer Picture Miscellaneous. http://radon.gas.uug.arizona.edu/~don/vietlink.html EXPORT-IMPORT-INVEST Vietnam - Business Directories 1996 http://www.cgtd.com/global/vietnam.html FAQs by Category: travel/vietnam-guide [ FAQs by Newsgroup | NewsPages | Search FAQ archive | Help ] * travel/vietnam-guide/part1 The Internet Travel Guide - Vietnam (part 1/3) (FAQ) * travel/vietnam-guide/part2 The Internet Travel Guide - Vietnam (part 2/3) (FAQ) * travel/vietnam-guide/part3 The Internet Travel Guide http://www.lib.ox.ac.uk/internet/news/faq/ by_category.travel.vietnam-guide.html Gallery - Vietnam http://www.saigon.com/Gallery/Gallery.html Gopher Menu see also http://coombs.anu.edu.au/CoombsHome.html # Search the "ANU-Vietnam-IT-L" database Search the "ANU-Vietnam-NatSci" database Search the "ANU-Vietnam-SciTech-L" database Search the "ANU-Vietnam-SocSci" database Asia Research Inf.Resources (COOMBSQUEST, gopher://cheops.anu.edu.au/11/ResearchFacilities/ASIAN/Vietnam Gopher Menu Background Notes for Vietnam COOMBS Vietnam Archives Human Rights in Vietnam I-nodes in Vietnam Telecomm-related Institutions in Vietnam Telephone & Address Directory of Scientists in Vietnam Travel Info for Vietnam UNDP Field Office in Vietnam UNDP Sub- gopher://emailhost.ait.ac.th/11/AsiaInfo/CountryInfo/Vietnam GORP Asia - Vietnam Resource Listings Cycle Vietnam by Jay Rolls tells about a 1,200 mile bicycle ride from Hanoi to Ho Chi Minh City. Vietnam Information includes some background information on the people, government, economy and communication systems of the country in addition to a list of pointers to other Internet sites with information on Vietnam. http://www.gorp.com/gorp/location/asia/vietnam.htm Hanoi, VIETNAM http://www.travind.com:80/hotels/listings/vietnam/hanoi.html Hot News / Hot Research: U.S. Establishes Diplomatic Ties with Vietnam/U.S. Establishes Diplomatic Ties with Vietnam Vietlinks A large collection of web sites, photographs and other material about Vietnam. Vietnam Veteran's Home Page A web site to honor Vietnam Veterans who served on either side of the conflict. A Virtual Visit to Vietnam Vietnam images, maps and WWW links http://www.nando.net/prof/poynter/vietnam2.html Hotel Equatorial International Hotel Equatorial International is a rapidly expanding group of international class hotels. With more than two decades of experience in the hospitality industry the group has built a reputation for offering comfortable and competitively priced accomodations. Our philosophy is simple--service with a dedication to excellence and keen attention to details. With hotels currently in operation in Singapo... http://www.equatorial.com:80/ http://gd.tuwien.ac.at/faqs-hierarchy/news/news.answers/vietnam/info-a nd-guide Subject: soc.history.war.vietnam FAQ: Admin Info and Posting Guidelines This announcement supersedes any previous ones. Contents of this FAQ 1. SHWV FAQs. 2. Administrative Information 3. Posting Guidelines 4. Archives Part 1. SHWV FAQs Currently, there are five FAQ messages: this one; a recommended reading list; and a 3 part FAQ on the Australian involvement in the Vietnam War. Others on people, places and events of the various Indochina Wars are being worked on, and will be posted as available. The moderators of the newsgroup, in accordance with the Charter, have the sole responsibility for the development and content of any newsgroup FAQs. Any person who believes that they have specialized http://gd.tuwien.ac.at/faqs-hierarchy/news/news.answers/ vietnam/info-and-guidelines http://www.solutions.net:80/rec-travel/asia/vietnam/ 204.112.6.60 http://www.solutions.net:80/rec-travel/asia/vietnam/ IDRC ASRO Note: This page is currently under construction. These pages are best when viewed in 256 colours monitor resolutions. International Development Research Centre Asia http://www.idrc.org.sg/ Images from Vietnam/Postcards: Images from Vietnam 1. Rural Scene (courtesy of The Vietnam Picture Archive)Nguyen... 2. An Old Gentleman (courtesy of The Vietnam Picture Archive)... 3. Sleeping Girl (courtesy of The Vietnam Picture Archive)To... http://persona.www.media.mit.edu/PO-bin/ readRack.perl?Vietnam.list|Images+from+Vietnam Index of /pub/usenet/soc.history.war.vietnam Name Last modified Size Parent directory soc.history.war.vietn 25-Oct-95 05:22 12K soc.history.war.vietn 25-Oct-95 05:22 35K soc.history.war.vietn 25-Oct-95 05:22 26K soc.history.war.vietn 25-Oct-95 05:23 22K soc.history.war.vietn 25-Oct-95 05:23 20K 5 files ftp://rtfm.mit.edu/pub/usenet/soc.history.war.vietnam Index of /pub/usenet/rec.travel.asia Name Last modified Size Parent directory Cambodia__Travel_Guide 08-Aug-95 01:32 13K Laos__Travel_Guide 08-Aug-95 01:32 33K Vietnam__Travel_Guide 04-Jul-95 00:58 46K Vietnam__Travel_Guide 08-Aug-95 01:32 45K Vietnam__Travel_Guide 04-Jul-95 00:58 44K Vietnam__ ftp://rtfm.mit.edu/pub/usenet/rec.travel.asia Index of /public/usenet/news-info/soc.culture.vietnam Index of /public/usenet/news-info/soc.culture.vietnam [Really from SUNSite Northern Europe http://src.doc.ic.ac.uk/public/usenet/news-info/soc.culture.v ietnam] Name Last modified Size Description Parent directory The_Internet_Travel_G 09-Nov-95 04:52 45K The_Internet_Travel_G 10-Oct-95 02:15 43K IMG ALT="[ ]" http://src.doc.ic.ac.uk/public/usenet/news-info/ soc.culture.vietnam Journey to Vietnam Welcome to Vietnam Web Page. This Web page provides a resourceful guide to Vietnam travel and commercial business opportunities. As we continue to add and expand this Web site we hope to bring you a more complete Web package. The Journey doesn't stop here. Click on any of the five cities on the map for beautiful scenic views and a short history of the location. http://maingate.net:80/vn/ Journey to Vietnam F R I E N D S H I P T O U R S T O Vietnam Express Travel offers Group or Individual Tours. Vietnam Express Travel is bonded and insured to make your travel arrangements a true peace-of-mind experience. http://www.sierramm.com/namviet/tours.html Journeys International, Inc. JOURNEYS International Inc. Nature Culture Education and Adventure Travel Thousands of active travelers have enjoyed our group family and individual tours and expeditions to Asia Africa and the Americas since our first Himalaya and Mt. Everest trips 1978. We now offer more than 300 trips worldwide. Distant in space time and culture we make Asia accessible. Our trips include Nepal Bhutan Burma Thai... http://www.gorp.com:80/journeys.htm Language related news groups The news pages indexed by this page list many of the language related news groups available through USENET news. NOTE : Not all of the news groups listed in the news files may be available at your site. News list pages are available for the following languages: * African * Arabic * Chinese * Danish * Dutch * Esperanto * Finnish * French * Gaelic * German * Hebrew * Hindi-Urdu * Indonesian * Italian * Japanese * Korean * Norwegian * Persian * Polish * Portuguese * Russian * Spanish * Star Trek * Swedish * Tamil * Thai * Vietnamese Created by the web development team at the ... http://babel.uoregon.edu/yamada/news.html Link to Vietnam Link to Vietnam A guide to Vietnam on the Internet The United States has opened an embassy in Vietnam. For Vietnam-related sites on the Internet, try these. Vietnam on the Web * Information links to Vietnam At the University of North Carolina's SunSITE. * Vietnam Pictures Archive Visit scenes from around the country. * Vietnam Veteran's Home Page Links to resources for veterans. * Vietnam Historical Archive Trace Vietnam http://dataserver.syr.edu:8080/syrol/arrow/suarea/ 0805Vietnam.html Lonely Planet - Destination: Vietnam (Regional:Countries:Vietnam:Travel) http://www.lonelyplanet.com/dest/sea/vietnam.htm Map of Coombs Computying's Vietnam Services Viewing Vietnam from Space - A selection of satellite images of Vietnam. The Projects calling for foreign investment Administrative Structure of Vietnam - Communist Party of Vietnam. http://coombs.anu.edu.au/WWWVLPages/VietPages/coombs-map.html Mekong Diary Yahoo: Stan Sesser is traveling along the Mekong River from Yunnan Province in southwestern China to the Mekong Delta in Vietnam (Regional:Regions:Asia:Travel) http://www.gnn.com/gnn/meta/travel/features/mekong/index.html Minie's Vietnamese Culture World The site houses information on Vietnamese art, religions, professional organizations, 'Viet' magazine, and available databases. Viet-Net is a WWW general resource site offering information on Vietnam, computer software for Vietnamese computer users, and Vietnamese language updates on Vietnam. http://www.engr.csulb.edu/~mphan/CULTURE/culture.html Nerd World : TRAVEL - ASIA *What is Nerd World * Top of Index * Submit Link * SPOT Launcher for Windows * Report an Error News from USA Today : [Nationline] [World] [Moneyline] [Sportsline] [Lifeline] [People] Nerd World Media Internship available in the Boston Area (USA). * ASEAN Tourism Homepage [New 1-2-96] The ASEAN Tourism Homepage contains updated travel information and tourism statistics of its member countries namely Brunei,Singapore,Indonesia, Malaysia,Philippines,Thailand and Vietnam. * Adventure Vacation In The Philippines A detailed account of travel in remote but picturesque areas of the Philippines. * Asia Adventures Asia Adventures provides unique travel programs to the Far East. College credit is available http://www.nerdworld.com/nw866.html NEW YORK WEB - Travel Vietnam part1 http://www.nyweb.com:80/travel/vietpart1.html Other Travel Sites * Travelbug Magazine (currently under construction) * About Australia Collection of Australia information by state * Travel Indochina Vietnam, Laos, Burma, Thailand or the Temples of Ankor Wat * Captain Cook Cruises * AATKings Australian Coach Tours * The Down Under Travellers Webzine * Millionaire Real Estate, Relocation & Travel Mall * Travdude Humerous thoughts on travelling in generel * Tourism Victoria's official snow skiing site * Cyberski Australia's premier snow skiing site * Tradenet If your visiting Italy, then check out Tradenet * River Estate Guest House in Kauai, Hawaii * This is Australia... * Federal Department of Tourism, Australia * Department of Tourism, Tasmania * Vancouver http://www.broflo.com.au/o_sites.html Phuoc's Home Page Vietnam World Wide Network Vietnamese HotWeb Vietnamese In Houston Pictures of Vietnam Lyrics to Vietnamese Songs Vietnamese Horoscopes Vietnamese History from Ancient times Lots more VN links here. Check out some other students' home pages: Kevin Nguyen Kenneth Leon Lots of Vietnamese students' pages here (I mean lots). http://coos.dartmouth.edu/~phuoc/ Regional information on Vietnam Excite: Regional Information:Countries:Vietnam.com/Regional_Information/Countr ies/Vietnam. http://akebono.stanford.edu/yahoo/Regional_Information/ Countries/Vietnam/ Singles Adventure Club The purpose of the Singles Adventure Club is to provide singles interested in exploring the world the opportunity to travel with like minded fellow singles. Groups are gender balanced as much as possible. These are considered soft adventure trips: during the day experiences are active and unusual at night we stay in comfortable lodgings with all amenities provided. Group size is limited to a maxim... http://www.quiknet.com:80/ammg/rip/sngltrvl.html soc.culture.vietnamese archive This is the archive for the soc.culture.vietnamese Usenet group. * soc.culture.vietnamese webmaster http://www.saigon.com/usenet/soc.culture.vietnamese/ Southeast Asian Links This url leads to simple index file that points to either a photo page or an info page for a number of seasian countries. The VietWeb - VietNet Home Page styles itself the official home page of Viet-Net. http://neal.ctstateu.edu/history/world_history/archives/ seasia01.html Tales From the Other Side The writers are relentless travellers and in this guidebook aim to give budget travellers a complete and comprehensive reference to every aspect of Vietnam. The conception of Tales From the Other Side came about whilst on a arduous hitching journey through Asia and was born from the fact that the writers believed that there was not a comprehensive guide to Vietnam available for budget... http://www.usyd.edu.au/~bdrewnia/tales/tales.htm Teleview Internet Plus: Frequently Visited Sites * Civil Service Recruitment Tracking System * Singapore National Library * Ministry of Education * Singapore Zoological Garden * Online Computer Times * Lian He Zaobao * The Muslim Community in Singapore Society *South East Asia * Travelling in Indonesia * Travels in Thailand * Friendship Tours to Vietnam *Asia * Asia Travel * Tourist Pages * Gateway Asia Travel Web * Countries of Asia *Europe * Europe * Multimedia Virtual Travel * University of Connecticut http://www.teleview.com.sg/visit.html The Connected Traveler THE CONNECTED TRAVELER c Copyright 1996 Russell Johnson Stories sounds pictures from around the world captured by Russell Johnson friends and the magazine of TravelMedia a multi-media communications company and WorldWorks developing World Wide Web services for international clients. Ah the the winter blues. Travel is one way to lick them. As you read this I am on a Asian marathon: Hong Kong Nepa... http://www.well.com:80/user/wldtrvlr/ The Internet Travel Guide - Vietnam VIETNAM The Internet Travel Guide Peter M. Geiser has set up a home page for his Internet travel guides. They can be found http://sunsite.unc.edu/vietnam/vntra.html The Vietnam Veteran Biker's Place http://www.flash.net/%7Ejharris/ The VietNam Pictures Archive at SunSite Trondheim : A collection of postcard pictures, courtesy of the Vietnamese Students Association at Trondheim, Norway. Quicktime clips from a cultural show, courtesy of the Vietnamese Students Association at the University of Michigan. http://sunsite.unc.edu/vietnam/vnpic.html Tourism destination This document provides you with the top most popular destinations for tourist. Go top Please show where you are or wish to be in Vietnam we will tell you where you should go. * Hanoi * Ho Chi Minh City * Haiphong * Caobang * Tayninh * Quangninh * Dongnai * Vinhphu * Habac * Lamdong * Nghean * Ninhbinh * Laichau * Quangnam http://coombs.anu.edu.au/~vern/vninfo/tour.htm Travel Indochina (Vietnam - Burma - Laos -Thailand - Angkor Wat) http://www.broflo.com.au/travindo/ Travel Sites worth checking out... Globalpassage This site has just about anything you'd ever need! Hotelanywhere An awesome directory of travel related sites can be found here. Worldwide Health Tips It's always good to know how you'll get sick before you do. Adventurous Traveller Bookstore The Prime net bookstore. The Internet Travelguide A great source of up to date info Vietnam Travels Some nice snaps and http://www.usyd.edu.au/~bdrewnia/tales/sites.htm Travel Trade Report http://www.siam.net/ttr/index.html TravNet! Vietnam Menu http://www.sky.net/%7Eeric/t/seavie.htm Trin Do's Homepage * VietGATE * Vietnamese in Houston, Texas * Vietnam Online * Vietnam Tourism Office Searching World Wide Web * Lycos Searching Tool * WebCrawler Searching Tool http://acad.bryant.edu/~tdo/index.html Trips to Vietnam Trips to Vietnam This section contains a series of trip reports, visit information, and other related materials contributed by Vietnam Veterans and friends of Veterans. Additional materials are constantly being added to this section. Please send to John Rossie at : jrossie@du.edu Ron Sleeis writes of his return to his old stomping grounds in Vietnam Professor (and Vietnam Veteran) Philip Milio's story and pictures of his return to Vietnam. Philip's trip took place during August, 1995. Mike Austin's moving story of his return trip to Vietnam and his chance encounter with members of a Joint Task Force-Full Accounting (JTF-FA) recovery team. This story has a poignant and emotional end... Valerie http://grunt.space.swri.edu/trips.htm U.S. State Department Travel Warnings/U.S. State Department Travel Warnings and Consular Information Sheets 1.1.1. http://www.stolaf.edu/network/travel-advisories.html 2. Subscribing to the travel-advisories mailing list 3. Related Country Information http://www.stolaf.edu//network/travel-advisories.html Unlimited Travel ON LINE http://206.29.117.33/VietNam.html Usenet Group Archives Lycos: * soc.culture.vietnamese Issues and discussions of Vietnamese culture * alt.politics.vietnamese Political and social discussions relating to Vietnam. * comp.binaries.ms-windows Binary programs http://www.saigon.com/usenet/index.html Inktomi UW-Madison Southeast Asian Resources - Internet Resources on Vietnam http://www.library.wisc.edu:80/resources/SEAsia/htmls/viet01.htm vietnam http://interhealth.com:80/vietnam/index.html vietnam travel: international and internal Travel - International air : Although Vietnam's national airline Hang Khong Viet nam (HKVN) are in the process of establishing a European booking office, they do not operate intercontinental services yet. International flig... Approximate flighttime : From London to Hanoi via Bangkok is 17 hours, including 2 hours stopover. International Airports : Noi Bai International Airport (HAN) is 45 km (28 miles) from Hanoi, buses and taxis are available. Tan Son Nhat International Airport is 7 km (4.5 miles) from Ho Chi Minh City. Buses and taxis are available. Departure tax : U$ 6. sea : The major ports are Ho Chi Minh City, Vung Tau, HaiPhong, Danang and Ben Thuy. International cruise facilities are http://qqq.com/vietnam/travel/ Vietnam vietnam FAQ: Admin Info and Posting Guidelines.vietnam FAQ: Recommended Reading List http://www.cis.ohio-state.edu/hypertext/faq/usenet/vietnam/ top.html Vietnam - a potential Asian Tiger ? How to Do Business with Vietnam | | A quick look at history | | Vietnamese Economy | | Vietnam Business Directories Connect to Vietnam Trade and Industry Directory 1995-96 What is Vietnam - makes interesting reading Doing business with Vietnam - how to enter the marke... February 07, 1994 " More than 50 billion us$ would be invested during next 6 years in infrastructure,manufacturing and assembly facilities by investors mainly from Japan,Taiwan,Singapore ,Korea and Usa,"according to research studies conducted by Center for Global Trade Development - an independent international business research organization - monitoring countries and industries with special emphasis on emerging markets http://www.cgtd.com/global/presviet.html Vietnam Access' Home Page To help you respond quickly to the fast changing market conditions in Vietnam, Vietnam Business InfoTrack Newsletter includes topics that really matter to you: * Industry Review outlines what's happening in Vietnams prominent industries, economic trends and business outlook. CORPORATE: Vietnam Business InfoTrack Newsletter gives you an immediate advantage to evaluate the potential of doing... 830, http://www.vcnet.com/vietnamaccess/va.html Vietnam Casualty Search a searchable database of soldiers who died in Vietnam. (Arts:Humanities:History:20th Century:Vietnam War) http://sersoft.clever.net/vietnam/ Vietnam-era U.S. Government Documents (Arts:Humanities:History:20th Century:Vietnam War) gopher://wiretap.spies.com/11/Gov/US-History/Vietnam Vietnam Experience, The a collection of thoughts, memories and pictures from the publisher of the 26 volume book series. (Arts:Humanities:History:20th Century:Vietnam War) http://www.shore.net/~cadmus/ Vietnam Express Travel arranges discount group, business, historical, and private tours; arranges in-country land and air travel/accommodations; schedules official visits/calls, shopping trips; and provides translators. (Business and Economy:Companies:Travel:Tour Operators) http://www.sierramm.com/namviet/tours.html Vietnam: Images http://stingray.ess.harris.com:80/vn/images.html Vietnam Information The country occupies a total area of 329,560 sq km of which 325,360 sq km is on land. It has a 3,818 km long land boundary and 3,444 km of coastline. http://sunsite.nus.sg/SEAlinks/vietnam-info.html Vietnam Insight Online Vietnam Insight, Vol VI, 1995 Vietnam Insight, Vol V, 1994 Address/Subscription Info Vietnam Insight is a monthly publication in English carrying the voice of opposition against the oppressive regime in Vietnam to the outside world. Vietnam Insight provides http://www.vinsight.org/insight.html Vietnam Institute Investing in Vietnam. (Business and Economy:Companies:Financial Services:Investment Services) http://www.fishnet.net/~rnli/vietnam.html Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia (Recreation:Travel:Travel Logs (Travelogues)) http://www.solutions.mb.ca/rec-travel/asia/vietnam/ vietnam-laos-cambodia.trip.karl.html Vietnam National Administration of Tourism http://coombs.anu.edu.au/~vern/vninfo/ministry/vnat.htm Vietnam Resource Collection http://grunt.space.swri.edu:80/books.htm Vietnam Science, Technology and Environment Australia Vietnam Science-Technology Link The Australia Vietnam Science-Technology Link is one of those struggling little NGOs with a specific interest in Vietnam. My particular interest is the environment, but then everything is part of the environment. I'm Vern Weitzel and my background is in biological anthropology. My main professional efforts were dealing with the primates of Southeast Asia. But I have found that conservation really is not fencing in forests or jailing poachers. To paraphrase our Vietnamese colleagues: If we can help people live sustainably, then they will save nature. We can recommend the document: Caring for the Earth published by IUCN (The World Conservation Union), the http://coombs.anu.edu.au/~vern/avsl.html Vietnam - TOURISM INDUSTRY-SERVICES Directory - 1996 Vietnam - TOURISM INDUSTRY-SERVICES Directory - 1996 -Over 600 listings -11 years Imports-exports of related items dollar amount, countries -Total 114 pages full of quality information ISBN 1-56981-061-3 Covering following industries and categories: *Airlines & Commercial Airtaxi Transport *Airports & Air-Traffic Management *Hotels, Motels, & Restaurant Industry *Rail-Road & Railway Transport Industry *Travel Agencies & Travel Related Services *Embassies; Diplomatic & Consular Offices *All Imports and Exports of the above related products from all countries of the world to/from Vietnam *Hot Opportunities *HS & SIC Codes for each Co. *index and headings in English, Francais, Espanol... http://www.cgtd.com/global/directory/vtditurs.html Vietnam Travel (Regional:Countries:Vietnam:Travel) http://maingate.net/vn Vietnam Travels Friendship Foundation of American-Vietnamese Information !. More Foundation Information coming soon! Read About A Father and Son's Trip To Vietnam. http://www.goodnet.com/~rbowley/a1.html Vietnam Veterans Memorials Vietnam Veterans Memorials around The World This gallery contains pictures, stories, and information about memorials to Vietnam Veterans in the United States and elsewhere. Our goal is to build a separate gallery for each and every Vietnam Veterans memorial. We are in need of information regarding Vietnam War memorials which are not yet included. Please contact the assis... Alphabetical Listing by State or Country Visit several Vietnam Veterans Memorials in Missouri. Photos and Narrative contributed by Michele Viehman The Franklin County Vietnam Veterans Memorial located in St. Clair, Missouri. The Vietnam Veterans Memorial, Wentzville, Missouri "New York Vietnam Veterans Memorials" This section http://grunt.space.swri.edu/vietmems.htm Vietnam Vets Oral History & Folklore Project/Vietnam Veterans Oral History and Folklore Project' biblography The following specialized bibliography was compiled by Prof. Lydia Fish, Director of the Vietnam Veterans Oral History and Folklore Project, and remains her intellectual property. This bibliography will be archived on the Viet Nam War Discussion List as shwv http://129.162.150.173/folk.htm Vietnam War@ Yahoo: (Arts:Humanities:History:Military History) http://www.yahoo.com/Arts/Humanities/History/20th_Century/ Vietnam_War/ VIETNAM LINKS - sogiti@iastate.edu/Index | | Connection | | Archive & Misc | | To The World | | Software | | Horoscope | | Photo | 1. VIETNAM - GENERAL INFORMATION 2. VIETNAM - A PHOTOGRAPH TOUR BY SIEW-LI KOK 3. VIETNAM CONNECTIONS (..sorry, not in alphabetical order) http://www.public.iastate.edu/~sogiti/links.html VIETNAM ON FILM AND TELEVISION DOCUMENTARIES IN THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS Compiled by Victoria E. Johnson July, 1989 __ N.B.: In converting from WordPerfect to ASCII, original page breaks were not preserved, so page references in Contents and Index listings are approximate. TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION . . . gopher://marvel.loc.gov/00/research/reading.rooms/ motion.picture/mopic.tv/mpfind/vietnam VIETNAM TRAVEL GUIDE http://www.asia1.com.sg/travel/vietnam/ VIETNAM TRAVEL WEB http://maingate.net:80/vn/travel/agent/orbitours/orbitour.html Vietnamese Literature A modest collection of Vietnamese literature work (Arts:Humanities:Literature:Countries and Cultures:Viet Nam) http://www.engr.wisc.edu/~ttran/vhvn.html Vietnamese Poetry (Arts:Humanities:Literature:Poetry:Countries and Cultures:Vietnamese) http://stingray.ess.harris.com/vn/poetry.html Vietnamese Professionals Society The Vietnamese Professionals Society VPS is a non-profit worldwide membership organization of Vietnamese professionals committed to the advancement of knowledge and contribution to the welfare of the people of Vietnam. On The Threshold Of The 21st Century A Few Thoughts Regarding A Suitable Direction For The Development Of Science Technology In Vietnam Prof. Tu Van Le University of Canberra ACT Au... http://www.webcom.com:80/~hcgvn/ VIETNET FAQ-Charter It also aims at creating opportunities for exchanging knowledges; learning more about Vietnamese culture (custom, history, ...); sharing news relating to VietNam, Vietnamese refugees, and Vietnamese communities aboard; expanding friendships between Vietnamese Student Associations of various universities; assisting, encouraging and helping each others in education as well as in employment;... http://www.vnet.org/vietnet/USA/FAQ.charter.html VNFORUM Home Page - Title http://www.saigon.com:80/vnforum.html Voices of the Vietnam War: experience, literature, art, and politics http://www.uta.fi:80/laitokset/sosio/culture/vietnam.htm Voices Of Vietnam Musician/composer Philip Blackburn tells of the music and people of Vietnam in this musical travelogue. Includes photos and music clips. (Regional:Countries:Vietnam:Entertainment:Music) http://www.rootsworld.com/rw/feature/vietnam.html /vvm/aboutvietnam.html Vietnam related Web pages. Cycle Vietnam: a bicycle tour of Vietnam. http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/vvm/aboutvietnam.html W3C/ANU - Vietnam WWW VL Other Names & Abbreviations: Viet Nam; Viet-Nam; historical names. Map Viewer - A Dynamic World Map (Xerox PARC). http://coombs.anu.edu.au/WWWVLPages/VietPages/WWWVL-Vietnam.html Welcome to VietGATE An online YELLOW PAGES of thousands of Vietnamese businesses in the California area. You can search by type of business, business location, and name of business! http://www.saigon.com/ Welcome to Vietnam Server 1. Server 2. Server 3. Server 4. Vietnams pictures. Vietnam - bad experiences of J|rgen Diercks There are since 14.12.1994: readers of this page Nguyen, Nam Trung http://www.tu-chemnitz.de/~ntn/viet-e.html WLR Cassidy & Associates New Service Announcement: Because Australian National University is indexing us as "specialist" under Vietnam, we are (as of 13 Jan 95) significantly expanding our Vietnamese linking effort. New Publication Announcement Cassidy, William L. Vietnamese Identification Investigations: The Standard Reference. http://www.deltanet.com/users/wcassidy/warlock.html World Telecom Resources: From 42 Countries http://homepage.interaccess.com/%7Ecmainfo/telecom.htm Yahoo - Regional:Countries:Vietnam:Travel Regional : Countries : Vietnam :Travel Options Search all of Yahoo Search only in Travel * Cycle Vietnam - Travel story about cycling through Vietnam. * Lonely Planet - Destination: Vietnam * Vietnam Travel * Vietnam Travels - Information about Vietnam including travel info, pictures, and t... http://www.yahoo.com/Regional/Countries/Vietnam/Travel/ Yahoo - Social Science:History:20th Century:Vietnam War Judith Goldsmith, A Biased Timeline of the Counter-Culture - a timeline of significant events for baby boomers, bohemians, beatnicks, and hippies, focusing especially on the sixties. Sixties Project & Viet Nam Generation - Interdisciplinary resource on the 1960s and the Vietnam War, including reviews, course syllabi, text, and graphic archives. http://www.yahoo.com/Social_Science/History/20th_Century/ Vietnam_War/ Yamada Vietnamese Guide [Guide index] [Font index] [Mailing List index] [News index] [Multiple-language sites] [Yamada home page]. Viet-Net - Good place for Vietnamese culture links and GREAT for software. http://babel.uoregon.edu/yamada/guides/vietnamese.html LOCAL NET ACCESS: NetNam Telematic Services Vietnam National Institute of Information Technology Nghia Do, Tu Liem Ha Noi, Viet Nam Email: admin@netnam.org.vn Phone: +84-4 346-907 Fax: +84-4 345-217 - VARENET (UUCP) is Vietnam's national Internet host, which polls the Australian National University once an hour, 7 days a week. - NetNam is a recently established local node. Vietnam (Socialist Republic of) top-level domain (VN-DOM) Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment of Vietnam 39 Tran Hung Dao Hanoi VIETNAM Domain Name: VN Administrative Contact: Tran, Dac Van (DVT2) dac@MOSTE.GOV.VN +84 4 265404 (FAX) +84 4 267484 Technical Contact, Zone Contact: Tran, Thai Ba (TBT2) thai@HANOI.AC.VN +84 4 346907 (FAX) +84 4 345217 Record last updated on 04-May-94. Domain servers in listed order: CHEOPS.ANU.EDU.AU 150.203.76.24 SUNIC.SUNET.SE 192.36.125.2 192.36.148.18 NS.EU.NET 192.16.202.11 NS.UU.NET 137.39.1.3 Viet Nam Network Information Center (VNNIC-DOM) Reserved by Asia Pacific NIC Domain Name: VNNIC.NET Administrative Contact, Technical Contact, Zone Contact: Asia Pacific Network Information Center (APNIC) admin@apnic.net +81-3-5276-3973 +81-3-5276-6244 (FAX) 81-3-5276-6239 Record last updated on 28-Feb-94. Vietnam Express Travel (NAMVIET-DOM) 1308 N. Hudson Street Arlington, VA 22201 Domain Name: NAMVIET.COM Administrative Contact: Stratton, Nathan (NS509) nathan@NETRAIL.NET (703) 524-4800 (703) 534-9755 Technical Contact, Zone Contact: Zimmerman, Matt (MZ22) mdz@NETRAIL.NET (703) 524-4800 (410) 489-2825 Record last updated on 07-Aug-95. Domain servers in listed order: NS1.NETRAIL.NET 205.215.6.2 NS2.NETRAIL.NET 205.215.6.5 NS3.NETRAIL.NET 205.215.6.3 Vietnam World Travel (VWTRAVEL-DOM) 99 N. 6th St., Ste. #B San Jose, CA 95112 USA Domain Name: VWTRAVEL.COM Administrative Contact: Nguyen, Duc H. (DHN) vwtravel@VWTRAVEL.COM +1 408 283 0539 Technical Contact, Zone Contact: Hostmaster, Best Internet (BIH2) hostmaster@BEST.COM 415-962-5237 Record last updated on 30-Jan-96. Record created on 30-Jan-96. Domain servers in listed order: NS.BEST.COM 204.156.128.1 NS2.BEST.COM 204.156.128.10 NS3.BEST.COM 204.156.128.20 =========================================================== InfoTec-Travel Contact: mendicott@igc.apc.org Purpose: InfoTec-Travel is a moderated internetwork electronic mailing list dedicated to the exchange of information about information technology in travel and tourism worldwide. To subscribe, send email to majordomo@igc.apc.org and in the body of the message put subscribe infotec-travel Last change: Sep 95 =========================================================== ---------------------- Index: 4878 Reference: 4820 From: echilton@cml.com (ed chilton) Subject: Re: Anti-war and Nuclear Threat Date: 17 Feb 1996 17:03:22 -0500 Organization: ComputerLink Online Inc. Keywords: Nuclear threat; Dien Bien Phu [In reply to John Tegtmeier's article <602144820@panix3.panix.com>] A comment concerning question 1. In my reading I have found mention that during the long battle at Dienbienphu, France's amabassador and military attache to the U.S. were more than once offered nuclear weapons from America's arsenal. They said thanks but no thanks. Now France is conducting nuclear tests in defiance of the U.S. requests. ---------------------- Index: 4879 Reference: 4807, 4858 From: Edwin E. Moise Subject: Re: KMT In Laos Date: 17 Feb 1996 17:03:58 -0500 Organization: Clemson University Keywords: KMT; Laos; Thailand In article <602164858@panix3.panix.com>, Phan@tigger.Stcloud.msus.edu (Dien Phan)wrote: -snip- DP> The map of nation layout from West DP> to East looks like this: DP> DP> West Bangladesh Burma Thailand Laos Vietnam China Sea East DP> ---------> -----> from Burma to Laos DP> <----- KMT troops movement recorded DP> DP> My question is what made KMT troop make an extra trip to Laos DP> then go back to Thailand? It does not make sense. Therefore part DP> or the entire KMT troops must be in Laos for a long time for DP> some mission before going back home by the Geneva accords in Laos DP> signed. I can think of two reasons it might make sense. One is that, despite the impression you give above, Burma borders directly on Laos. Depending on where in Burma you are coming from, Laos may simply be closer. The other is that the KMT troops were in a great hurry to leave Burma, and may not have been able to take the time to ask the governments of neighboring countries for permission to enter. The Thai Army was much stronger than the Laotian Army; crossing the border into Laos, and then taking a few weeks to negotiate with the Thais before crossing from Laos into Thailand, might have been a whole lot safer than crossing directly into Thailand without Thai permission, risking being blown away by the Thais. Ed Moise eemoise@clemson.edu ---------------------- Index: 4880 Reference: 4797, 4829 From: rufrmtx@aol.com (Kyle Ramsey) Subject: Re: USAF Gunships Date: 17 Feb 1996 17:04:49 -0500 Organization: America Online, Inc. Keywords: AC-47 gunship (USAF) 4 vulcans? Wow, I'll bet the a/c would yaw like a bitch if all four let go at once. My father flew F-4E's out of Da Nang and said the vulcan would make that a/c buck. I think the 7.62's dropped their brass inside the a/c, right? How did you guys manage to operate without busting your ass with all that brass rolling under your feet? I've shot the 7.62 m/g mounted on the door of an CH-46, but must of the brass flew outside. Please tell me about how this was dealt with. Kyle Ramsey "Quietly Making Noise" ALbuquerque, New Mexico ---------------------- Index: 4881 Reference: 4808 From: gmoore3501@msn.com (George Moore) Subject: Re: Announcing New Co-Moderator Date: 17 Feb 1996 17:05:28 -0500 Organization: x vietnam-request@panix.com (Moderator) wrote: MOD> In accordance with the Section 4 of Charter of soc.history.war.vietnam MOD> as reproduced below, the current moderators of the newsgroup are MOD> hereby announcing the appointment of a new co-moderator and are MOD> submitting his name to the newsgroup for a five day discussion period. MOD> MOD> The new co-moderator nominee is: MOD> MOD> Edwin E. Moise Historical/FAQ Advisor If his appointment means that he will not be able to continue pointing out the errors in my thinking, I am opposed. On the other hand, if his appointment means that he will be able to supervise even more closely the errors in my thinking, I am pleased at this news. Please do appoint EEMOISE as a co-moderator, but only if he is able to freely point out the errors in my posts. George Moore gmoore3501@msn.com ---------------------- Index: 4882 Reference: 4790 From: smason@iaccess.com.au (Scott Mason) Subject: Re: VN-War Exile's Appeal from Sweden Date: 17 Feb 1996 17:06:18 -0500 Organization: Internet Access Australia In article <602144790@panix3.panix.com>, nyt@nyxfer.blythe.org (NY Transfer News Collective) says: NYT> Via NY Transfer News Collective * All the News that Doesn't Fit NYT> NYT> APPEAL Rec'd February 11, 1996 NYT> NYT> Robertsfors, Sweden NYT> NYT> Dear Friends, NYT> NYT> My name is Robert Malecki and I need your help. I need the help of the NYT> members in your organisation. I need the help of all organisations who NYT> claim that they stand on the side of poor and working class people. NYT> NYT> I have been living in exile in Sweden for over 23 years because of my NYT> activities during the Vietnam war. If I were to return to the United NYT> States, I could be put in prison for a very long time and therefore this NYT> plea for help. ****************** One very long SNIP SNIP SNIP ****************** All I have to say about this guy is, You made your bed mate, sleep in it. ****************** Regards, Scott USMC 67-71. ---------------------- Index: 4883 Reference: 4821, 4823 From: Owen B Evans Subject: Re: soc.history.war.vietnam FAQ: Australian Involvement (1/3) Date: 17 Feb 1996 17:06:54 -0500 Organization: Citynet Technologies Keywords: Australian involvement; Peterson, Barry; Royal Australian Regiment I served with 6th Battalion RAR in vietnam for a year and also a few weeks with a company in 2 RAR run then by Barry Peterson of AATTV fame. I also spent a few months in Saigon. That was from May 1969 to December 1970. I think I learnt a few things from your article I didn't previously know and I haveto agree particularly with one thing. Generally speaking, Australians hated EVERYONE!. Except me of course. A good article I thought. Owen. ---------------------- Index: 4884 Reference: 4540, 4781 From: "J. Calbreath" Subject: Re: REQ: vietnam war country lyrics Date: 17 Feb 1996 17:09:17 -0500 Organization: University of Washington Keywords: Cultural representations, music On 14 Feb 1996 in article <602144781@panix3.panix.com>, Michael Mullin wrote: MM> Okie From Muskokie, Merle Haggard "Lucky Man" Emerson Lake & Palmer. Also happens to be one of the earliest uses of a synthasizer in Rock music. ---------------------- Index: 4885 Reference: 4763, 4850 From: dufresne@winternet.com (Ron DuFresne) Subject: Re: "So-called" anti-war movement Date: 17 Feb 1996 17:09:56 -0500 Organization: StarNet Communications, Inc Frank Warner (wakingup@postoffice.ptd.net) wrote: -snip- FW> To "end the war," the North Vietnamese leaders also promised free FW> elections in the Paris Peace Accords. And 23 years later, too few are FW> protesting that broken promise. No freedom, is that peace? Frank, One must wonder though, had the war effort gone a different route, what sort of 'freedom' the peoples in South Vietnam would have gained. The point is; The US has a bad record when it comes to supporting regimes in other countries... Just my $0.02... Later, Ron DuFresne ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ "Cutting the space budget really restores my faith in humanity. It eliminates dreams, goals, and ideals and lets us get straight to the business of hate, debauchery, and self-annihilation." -- Johnny Hart ***testing, only testing, and damn good at it too!*** OK, so you're a Ph.D. Just don't touch anything. ---------------------- Index: 4886 Reference: 4561, 4703 From: KyPhong@minerva.worldbank.org Subject: Re: Pham Xuan An Date: 17 Feb 1996 17:10:34 -0500 Organization: KP Keywords: Pham Xuan An; Nguyen Tu; Nguyen Huu Hanh; Do Kien Nhieu; Saigon In article <602104703@panix3.panix.com>, dawson@mozart.inet.co.th (Alan Dawson) says: AD> In article <602034561@panix3.panix.com>, AD> KyPhong@minerva.worldbank.org (Ky Phong) writes: AD>KP> After the war he turned out to be a communist agent with the rank AD>KP> of Lt. Col in the PAVN! (His picture in full uniform was publised AD>KP> several years ago in a book written by Bui Tin, a colonel who defected AD>KP> to the west.) AD> AD> Once again, I'd like to play the skeptic. I realize the extreme AD> popularity of the theory that there were scads and lots and huge AD> numbers of VC in the Saigon and American establishment. But. AD> AD> We know of exactly one such person -- a brigadier general in the AD> ARVN, who officially ordered the final surrender of the army, in AD> fact. He was a communist, this we know. Dear Mr. Dawson: You must refer to BG. Nguyen Huu Hanh, then-CO of 22nd Tactical Zone (headquatered in My Tho). I do not think this traitor was capable of spying on anything accept on his own wife. The only reason why VN commi used him after the war was that his brother was a VC general. (If you want to know how competent Hanh was, please read About Face by Col. David Hackworth) -snip- AD> The fact is that in wartime Saigon and South Vietnam, it was possible AD> to exploit friendships, contacts, bribery and other tactics, and to AD> get information. For two YEARS, we had the motorcycle messenger who AD> carried the daily sitrep between the JGS at Tan Son Nhut and the AD> downtown Presidential Palace drop off a photocopy of it in our AD> office. We called this news-gathering, although of course by any AD> wartime standard it was espionage. For *three* years we obtained the AD> daily Saigon sitrep from the office of the (two-star general) mayor, AD> via one of his aides I knew personally. About the two-star general-mayor: You must talking about MG Do Kien Nhieu, the mayor of Saigon. Well, we all know how good he was by reading a profile about him on The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia by J.W. McCoy. Further more, for a mere reporter like you to be able to acquire SitRep infos. from the Saigon City Hall to and from The Presidental Palace was unthinkable. That tells you how secured our intelligence was ! AD> I'd submit that Pham Xuan An doesn't qualify. During the American AD> war, he was a correspondent for Time Magazine. There is no question AD> of his *actual* job, or his deception. However, he had no better or AD> worse access to secrets than any other citizen. Certainly he passed AD> info to the communist side, but he had no more *direct* ability to AD> gather than information than any other newsman, Vietnamese or AD> American. -snip- AD> On top of that, correspondents (including An) were *routinely* AD> briefed on upcoming operations by the military of Vietnam, the US and AD> other countries -- subject only to the restriction they couldn't AD> publish. They were specifically free to pass the information to AD> others such as their bosses to enable their own planning. And in AD> addition, blabbing was a common event among almost all people with AD> classified information. -snip- Now comes to our main Man: Pham Xuan An. I have talked to Mr. Nguyen Tu (You should remember this reporter. He was the one who fed the Saigon-based, Caravelle-seated news reporters' corps about the scences of the distraseous retreat of the II Military Corp. along the hellish Route 7B) in regard to the question how much did P.X. An know. Tu's answer is: A Lot! Mr. Tu and An knew each other since the early 1950. And, according to Tu, because An was playing bothsides he had acquired alot of important military and political infos. An now, according to the latest sources, is a general, and he deserves it. I understand your sympathy to An --since you are his acquaintant But we have to assess a man's motive throughly. Some people like Morley Safer of the CBS News still wonders if An is a communist agent ! Now, how naive can you be? Mr. Nguyen Tu sends you his regards. Warmest Regards, KyPhong@erols.com ---------------------- Index: 4887 Reference: 4820 From: tth@surya.caltech.edu (Thomas Hamilton) Subject: Re: Anti-war and Nuclear Threat Date: 17 Feb 1996 17:11:15 -0500 Organization: California Institute of Technology, Pasadena Keywords: Russell, Bertrand; Anti-war movement, US; Nuclear Disarmament Dellinger, Dave; Muste, A. J. In article <602144820@panix3.panix.com> tegtmeie@panix.com (John Tegtmeier) writes: JT> Seems we have discussed a bit about the anti-war movement is the US JT> but rather ignored one of its major antecedents - the nuclear JT> disarmament movement of physicist Bertrand Russell, et al. Russell was a mathematician and philosopher. He was not a physicist. JT> So, a couple of questions: JT> JT> 1. How credible was the risk of the use of nuclear weapons, tactical JT> or strategic, by any of the powers directly or indirectly involved in JT> Vietnam? JFK once said the risk that the Cuban Missle crisis would lead to nuclear war was "between one third and even". JT> 2. To what extent was the anti-war movement, especially in the early JT> formative days, influenced and shaped by the nuclear disarmament JT> movement or its leadership? A huge amount. The anti-war movement looked to older pacifists such as Dave Dellinger and A.J. Muste for leadership. As far as the younger leaders of the anti-war movement are concerned, the immediate precedent was the Civil Rights movement, which had shaped the attitudes of the SDS leaders, for example. However, the Civil Rights movement itself involved leaders such as Bayard Rustin who had intimate connections to earlier pacifist movements. ---------------------- Index: 4888 Reference: From: Phan@tigger.Stcloud.msus.edu (Dien Phan) Subject: Happy Tet New Year to all SHWV readers Date: 17 Feb 1996 17:12:10 -0500 Organization: St. Cloud State University Keywords: Tet Offensive Monday, Feb. 19, 1996 is the Vietnamese New Year, Tet. Twenty seven years after the notorious Tet Offensive in 1968 when many lives were lost because VC/NVA broke the tradition of peace and happiness of the Vietnamese holidays and mounted a massive attack. They have hoped for massive uprising of the South Vietnamese people against Thieu's regime and the Americans. They miscalculated. After Tet, Ho Chi Minh realized that the South Vietnamese did not love him and the communist party as he was convinced. For all readers who are interested in Vietnam, this year is the leap year in Luna calendar and there is an extra month for this year (this is the 13th month of the year of the Hog). The year of the rat will begin on Monday. Happy Tet. Dien. ---------------------- Index: 4889 Reference: From: wakingup@postoffice.ptd.net (Frank Warner) Subject: Anti-war Movement and Meanings Date: 17 Feb 1996 17:12:49 -0500 Organization: ProLog - PenTeleData, Inc. Keywords: Anti-war movement, US; Fonda, Jane; Paris Peace Accords The trouble with phrases like "end the war" and "anti-war" is they mean so many things to different people. But the anti-war movement during the Vietnam War deserved much of the skepticism it was subject to. The fact is, as soon as American combat units left at the end of 1972, the movement dried up. There were no more major marches. No more rallies in front of the United Nations. Jane Fonda, who called on American bomber pilots to reconsider what they were doing in the war, didn't call on the North Vietnamese Army to reconsider their moves deeper into South Vietnam, despite their promise in the 1973 Paris Peace Accords to hold their ground and go no farther. The war went on more than two more years, with killing almost every day, but the anti-war movement virtually disappeared. It was as if to say, if Americans aren't dying, there is no war. If the North Vietnamese keep shooting, that isn't war. If the North Vietnamese roll tanks into Saigon, set up a new government with virtually no South Vietnamese (despite northern leaders' claims they were so popular among the people of South Vietnam) and break their promise in the Peace Accords to hold free elections, that's fine. If, as anti-war, you were an American who was just tired of Americans dying in war, your silence after January 1973 made sense. If, as anti-war, you claimed to be against all war-making, the inactivity of the anti-war movement from January 1973 until May 1975 is inexplicable, if not immoral. We all had different reasons for opposing the war. I didn't like it because it took my father away for a year. I wrote President Kennedy and asked him not to send my father, but he sent him anyway. My father said he was going to give the South Vietnamese a chance at democracy and freedom. A good reason to help others, I thought, but I missed him all the same. Eventually, I didn't like the Vietnam War for many other reasons. Some didn't like the war because the Americans and South Vietnamese weren't trying to beat the North Vietnamese, not even trying to take a piece of their territory to bargain with. Some didn't like it because, with the limits we gave ourselves (and the limits the Soviets and Chinese imposed), it meant we would be dying to hold a line, never to win, possibly for decades. Some didn't like it because, unlike Korea, Vietnam was not a peninsula with more defensible borders. Some didn't like the war because the South Vietnamese government was seldom democratic, often corrupt, sometimes more corrupt than others. Some didn't like it because they believed the South Vietnamese really wanted to unite with the North Vietnamese, and the North Vietnamese really were Jeffersonian democrats who couldn't wait to hold elections for a nation whole again. Some didn't like it because they believed Vietnam should unite, even if it was under dictatorship, because the Vietnamese people only wanted rice in their stomachs and cared nothing for free speech, free press and free elections. Some didn't like the war because it made us feel terrible about ourselves, suddenly representing the horrors of war more than we represented the ideals of freedom. Some didn't like it because they believed the United States government was corrupt. Some didn't like it because they believed the United States government only wanted to help big business make money off the Vietnamese. And some didn't like the Vietnam War because they believed all war is wrong. Most of us didn't like the Vietnam War for a combination of reasons, including many not listed here. But for whatever reason the war was "a tragic mistake" in the 1960s and 1970s, there is no reason not to insist on liberty in Vietnam today. The Vietnam War really isn't over until Vietnam is free. Without freedom, without human rights, there is no peace. So the anti-war movement still has work to do. For the 73 million people in Vietnam, the anti-war movement must insist on freedom. Frank Warner ---------------------- Index: 4890 Reference: 4757, 4814 From: Phan@tigger.Stcloud.msus.edu (Dien Phan) Subject: Re: Hmong Origins Date: 17 Feb 1996 17:13:41 -0500 Organization: St. Cloud State University Keywords: Meo; Highland groups In article <602144814@panix3.panix.com>, Paul Durham says: PD> In article <602124757@panix3.panix.com>, RustyLang wrote: PD>RL> In article <602114734@panix3.panix.com>, gmoore3501@msn.com (George PD>RL> Moore) writes: PD>RL>GM> My understanding is that "Miao", usually written in the United You are correct. Meo means "cat" and it does not have bad meaning. The Montagnards in Vietnam was called "Moi" ( primitive barbarians) years ago, but Pres Diem banned the name and called them "Thuong" (High for highlanders in Central Highland) which is a better name. ---------------------- Index: 4891 Reference: 4811, 4831 From: break@u.washington.edu ('BN' N Pham) Subject: Re: "So-called" anti-war movement Date: 17 Feb 1996 17:16:49 -0500 Organization: University of Washington Keywords: Anti-war movement, US; Ngo Dinh Diem Edwin E. Moise writes: EM> In article <602144811@panix3.panix.com>, Craig Thompson EM> wrote: EM>CET> I remember it as being a "Get America Out of Vietnam and To Hell with EM>CET> the South Vietnamese" movement. -snip- EM> The anti-war movement was a lot of different things, as you EM> commented later in your post. My own motive for joining was EM> that the United States was killing a lot of South Vietnamese EM> for what I regarded as no good reason. I thought the United EM> States should stop doing this. Bear in mind that throughout EM> the period I was active in the movement (1964-67), the EM> proportion of native-born South Vietnamese was higher among EM> the forces fighting on the Communist side in South Vietnam EM> than it was among the forces on the anti-Communist side. EM> The people the U.S. was shooting were mostly South Vietnamese. I guess the saying that you have to experience it to know it is true. To us, VNese, there are no South VNese against North VNese. There were only non-communist VNese fighting against communist VNese aggressors. They got the North to experiment with their communism. All we wanted is to be left alone without any ideology. There are plenty of non-communist North VNese. And there are plenty of communist South VNese. To us, any VNese wants to be a communist, they are free to go North. And we would like any VNese, from North or South want to be a non-communist to come South with us. As Bui Tin revealed, without North VNese supplying and running the communist insurgency in the South, they have no chance of success. If they did not use force against us, there would be no war in South VN. So the issue of killing whether native South communist, or North communist should have been a non issue. Instead the issue should have been what business do they have taking up arms against the government of South VN? They should have been citizens of a non-communist South VN, not a comunist South VNese insurgent. Actually I think the US should not mettle in the internal affairs of SVN. If the US would like to support us, it should supply us with the materials. President Diem have stated that South VN did not have a shortage of blood. -snip- EM> I expected the Communists to establish a dictatorship about as EM> bad as the one that actually exists today in Vietnam. It is now EM> about average, as dictatorships go, although a few years ago EM> (late 1970s and early 1980s) it was worse than average. EM> EM> I did not feel in the 1960s that the United States was morally EM> entitled to kill hundreds of thousands of South Vietnamese in EM> order to ensure that South Vietnam would have a dictatorship EM> satisfactory to the U.S., rather than a Communist dictatorship. EM> I still feel the same. The issue is not about the killings. They decided to get into a war. It was a war. If the US did not get into the war, the South VNese would be doing the killings. Would that be better for you? Now if you are against the South VNese doing the killings, then you would have seen the VNese communists doing the killings, until they took over the whole SVN like they did in 75, and then for the kicker, put all those who might have any potential raise up against them in those re-education camps. EM> If the United States had been fighting to support a democracy EM> in South Vietnam, or even a high-grade dictatorship (as good EM> as the one the U.S. was supporting at the time on Taiwan), EM> I might have taken a different attitude. South VN never had a chance for any kind of democracy. But what ever it had is still much better than even what they have today. The best gauge for democracy is the ability, or the frequency of the demonstration against the government. And there were plenty in South VN then. What ever the view you have, what ever the press talk about how undemocratic South VN was, I believe those demonstration against the government both during Mr. Diem's regime, and afterward have demonstrated pretty well the level of democracy in South VN then. ---------------------- Index: 4892 Reference: 4809, 4861 From: Phillips Wheatley Subject: Re: USAF Gunships Date: 17 Feb 1996 17:17:26 -0500 Organization: Delaware Technical & Community College {In reply to Spectre Gunner's article <602164861@panix3.panix.com> ] ...rechargeable red flashlights...isn't it funny how a little thing like that can bring back so much...I think I lived with one in my mouth every night...all night for a year...kept our hands free and allowed us to work in the dark... ...former AC-119G gun plumber Jan '69 - Jan '70 ---------------------- Index: 4893 Reference: 4835 From: tedg@redbud.lbjlib.utexas.edu (Ted Gittinger) Subject: Re: Kennedy Assassination Article Date: 17 Feb 1996 17:18:03 -0500 Organization: University of Texas at Austin [In reply to Acadia Press's article <602154835@panix3.panix.com>] This would certainly dispel the conventional wisdom that JFK was assassinated by a cabal of the Fraternal Order of Moose, the Elks lodges, and the International Rotary. ---------------------- Index: 4894 Reference: 4552 From: hoefling@pentestone.com (Darrell Hoefling) Subject: Re: Vietnam War feature films Date: 17 Feb 1996 17:18:50 -0500 Organization: HSM Development Keywords: Stone, Oliver; Cultural representations, film, US peter.callaghan@zetnet.co.uk (Peter Callaghan) writes: PC> I am an 18 year old student living in Manchester UK. I am completing PC> an A level History Personal Study on feature films which portray the PC> Vietnam war and how realistic they are. PC> I would be grateful if anyone can suggest which, if any, is the more PC> realistic: Deer Hunter, Platoon or Full Metal Jacket. The message a movie gives is the most important, plot being second and costumes third. All of the movies you mentioned are anti-American the message is incorrect unless you hate our country. i also happen to think the plots were un-realistic as well. costumes and effects were ok. My vote is for Hamburger Hill as the best of the vn moies. remember Oliver Stone may be a veteran but he has an axe to grind, probably didnt like his drill sgt. macv sog ccn b36 70-71 ---------------------- Index: 4895 Reference: 4600, 4786 From: spencer@cwis.unomaha.edu (Tom Spencer) Subject: ARVN Tactics (was: Events of 1963) Date: 17 Feb 1996 17:22:48 -0500 Organization: University of Nebraska Omaha Keywords: Tactics, ARVN gmoore3501@msn.com (George Moore) writes: [lots and lots of stuff deleted] GM> Thank you for underlining the point I have been trying to make GM> about the events of 1963. Is the battle at Ap Bac in January of 1963 GM> not the ultimate example of your idea? SVN troops quite clearly GM> decided during that battle that it was easier to not corner Viet Minh GM> troops. An escape route was consequently left open to them. I still do GM> not know why this happened, but the outlines are becoming more clear. GM> Needless to say, the conclusions of my research have been devastating. I would like to suggest that leaving the enemy an escape route might, in some cases, be an effective military tactic. In a Western fight, troops with no escape route that are locally overwhelmed, will surrender, knowing that they will not be treated too badly. How did SVN treat their prisoners in that period. If very badly, the surrounded troops will fight to the death because they're dead anyway and they might as well trade their lives for as many of the enemy as possible. If, ont he other hand, the NVN have an escape route, they will take it if locally overwhelmed. If the operation is well planned many of them can be killed on the way out. Granted, with the escape route, more NVN soldiers will escape, but there will be enough fewer SVN casualities to be worth it. But then again, I have no military experience, so what do I know? [More stuff deleted] ---------------------- Index: 4896 Reference: 4811, 4831 From: tth@maya.caltech.edu (Thomas Hamilton) Subject: Re: "So-called" anti-war movement Date: 17 Feb 1996 17:23:43 -0500 Organization: California Institute of Technology, Pasadena Keywords: Anti-war movement, US; Chiang Kai-Shek; McCarthy, Joseph Nguyen Cao Ky; Ho Chi Minh In article <602154831@panix3.panix.com> Edwin E. Moise writes: EM> If the United States had been fighting to support a democracy EM> in South Vietnam, or even a high-grade dictatorship (as good EM> as the one the U.S. was supporting at the time on Taiwan), EM> I might have taken a different attitude. I think Ed's comment here is important to understanding why so many anti-Communist Americans opposed the Vietnam war. To Americans, Vietnam seemed a replay of Korea and the Chinese Civil War. The Communist victory in the CCW shocked and confused Americans who searched for explanations. Senator McCarthy argued that the Communist won because Acheson and Marshall were Communists. However, most Americans preferred another explanation. It was widely believed in the US that Chiang Kai-Shek lost because he was a corrupt dictator who was unable to rally the support of the Chinese, US officials often described Chiang's associates as "gangsters". (I wonder if Ed's opinion of Taiwan was as high in 1964 as it is now? For most US liberals, Taiwan's reputation has increased steadily since the 60s) This was in contrast to events in post-war Germany, where Konrad Adenauer had consolidated a pro-democracy government. The US attributed Adenauer's success to the fact that he was an older, respected statesman which a long record of honest, patriotic service to Germany and democracy. So when the US began its big escalation in 1965, Americans naturally examined the RVN government to see what we were fighting for. What Americans saw was Nguyen Cao Ky, a 35 year old pilot who dressed like a thug. This guy looked lots worse than Chiang! Guns on his hip, sunglasses etc. won him the contempt of the American people. No American could imagine voting for such a gangster. Ho Chi Minh, on the other hand, looked exactly like the sort of leader Americans respect. He seemed older and more civilized. This also explains why so many Americans were convinced of the power of the shadowy "third force". Americans believed that their must be some anti-Communists somewhere in VN more respectable than Nguyen Cao Ky! Aside from their natural hostility towards gangsters, Americans thought they had learned from China that gangsters always lose. To US television audiences, Nguyen Cao Ky had "loser" written all over him. Maybe if the CIA had fixed Nguyen Cao Ky up with a nice suit and a little gray hair dye, things would have gone differently. But many Americans thought that if the US's only friends were 35 year old pilots, the war was already lost. Brought up as poker players, Americans believe that if you are beat, fold. The above logic influenced many Americans to oppose the war. Few Americans had (or have) any sympathy for Communism. ---------------------- Index: 4897 Reference: 4686, 4734 From: gpaul2@ix.netcom.com (Paul Gregoire) Subject: Re: Hmong Origins Date: 17 Feb 1996 17:24:28 -0500 Organization: Netcom Keywords: Hmong; Meo; Vang Pao In <602114734@panix3.panix.com> gmoore3501@msn.com (George Moore) writes: -snip- GM> Further, in Laos today, it seems that the term "Meo" is used GM> officially to refer to those tribesmen who support the government and GM> that the term "Hmong" is now used to describe those "traitors" who GM> live in America... GM> GM> I would appreciate any confirmation of this. It sticks in my mind GM> because, during my recent travels in Lao and Isaan (NE Thailand), I GM> was frequently reminded that the term "Hmong" is used by foreigners GM> only when they wish to express their ignorance of local affairs. I GM> frequently got caught using the term. GM> GM> The Thai still use the term "Hmong" when they wish to refer to GM> the "barbarian hill tribesmen" who come to Bangkok looking for work. I worked in Laos in the PDJ area from 71'-73'. I carried Vang Pao several times during his inspection tours and carried literally hundreds of Meo passengers. I never heard the word Hmong until I came back to the states. They were always referred to as Meo. Paul G. ---------------------- Index: 4898 Reference: From: caroline nachman Subject: Free Software: SquareNote Date: 17 Feb 1996 17:26:42 -0500 Organization: sqn inc. Keywords: Website; Software [Moderator's note: This is being posted with the understanding that the program in question is free, not shareware. JT] Help! We recently developed SquareNote, v3.5 for free distribution to students, faculty, scholars, researchers and writers. Because it's free, we have no budget for getting out the word about this resource/tool. We will be grateful for any suggestions. For nine years, SquareNote has been helping grad students, college students and faculty scholars to keep track of their research notes and plan better theses, dissertations, papers and books. A good description of this software is "index cards on a PC." Many thousands of scholars, writers and researchers in 39 countries and at more than 1,100 colleges and universities use it. It has been a lifesaver for hundreds of PhD candidates organizing notes for their dissertation, and for authors preparing to write a book. It's also used by many as a "personal information manager." For example, it's been a great help to professors of history and commercial authors of historical biographies. [E.g., "Beethoven In German Politics, 1870-1989." by Professor David B. Dennis of Loyala/Chicago University [New Haven: Yale University Press, April, 1996; and the recent "Winchell: Gossip, Power And The Culture Of Celebrity" by Neal Gabler [New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994.] SquareNote runs on any IBM-compatible PC, under MS-DOS [its natural habitat], MS-Windows [where 50% of our users have it], the DOS partition of OS/2 and Power-PC MACs with DOS/Windows emulator or PC-card. We maintain a WWW site and an FTP site from which SquareNote3.5 may be downloaded. It's free. Once downloaded, it may be duplicated for other scholars, students and researchers. Sending a blank email to "sqn35net@sqn.com" will bring you full details on SquareNote and how to get your free copy. Or you can just open our Web site at "http://sqn.com" and download your copy now. Thanks for your help. Stephanie Mora, SQN Inc. "Organizes, | For free SquareNote3.5, indexes & retrieves your notes, ideas | email sqn35net@sqn.com" & documents. Like index cards on a PC."| or open http://sqn.com" ---------------------- Index: 4899 Reference: 4581, 4643 From: dawson@mozart.inet.co.th (Alan Dawson) Subject: Re: Events of 1963 Date: 17 Feb 1996 17:27:42 -0500 Organization: Institute for Important Studies Keywords: Halberstam, David; Thich Tri Quang; Ngo Dinh Diem; French Buddhists, protests of 1963; ARVN; Ap Bac; Strategic hamlets In article <602074643@panix3.panix.com>, Phan@tigger.Stcloud.msus.edu (Dien Phan) writes: DP> In 1962, US mounted a massive campaign to criticize Diem's government. DP> US embassy and consulates were allowed to print leaflets for Buddhist Dien, you'll have to come up with some documentation on this to convince me. I've never heard any such thing. The USG *did* criticize the regime, on many bases -- most or all of them quite justified in my mind. But actively print leaflets? I think not. DP> uprising campaign, a intefere with intent to overthrow the government. DP> It is illegal in the US for citizens to plot against and plan to At that time, it was not illegal. In many important ways, it still isn't, cf $20 million voted publicly to a fund to help destabilise and ultimately overthrow the Iran regime today. DP> overthrow the US goverment but US government did so to many countries. DP> Rev. Thich Tri Quang was hid by US embassy staff and transported to DP> the US to campaign for US intervention in Vietnam (not to mention No sir, he definitely was not transported to the US. Now, I've told you that and others have told you that, but you still insist it's true. We definitely need something better than you claim on this. I also told you Tri Quang was hidden on the roof of a building at 19 Ngo Duc Ke by the New York Times correspondent David Halberstam in a small apartment the building residents called "the chicken coop." Again, you'll need something more than your own claim to oppose that report. DP> possible CIA agitator agent threw a grenade to a Buddhist DP> demonstration in Hue to start the uprising of Buddhist). Fearful of Well, heh-heh, hard to challenge that. What is a "possible CIA agitator," anyhow? Do you have a name or other identity of this person? DP> losing the war, Diem sought help from France and got promised of the DP> come back of French after the US withdrawal from S. Vietnam. France Dien, you really make the most outlandish claims! Again, do you have even a shred of documentation for this? DP> also arranged the secret negotiation between South and North Vietnam DP> in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, a neutral communist nation. Mme Nhu, Diem's DP> sister in law, lead a RVN congress team to attend a Congress DP> conference in Belgrade where the meetings with North Vietnamese This was a common report in Saigon, anyhow. So far as I know, there isn't (again) a shred of support for this common rumor. I seem to recall, although I can't find it in a quick search, that North Vietnamese officials of those days denied this report after the war was over. DP> delegation took place. Angry with French plot to force US withdrawal, DP> the Kennedy Administration sought out unhappy ARVN generals and plot a DP> coup that killed Diem. The US overthrew Diem because it feared France? What a bizarre idea. DP> them from communist and "free fire zone". US advisors considered this DP> a human right violation by removing people from freedom to chose the DP> place to live. After Diem was overthrown, Strategic Hamlet was DP> abandoned, and Vietnamese peasants while having their freedom to chose Inventive twist. US advisers *did* largely oppose the strategic hamlet relocations, but not on human rights grounds. They opposed them because they knew, and saw with their own eyes, that people lifted out of their native villages to some new place were damned resentful, opposed the government, were exceptionally bitter and even joined the Viet Cong over it. IMO, they were correct. DP> Actually RVN troops was in good shape until 1964 when VC attacked DP> Binh Gia where the two best ARVN marine battalions were outnumbered Yes, ARVN was in fine shape until they started to fight the war. DP> and wiped out by VC troops. Infancy ARVN troops were not good enough DP> to fight the war. VC began to outgunned ARVN troops with AK47 and B40 DP> rockets. The US was hesitated to equip ARVN troops with more expensive DP> M14 auto rifle for fearing losing these weapons to VC. The US had bad Yes, good one. Cause and effect, in a circle. If we give them guns, they lose them. If we don't give them guns, they get beaten up. DP> did not have much of a chance to learn how to fight with VC troops DP> until Pres Nixon decided to Vietnamize the war and let ARVN fight DP> for themselves. And ARVN troops proved it through An Loc, Phouc Long, DP> Easter attack, Quang Tri, and other battles. Including -- the final proof -- at Saigon in 1975. DP>GM> details on the Viet Minh buildup before the battle at Ap Bac? I have DP>GM> looked all over the place for such information, but can't find a word DP>GM> about it. Any references on this question will be highly appreciated. DP> DP> Ap Bac was only a small battle. See Tim Page's book: Nam 1965-1975, DP> by Noble publishing. Well, yes, and the Tet offensive was a victory for the US-Saigon, and the Cambodian invasion achieved far MORE than its goals. Ap Bac was a small, important... no, VITAL battle in the history of the war. It's not just what happens, but what is SEEN to happen that's important. -- Alan Dawson When the president does it, that means it is not illegal. (Richard Nixon) ________________________Log Ends___________________________


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